

SOCIAL FORCES

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SOCIAL FORCES

December, 1942

REGIONALISM, SCIENCE, AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT*

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PROFESSOR ODUM'S syllabus of "A Sociological Approach to the Study and Practice of American Regionalism"¹ is of interest from many points of view. I shall forego the temptation to comment extensively on the details of this paper and confine myself instead to two implications of regionalism which I consider of fundamental importance: (1) Regionalism contemplates a broader and more integrated theoretical framework than has been customary for the study of social phenomena. "The regional approach," says Professor Odum, "also affords the best opportunity for the cooperation and coordination of all the social sciences attacking a problem and likewise for the cooperation of the physical sciences and the social sciences." (p. 432) (2) Regionalism as a method of approach in the social sciences and in public administration has immediate and pressing importance to practical problems of national and international scope.

While the following remarks represent to me

* This critique on regionalism by Professor Lundberg is the first of the series to be incorporated into a Source Book and Symposium on Regionalism. It is contemplated also that an early issue of *SOCIAL FORCES* will be devoted largely to the publication of other critiques by sociologists, including a summary of the criticisms of approximately one hundred sociologists who have examined critically the syllabus on "A Sociological Approach to the Study and Practice of American Regionalism," published in *SOCIAL FORCES*, May 1942. The symposium and source book will comprehend three main divisions of contributions. The first will have to do with theory; the second with the delineation of regions; and the third with regionalism in relation to planning. Seven or eight contributions will be devoted to the various concepts of world regions in relation to post-war reconstruction.—*Editors*.

¹ *Social Forces*, 20 (May 1942), 425-436.

some important theoretical and practical aspects of regionalism, I do not wish to imply that all regionalists necessarily share all of these views. Nor is it implied that the paper referred to or its author necessarily supports any or all of the views set forth below.

THE MEANING OF REGIONALISM

A great variety of regions have been designated by different people for different purposes. The geographer, the geologist, the meteorologist, and other scientists have delimited areas within which the behavior in which they are interested takes place. Professor Odum cites numerous examples of the designations which social scientists have made. The basis for the designation may be any social behavior whatever, from the circulation area of a newspaper, or the clientele of a telephone company, to an area of common economic interdependence, language, or religion. The point to note is that under this definition obviously there may be tremendous overlapping and interlacing of regions. Also, constant change—migration, appearance, disappearance—of regions of all sorts must be expected.

Regionalism, without further specification, might be assumed to be a study of regions in general—a sort of geometry or topology purporting to clarify and depict the properties of all kinds of regions, *per se*. That is, regionalism might suggest a discipline like some branches of mathematics. But this is clearly not what sociologists have in mind when they speak of regionalism. They mean by regionalism the study of segments of human social behavior with special reference to the geographic frame within which it occurs. A *region* in human sociology usually refers to the geographic area or space within which some speci-

fied interhuman behavior takes place with such a degree of homogeneity and distinctiveness as to permit a definite characterization of this area as distinguished from other areas. This broad and general meaning of the term *region* fails to discriminate, as Professor Odum very well has done, and as scientific work certainly requires, between the general category and its subdivisions such as *district, subregion, state, and zone*. I am concerned at present, however, only with the general concept.

Regionalism (in human sociology) refers, it seems to me, to any study of social behavior in which the emphasis is on the *relation* between the geographic area and the behavior in question. So understood, regionalism is a sort of world ecology, in that its interests extend to the functional, organic relationships *between regions* as well as between parts of each region. In this sense, any behavior whatever (social, physical, biological, etc.) can be studied from the regional point of view, because we think of all behavior as taking place in space. By "space" in this connection is usually meant geographic space. Elsewhere I have gone farther and pointed out that this is an unnecessary and unwarranted limitation inasmuch as human thinking on any subject tends to structure itself in spatial terms, and that expressions such as "social space" have precisely the same justification and "reality" as physical or geographic space.² I think this is of importance from certain theoretical and methodological points of view, but need not be elaborated upon in the present connection.

The use of *region* and *regionalism* as indicated above has given rise to some tortuous discussion as to whether these subjects are properly within the field of sociology, whether regionalism does not infringe upon the domain of geography, political science, public administration, etc. If, as stated above, we mean by regionalism the study of segments of social behavior with special reference to the geographic frame within which it occurs, then it is clearly sociology, and I would not worry about possible overlapping with certain other social sciences in either their pure or applied aspects. Political science, public administration, etc., are obviously specialized sociologies or social engineering techniques, just as bacteriology and medicine are respectively specialized biology and therapeutic art. As for geography, there is no more occasion

for confusion between it and sociology than there is for confusing meteorology, bacteriology, chemistry, or physics with sociology. All of them *can* be studied *with reference* to human social behavior. But when this is not the primary emphasis, we do not call them sociology. If some geographers become primarily interested in the human social aspects of geography they are sociologists, and I don't think we should let the accidents of university administration and departmentalization impose illogical classifications upon scientists and sciences. Far from spending time trying to rationalize some of these obsolete barriers, we should devote ourselves to breaking them down. The Unity of Science³ movement is the most promising influence in this direction, and as such, I think it is the most important intellectual movement in the world today. Since I conceive regionalism also to be a step in this direction, I should like to sketch some reasons for the above high estimate of this aspect of the matter.

REGIONALISM AND UNIFIED SCIENCE

Science made headway when it began to be recognized that the multiplicity of events in nature could be subsumed under a limited number of categories so abstractly defined as to permit individual phenomena of widely disparate character to be regarded as merely *special cases* of the phenomenon defined by a scientific term. The principle of parsimony requires that scientific theory constantly expand in this direction. Through this process the "physical" sciences have enormously reinforced each other and have achieved a coherence and compatibility which is notably lacking between the "physical" and the social sciences, as well as among the social sciences themselves.

That this split in our basic approaches to the physical and to the social worlds constitutes and causes the major maladjustments in modern human affairs has been recognized by the ablest thinkers for at least a century. Comte pointed out that the theological, the metaphysical, or the positive orientation "might alone secure some sort of social order; but while the three co-exist,

² *Foundations of Sociology* (New York: Macmillan, 1939), pp. 131, 263, 330, 477.

³ See the *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vols. 1 & 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). See also the excellent brief treatment of one aspect of the subject by E. F. Haskell, "The Religious Force of Unified Science," *Scientific Monthly* (June 1942), 546-551.

it is impossible for us to understand one another upon any essential point whatever."⁴ John Dewey, after diagnosing as the "outstanding problem of our civilization" the cleavage in thinking which "marks every phase and aspect of modern life: religious, economic, political, legal, and even artistic," comes to a similar conclusion. "The basic problem of present culture and associated living," he says, "is that of effecting integration where division now exists. The problem cannot be solved apart from a unified logical method of attack and procedure."⁵

Regionalism as a sociological theory aims definitely, it seems to me, at a higher integration of sociological theory with scientific theory in general. If so, regionalism cannot avoid (and indeed has not avoided) the problems of a common language with which to designate a whole world of new phenomena as being merely special cases of the general principles of natural science.

Consider, for example, the curious objection to a comprehensive regional approach in sociology on the ground that this is an organic or organismic "analogy."⁶ Why this fact should be considered objectionable is not so clear. The explanation seems to be somewhat as follows: Most sociologists learned in graduate school about the theories of Worms, Lilienfeld, Schäffle, Spencer, et al., and took voluminous notes on their professors' criticisms of these oversimplified and over-enthusiastic exploitations of the Darwinian upheaval. Now it happens that certain terms in a language may be equally valuable as descriptions of behavior, structure, and organization, regardless of the subject matter. If so, the use of such terms contributes notably to that parsimony of concepts which is everywhere recognized as one of the desirable and necessary requirements of scientific theory. Yet, on the basis of the conditioning described above, the employment of such terms in sociology (which has hitherto relied on theology and philosophy rather than on the other sciences for its vocabulary) operates as a sort of trigger to discharge needlessly both barrels of certain antiquated lecture notes compiled a generation ago to refute "the organic fallacy," "reduc-

tionism," "neo-Hegelianism," etc. The resulting verbal fog makes it practically impossible to direct attention to the fact that this type of criticism is totally irrelevant in connection with modern conceptions and definitions of "organismic," "symbiotic," "gradient," "equilibrium," "balance," and other words common in discussions of regionalism. The fact that these and any other terms, operationally defined, are also found useful in other sciences in no way implies that their use in sociology constitutes "mere analogy," "figures of speech," "forcing the data of sociology into the categories of other sciences," etc.

The idea that certain words "belong" in some mysterious sense to certain subject matters seems to have carried over to us from primitive people's conception of language. This is the more interesting in view of the fact that some of the most excited of the critics of the regionalist's use of "organic," "physical" terms have not hesitated themselves to draw on the other sciences for terms like "metabolism," "circulation," "power," etc. When these terms are defined as they are defined in other sciences, i.e., in terms of behavior (operations), such usage seems to me in every way desirable both in the interests of parsimony of concepts and as a step toward the unity of science. Nevertheless, the use in sociology of such concepts as "energy," "social atom," "mechanism," "field of force," etc., sometimes provokes some very remarkable brain-storms.

Take, for example, the agitation that has arisen in some quarters over the use in sociology of the word "force." Aside from the common folk-usage of this term in both physical and social science to mean merely "something that does something," the word is in sociology subject to rigorously operational definition of the type used to define the same phenomenon in physics. From this point of view "force" as defined and used in physics is merely a special case of a more general definition of "force" which would also include the sociological definition as another special case. For scientific purposes it is desirable that when terms used in one science are adopted also in another the operational definitions of the term in each field should be so similar as to justify using the same word to designate the phenomenon referred to. Dodd's definition of a societal force fulfills this requirement.⁷ When this requirement

⁴ *The Positive Philosophy* (Translated by H. Martineau, London, 1853), I, 15.

⁵ *Logic, The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Holt, 1938), pp. 78-79.

⁶ For a fuller discussion of this subject see my *Foundations of Sociology*, chaps. 5 and 6.

⁷ For example, since Newton a physical force has been defined in terms of its net effect, i.e., as the product

of definition is met there is no merit whatever in the contention that "foreign" terms are being "imported," categories of other sciences are being "forced" on sociology, etc. *Force* or *energy* is no more the property of any particular science than "power," "cycles," "mobility," "environment," or "change" are such property. When necessary we qualify these words with an adjective (e.g., business cycle, temperature cycle, etc.) to indicate which special case or class of phenomena we are dealing with. The alternative is to revert to the practice of primitive languages and adopt a separate word for every item (e.g., gray goose, gray horse, gray cow, etc., would require completely different words, there being no general designation of *gray*). It is precisely this tendency of increasing generality and abstractness and therefore inclusiveness of terms which characterizes scientific as compared with primitive, colloquial language. The general applicability in physical science of the concepts of physics is due entirely to the generality of the definitions of these concepts. Consider the following discussion of the meaning of "mass" in physics:

... When you measure mass, you measure not the amount of a stuff, but the amount of a change in the velocity of something. In other words, the mass of an

of a mass, moved a given distance at a given rate of change of speed. (The unit of physical force is the dyne, which is defined as one gram moved one centimeter per second per second.) The force of public opinion has been similarly defined by Dodd as follows: "For a force of public opinion, consider an attitude test (I) which yields a score reflecting the intensity of a person's feeling on some public issue, such as an immediate declaration of war on another nation. Suppose the war fever is rising and with the test repeated at monthly intervals the velocity of increasing war enthusiasm is measured; an overt act by the enemy which suddenly increases this velocity in one month, produces an acceleration. If instead of an average score the total score of all persons taking the attitude test is used, this sum of variable scores of P persons is equivalent to a product of P and a constant score (i.e., the average score). The acceleration of the total score, expressed in score units per month per month, is here one measure of the force of public opinion pushing that nation towards the war. Again the force varies with each of its three constituent factors: (a) the number of people stirred up, (b) the intensity of their feeling, and (c) the speed, or shortness of the time."—S. C. Dodd, *Dimensions of Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 742-43.

object is measured by the acceleration which a given defined event gives to that object. It will not do to say that the acceleration is an *indication of the mass* of the object; it *is* the mass of the object. To be even more brutal, the mass of an object is a number, and this number is obtained by measuring accelerations under certain conditions.*

The proposal to adopt or further to expand when necessary scientific concepts to include also social phenomena causes resistance and confusion only when someone attaches primitive and obsolete meanings to scientific terms as, for example, imagining *force* or *energy* to mean colored liquid or gas that comes in jugs or tanks, or some equally childish conception. I am sure those who worry unduly about applying common categories to data which vary widely in some respects, would have objected strenuously to Newton's "analogy" (1) in attributing to gravity *both* the fall of an apple *and* the courses of the stars. Yet all the "physical" sciences have done very well with this "figure of speech."

The best evidence of the desirability of increasingly broad but definite concepts in sophisticated discussion is perhaps found in the terminology which sociologists have developed by common consent. Take a word like *tension*. It is used in physics (cables, etc.), physiology, and psychology (e.g., of nerves) and with reference to group situations. No "misleading analogy" whatever is involved. Each is a *special case* of tension, which is a behavior term or observation category not confined to any particular subject matter. Consider likewise terms like change, velocity, acceleration, attraction, repulsion as they may be used in sociology and as they are defined in *modern* science. No analogy or reduction whatever is implied when we use these terms in sociology. Contrary assumption flows from mistaken notion as to definitions of such terms in recent physics. We achieve the unity of science not by reducing one science to another but by providing a common language for all science.

Fortunately, there are signs of a breakdown of the traditional provincialism of the social sciences. The University of Chicago has taken organizational steps for the specific purpose of unifying scientific theory in the establishment of an Interdivisional Committee on Unified Science and the support of a special nondivisional fellowship.

* J. A. Gengerelli, "Facts and Philosophers," *Scientific Monthly* (May, 1942), pp. 438-439.

Also, a volume is announced on *Levels of Integration in Biological and Social Systems*⁹ by prominent anthropologists, sociologists, zoologists, ecologists, and biologists. It is my considered judgment that there is more hope for scientific sociological theory in efforts of this kind than in burrowing into the "history of social thought." Regionalism is a step in the direction of this highly desirable integration.

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF REGIONALISM

The above argument is no mere exercise in logic. The practical significance of the position is as great as its theoretical importance. The estimates of the problem by Comte and Dewey quoted above have quite as direct reference to current social problems as to the advancement of science. The position discussed above is not a matter of mere preference in words. Words and their manipulation and meanings constitute the thoughtways and influence the technique ways, the state ways, and every aspect of social behavior. People whose thoughtways are contradictory or incompatible are schizophrenic and are unable to behave consistently and intelligently in the face of many situations with which they must deal. To be specific, it does make a practical difference whether we think and talk about the war in terms of physical and cultural regionalism or in terms of good men, bad men, right-wrong, and the whole moralistic, legalistic approach which this terminology implies.

It is hardly necessary to cite authority or to elaborate upon a diagnosis the concrete evidences of which are on the front page of every newspaper. To what extent were the principles of regionalism taken into consideration in the Versailles settlement? To what extent are these principles likely to receive consideration in the settlement at the close of the present war? Here is a dilemma of colossal proportions: *Suppose* that the application of sound principles of regionalism to Europe, including such factors as size and ethnic composition of population, technological development, natural resources, etc., dictates in the peace settlement that the defeated powers should have substantial territorial concessions of the type for which they have been fighting. Will it not be politically impossible for the victorious powers to make the settlement which is dictated by the most

indisputable principles of regionalism, anthropology, and sociology? Will it not be impossible because (1) no considerable part of the population is as yet accustomed to thinking of international settlements in these terms, and (2) the constituents of the peacemakers, especially in relatively democratic countries, will demand a settlement in the romantic terms in which the war has been carried on—"freedom," "democracy," "self-determination," "justice," and the whole legalistic, moralistic frame of reference. The trouble with these terms is that they are devoid of objective meaning, especially as applied to international affairs, since there is as yet no international society to give them meaning. We have here only another projection of primary group ideals upon an international situation to which they are grossly inapplicable. Regional principles, on the other hand, recognize the realities of the larger situation and attempt to deal with them. The dilemma outlined above can be resolved only by the adoption of a realistic scientific approach of the type that has been found of revolutionary efficacy in the fields where it has been tried.

If the impasse reviewed above seems an unduly pessimistic view of the present situation, I should like to quote the recent remarks of a former member of our diplomatic corps and an author widely applauded in high government circles:¹⁰

To me it seems that we are not justified in doing anything to the German people in the way of punishment. . . . I would haul out trucks, commandeer supplies of metals and machinery, take up strategic railroad tracks. I would redraw future boundary lines so that the coal and ore fields in the east and west would lie outside the boundary of the Reich. I would supervise the ports and the frontiers so that war-essential machinery and metals would not enter the Reich. This is perfectly feasible, practically possible. Such a policy would force the Germans to devote their entire energies to tilling the land to raise adequate supplies of food to keep themselves alive.

Students of regionalism should find food for thought in the above proposal, both as a practical program and as a type of thinking.

Another illustration of the results of intruding extra-regional considerations (in this case "balance" of political power) into the post-war settlement are the tentative proposals of N. J.

¹⁰ Douglas Miller, "Achilles Heel of Nazi Germany," *New York Times Magazine* (Aug. 24, 1941), p. 22. (Author of *You Can't Do Business With Hitler*.)

⁹ Edited by Robert Redfield (Lancaster, Pa.: The Jacques Cattell Press, 1942).

Spykman.¹¹ Lest it be assumed that this illustration is of the type given above, it should be emphatically said that Spykman's study is one of the ablest regional studies of the contemporary scene that has yet appeared. In justice to the author, also, it should be admitted that he recognizes the difficulties his proposal involves and he suggests alternatives. Confronted with the necessity of a territorial division of Europe to satisfy the balance of power requirements anent the Western Hemisphere, Spykman says:

The [German] plan is to achieve for Germany, in the western half of the Old World, a position similar to that which the United States enjoys in the New World—possession of the northern continent, the European land mass, control of the middle sea between Europe and Africa, and hegemony over the southern continent. . . . (p. 121)

A federal Europe would constitute an agglomeration of force that would completely alter our significance as an Atlantic power and greatly weaken our position in the Western Hemisphere. If the peace objective of the United States is the creation of a united Europe, she is fighting on the wrong side. All-out aid to Mr. Hitler would be the quickest way to achieve an integrated transatlantic zone.

If the interests of the United States demand the prevention of a federal Europe, they also demand the prevention of the establishment of hegemony over Europe by one or two states. . . .

The greatest difficulty will be that of balancing Germany and Russia. . . . The easiest solution would be to give them a common frontier. But if this should prove impossible, then the political unit between them should be a great eastern European federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, not a series of small buffer states. . . . It is possible to conceive of several different combinations in addition to an eastern European federation, such as a British-Scandinavian group around the North Sea and the Baltic, and a Latin group around the Mediterranean. (pp. 466-467)

One wonders how all of the above proposals, as well as numerous others that have been suggested, would fare if Odum's proposed indices were applied to them to determine to what extent they are really organic regions for any purpose whatsoever. It is conceivable (to follow out the comparison of the positions of Germany and the United States) that a federation of Canada, Mexico, and Central American countries, supported by ample military power from abroad,

¹¹ *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

might prevent our domination of the Western Hemisphere. The picture, however, is hardly convincing or inspiring from the regional or any other point of view.

The basic postulate of regionalism is that in human society, as in any organic entity, some parts belong together in the sense that normal functioning otherwise is impossible either for the parts or for the whole. To determine where these "natural" boundaries run is unquestionably the major task of the regionalist. Odum's suggestions for the development of reliable indices of relevant cultural and physical factors and their combination into composite indices is undoubtedly the proper approach to this problem.¹²

Another approach of great interest and possible significance is that of G. K. Zipf,¹³ who concludes on the basis of considerable data that there is an optimum and, within limits, a necessary ratio or symmetry in the relative sizes of communities in any functional region ("society"), radical departure from which results in social tensions and ultimate disintegration. Zipf has also advanced a reasonable theory to explain his empirical findings. I have the impression that the unpopularity of the implications of Zipf's work with reference to the present world situation (as well as the author's comments on the current political situation in the United States) has caused scientists to neglect or avoid, in favor of minor valid criticisms, the main challenge of his work.¹⁴ Are the

¹² *Op. cit.*, pp. 433-444.

¹³ G. K. Zipf, *National Unity and Disunity* (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1941).

¹⁴ A recent reviewer (*A. J. S.*, Sept., 1942, pp. 285-87) finds Zipf's book "dangerous" and that it "coincides closely with Axis publicity designed for consumption in the United States." The injection of such considerations into the judgment of research findings strikes a disagreeably foreign note and will be deplored, I think, by all open-minded scholars. The question of whether there is some relationship between the relative sizes of urban communities in a society and the social and political equilibrium of that society would seem to be a permissible subject for investigation. Any regularity or consistency found is of interest and possible significance, whether it be a harmonic sequence or some other. It is of no scientific relevance whether research findings are "dangerous," and whether they conform to unpopular political faiths. We are interested only in whether the facts are as alleged. The same reviewer declares the principal theorem of Zipf's work to be "a bluff." It may be, and if so I shall be as delighted as anyone to see that fact demon-

empirical facts and the relationships as set forth by Zipf actually so, or are they not? If his findings are corroborated, the implications for social science, regionalism, national, and international affairs are of vast importance. Zipf's analysis must either be refuted or reckoned with.

My main theme in this paper has been that in our present schizoid culture the scientifically advisable may be the politically impossible. This impasse arises from the fundamental split in our thinking about social as contrasted with "physical" problems. The postulates, the logic, the methods and the language we use in formulating our adjustment to the two worlds are incompatible, incongruous, and contradictory. This state of affairs exists because even social scientists have not as yet themselves fully decided whether or not to take an all-out natural-scientific view of the phenomena with which they deal, or what is worse, seem to have a very mistaken conception of what the latter position involves.¹⁵ While paying much lip-service to science, they are quite sure that social phenomena are "different." They are fond of pointing out that while there is uniformity in "nature," "history does not repeat

itself." A little examination of this cliché will reveal that those who resort to it are looking in history for a type of repetition which in fact occurs nowhere in nature.

In the first place, the events with which all science deals are necessarily historical, and we are fully convinced that "natural" history does repeat itself. The seasons follow each other unfailingly, as do storm and sunshine, and all the processes of chemistry and biology. It seems to have been overlooked that these events are "repetitious" solely by virtue of the fact that we have defined them sufficiently abstractly so that the vast multiplicity and variety of the individual events permit their classification as special cases of the category defined. Such categories have as yet been inadequately developed for the social history of human beings. Historians have instead, to a considerable extent, conceived it to be their function to *record* and *name* individual events, to moralize about them, and to point out how "different," "complex," and inscrutable they are. That *these individual events* do not repeat themselves is unquestionably true. Neither do seasons nor thunderstorms "repeat themselves" in this sense. Only by defining "thunderstorm" in highly abstract terms, and by agreement to classify as "thunderstorms" all events possessing certain limited, stipulated characteristics, do we arrive at the conclusion that thunderstorms "repeat themselves." The fact that no two are alike in hundreds of *other, additional* respects, is not considered relevant. Yet it is precisely these irrelevant "differences" in social events which cause us to conclude that "history" does not repeat itself. Anthropology and sociology are fortunately gradually correcting this impression. The laws of culture will be statements of how history repeats itself. The principles of demography and regionalism are perhaps among the best established of these generalizations.

strated. The reviewer in question certainly does not demonstrate it. He states that "the harmonic sequence of community size is not convincing even for 1940 in the United States." Just how this constitutes a refutation is not clear, since Zipf's figures show, and his thesis contends, only that under certain conditions is the harmonic series approached. To the extent that these conditions were not present in this country in 1940, the reviewer's facts support rather than refute Zipf's thesis. In the absence of more adequate refutation, the reader will draw his own conclusion as to whether it is the book or the review which is a bluff.

¹⁵ For a striking recent demonstration of this, see Ludwig Mises, "Social Science and Natural Science," *Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence* (April 1942), pp. 240-253.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE FASCIST MOVEMENTS*

TALCOTT PARSONS

Harvard University

THE older type, especially of European, social theory was, very largely, oriented to the understanding, in broad terms, of the social situation of the writer's own time. Whatever was sound in these older attempts, as of a Comte, a Spencer or a Marx, tended to be so intimately bound up with scientifically dubious elements of grandiose speculative construction and methodological assumption and dogma that the whole genus of analysis has tended to become discredited as a result of the general reaction against speculative theories.

In the course of such reactions it is not uncommon for the baby to be thrown out with the bath, for elements of sound insight and analysis to be lost sight of through their seemingly inseparable involvement with these other elements. Perhaps in the last few years more strongly than at any other time have there been signs that warrant the hope of an ability in the social sciences to apply generalized theoretical analysis to such problems in a thoroughly empirical, tentative spirit which will make possible a cumulative development of understanding, relatively unmarred by scientifically irrelevant or untenable elements. The very breadth of the problem of diagnosis of the state of a great civilization creates a strong demand for such a method.

Perhaps the most dramatic single development in the society of the Western world in its most recent phase has been the emergence of the great political movements usually referred to as "Fascist." In spite of their uneven incidence, with Germany and Italy by far the most prominent centers, and their varying character in different countries, there is sufficient similarity to justify the hypothesis that the broad phenomenon is deeply rooted in the structure of Western society as a whole and its internal strains and conflicts. However much my own approach may turn out to differ from the Marxian this much must certainly be granted the latter—that it does relate Fascism

to fundamental and generalized aspects of Western society.

As a starting point for the present analysis perhaps the common formula of characterization as the "radicalism of the right" is as satisfactory as any. It has at least the virtue of calling attention to two important points. In the first place Fascism is not "old conservatism" of the sort especially familiar before 1914, although elements which were once conservative in that sense have often been drawn into the Fascist movements. Secondly, it is definitely of the "right" in that it is specifically oriented in opposition to the political movements of the "left," notably of course communism.

Perhaps the most important reason why we are justified in speaking of "radicalism" lies in the existence of a popular mass movement in which large masses of the "common people" have become imbued with a highly emotional, indeed often fanatical, zeal for a cause. These mass movements, which are in an important sense revolutionary movements, are above all what distinguishes fascism from ordinary conservatism. They are movements which, though their primary orientation is political, have many features in common with great religious movements in history, a fact which may serve as a guide to the sociological analysis of their origins and character.

A second important feature is the role played by privileged elite groups, groups with a "vested interest" in their position. While from some points of view the combination of these two elements in the same movement is paradoxical, it will be argued here that it is of the very essence of the phenomenon and perhaps more than anything else throws light on the social forces at work.

It has come to be a well-known fact that movements of religious proselytism tend to develop in situations involving a certain type of social disorganization, primarily that early though only roughly characterized by Durkheim as "anomie." Anomie may perhaps most briefly be characterized as the state where large numbers of individuals are to a serious degree lacking in the kind of integra-

* Presidential Address, delivered before the Eastern Sociological Society, Asbury Park, N. J., April 25, 1942.

tion with stable institutional patterns which is essential to their own personal stability and to the smooth functioning of the social system. Of this there are in turn perhaps two principal aspects. In the first place there seems to be a deep-seated need for a relative stability of the expectations to which action is oriented. The aspect of this on which Durkheim lays primary stress is the sufficiently clear definition of the goals of action—there can, he says, be no sense of achievement in progress toward the realization of an infinite goal. But goals are, to a very large extent defined by institutionalized expectations. This Durkheim illustrated by the inability of indefinite increase of wealth, once cut loose from definite standards, to satisfy ambition.

Similar considerations apply to other aspects of conduct. Expectations cannot be stable if the standards with which conformity is demanded are left so vague as not to be a real guide, or if the individual is subjected, in the same situation, to two or more conflicting expectations each of which advances claims to legitimacy which cannot be ignored.

The second, it would seem somewhat more difficult and complex aspect, lies in the need for a sufficiently concrete and stable system of symbols around which the sentiments of the individual can crystallize. In many different aspects of life highly concrete associations are formed which perhaps in many cases have no great intrinsic importance in themselves, but in that they become stabilized and perpetuated through a living social tradition perform a highly important function in integrating social groups and in stabilizing the orientation of individuals within them.

The general character of the typical reaction of the individual to anomie is that usually referred to in psychological terms as a state of insecurity. The personality is not stably organized about a coherent system of values, goals, and expectations. Attitudes tend to vacillate between indecision which paralyzes action—and all manner of scruples and inhibitions—and on the other hand compulsively “overdetermined” reactions which endow particular goals and symbols with an excess of hatred, devotion or enthusiasm over what is appropriate to the given situation. Generalized insecurity is commonly associated with high levels of anxiety and aggression, both of which are to an important extent “free-floating” in that they are not merely aroused in appropriate form and in-

tensity by fear or anger-provoking situations but may be displaced onto situations or symbols only remotely connected with their original sources.

The present formulation of the psychological correlates of anomie has consciously adhered to the level closest to the more general character of social situations—lack of definition of goals and standards, conflicting expectations, inadequately concrete and stable symbolization. I am well aware that many psychologists find the deepest sources of insecurity to lie in the relations of the individual to his parents and others in the family in early childhood. The two approaches are by no means necessarily in conflict. There is much evidence that insecurity developed in adults from the sources here indicated affects their relations to their children and in turn the character formation of the latter, so that a cumulative vicious circle may work itself out.

An increase in anomie may be a consequence of almost any change in the social situation which upsets previous established definitions of the situation, or routines of life, or symbolic associations. To be sure, the members of some societies have average character types which are better able to withstand and adapt to rapid changes than are others—but in any case there is a limit to the extent and rapidity of change which can take place without engendering anomie on a large scale. There is ample evidence that the period immediately preceding our own time was, throughout the Western world, one of such rapid and fundamental change as to make this inevitable.

It was, in the first place, the period of the Industrial Revolution which, though going much farther back in history, tended cumulatively to gain in force throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. Though in widely differing degrees, most Western countries changed from predominantly agricultural to industrial and commercial societies, a change impinging not only on occupation but on the life of very large numbers of the population in many different aspects, especially in the tremendous growth of cities and the continual introduction of new elements into the standard of living.

Secondly, and intimately connected with this, the society has been subjected to many other influences adversely affecting situational stability. Migration of population from the rural areas to the growing urban concentrations has been only one phase of a tremendous and complex migration

process which has necessitated the complex process of adaptation to new social environments—sometimes, as in the great bulk of immigration into the United States, assimilation to a drastically different cultural tradition with exposure to conflicting expectations and discrimination on ethnic lines. A somewhat different source of strain lies in the instability of the new economy—the exposure to cyclical fluctuations with unemployment and rapid and drastic changes in the standard of living. Inflation and many of the social and economic effects of war fit into the same general pattern.

Though it is perhaps more significant as a consequence of than as a causal factor in anomie, the fact is relevant that not only in women's dress but in any number of other fields our society is to a very high degree subject to rapid and violent changes of fad and fashion. No sooner have we become attached to a pattern than its social prestige melts away leaving the necessity to form a new orientation. This is especially true in the recreational and other expressional fields, but applies also to political and cultural ideas, and to many fields of consumption patterns.

Finally, the cultural development of the period has been preeminently one to undermine simplicity and stability of orientation. It has been to an extraordinary extent a period of the "debunking" of traditional values and ideas, and one in which for previously stable cultural patterns in such fields as religion, ethics, and philosophy, no comparably stable substitutes have appeared—rather a conspicuously unstable factionalism and tendency to faddistic fluctuation. Part of the situation is an inevitable consequence of the enormous development of popular education, and of the development of mass means of communication so that cultural influences which in an earlier time reached only relatively small "sophisticated" minorities now impinge upon a very large proportion of the total population.

Returning for a moment to the psychological level of consideration, one of the most conspicuous features of the present situation lies in the extent to which patterns of orientation which the individual can be expected to take completely for granted have disappeared. The complexity of the influences which impinge upon him has increased enormously, in many or most situations the society does not provide him with only one socially sanctioned definition of the situation and

approved pattern of behavior but with a considerable number of possible alternatives, the order of preference between which is by no means clear. The "burden of decision" is enormously great. In such a situation it is not surprising that large numbers of people should, to quote a recent unpublished study,¹ be attracted to movements which can offer them "membership in a group with a vigorous *esprit de corps* with submission to some strong authority and rigid system of belief, the individual thus finding a measure of escape from painful perplexities or from a situation of *anomie*."

Thus the large-scale incidence of anomie in Western society in recent times is hardly open to doubt. This fact alone, however, demonstrates only susceptibility to the appeal of movements of the general sociological type of fascism but it is far from being adequate to the explanation of the actual appearance of such movements or above all the specific patterns in terms of which they have become structured. It is this latter problem which must next be approached.

The state of anomie in Western society is not primarily a consequence of the impingement on it of structurally fortuitous disorganizing forces though these have certainly contributed. It has, rather, involved a very central dynamic process of its own about which a crucially important complex of factors of change may be grouped, what, following Max Weber, may be called the "process of rationalization." The main outline of its character and influence is too familiar to need to be discussed in detail—but it must be kept clearly in mind as a basis for the subsequent analysis.

Undoubtedly the most convenient single point of reference is to be found in the patterns of science. The development of science is itself of course inherently dynamic and has a certain immediate effect in progressively modifying traditional conceptions of the empirical world. It is, however, its application in technology which provides the most striking source of cumulative social change, profoundly affecting the concrete circumstances of men's lives in a multitude of ways. Again it is not only that the explicit formal content of occupational roles is affected—this is the center from which many complex ramifications of change radiate into the informal and symbolic areas of men's working lives, and into their private lives

¹ Theodore W. Sprague, *Jehovah's Witnesses: "a Study in Group Integration."* Dissertation, Harvard University, 1942.

through changes in their patterns of consumption, recreation, etc. Whatever the positive value of the changes, they always involve an abandonment of traditional orientation patterns, circumstances and definitions of the situation which necessitates a process of readjustment.

Though by no means simply an aspect of science and its application in technology a second dynamic complex is intimately related to it. It may be characterized as the treatment of a wide range of action patterns and contexts of human relationship in terms of orientation to relatively specific and limited goals. Perhaps the classic center of the complex is the field of "contractual" relationships, and its formulation at the hands of such theorists as Spencer and Tönnies provides the classic sociological characterization. Contractualism overlaps widely with the use of money and the wide extension of market relationships. This involves the enormous extension of the mobility of elements essential to coordinated human action and the extension of the possibility of focussing elements from many sources on the realization of a single goal. Codification and systematization of personal rights and individual liberties is another essential aspect as is the clear development of the modern institution of ownership in the sphere of property. The question of where ownership is lodged is not the primary issue—but rather the concentration of the various rights which taken together we call ownership into a single bundle rather than their dispersion; and by the same token their segregation from the other elements of the status of their holder.

By no means the least important element of this complex is the patterning of functional roles primarily about their functional content itself with clear segregation from other elements of the total social status of the individual—in kinship, local ties, even to a considerable extent social class and ethnic adherence. Though prominent in the case of independent roles such as those of private professional practice this patterning of functional roles is most prominent in the field of large-scale organization, indeed without it the latter as we know it would scarcely be conceivable at all.

The interdependence between the complex of science and technology on the one hand, and that just discussed on the other is exceedingly close. Some schools of thought, as of Veblen and Ogburn, give the former unquestioned primacy. This is at least open to serious question since it is only in

relatively highly developed stages of the patterning of functionally specialized roles that the most favorable situation for the functioning of scientific investigation and technological application is attained. Less directly the mobility of resources through property and market relations, and the institutions of personal freedom all greatly facilitate the influence of science on social life.

Finally, science itself is a central part of the cultural tradition of our society. As such it is perhaps the most conspicuous embodiment of the more general pattern which may be called that of "critical rationality," differing from others primarily in the place accorded to the canons of empirical observation and verification. This same spirit of critical rationality has to an increasing extent ramified into many or even most other areas of the cultural tradition.

Notably of course it has permeated philosophical thought and the religious traditions of the various branches of Christianity. In this direction two consequences above all have appeared—the questioning of the cognitive status of the "non-empirical" elements of philosophical and religious thought, and the tendency to eliminate patterns and entities of primarily symbolic significance. The use of the categories of "ignorance" and "superstition" as sufficient characterizations of all thought not in conformity with the particular rational or pseudo-rational standards of the moment is an indication of the basic attitude.

The present concern is not whether the patterns of rationality in these different areas are in some sense superior to those they have tended to supplant, but rather the relation of their relatively rapid process of development to the functioning of the social system. It should be clear that their development is in itself perhaps the most important single source of anomie. Its significance in this respect is by no means simple and cannot be adequately analyzed here. It is partly a matter of the sheer rapidity of the process, which does not provide an opportunity for stable reorientation. Another aspect is the unevenness and incompleteness of its incidence so that it engenders conflicts in the social pressures impinging on the same groups and as between different groups. There is also the question whether, to balance its undermining effect on traditional patterns and values, it succeeds in providing even for the groups most thoroughly permeated, functionally adequate substitutes.

But beyond the significance as a source of temporary or permanent anomie, the process of rationalization has a further significance of crucial interest here. It is to it that we must look for the primary explanation of the structuring of attitudes and social organization so far as it can be treated as a response to the generalized condition of anomie. This question will have to be discussed on two primary levels, first that of the cognitive definition of the situation, second that of the differential affective appeal of the competing definitions of the situation which have come to be available.

The process of rationalization would scarcely have been of profound social importance if it had not affected large numbers of people in the immediate circumstances of their daily lives. But as an essential part of the same general cultural movement there has developed a tradition of "social thought" which, in a sufficiently broad perspective, can be seen to be highly distinctive in spite of its internal complexity. It has provided, above all, two interrelated things, a diagnosis of the status of the society—particularly in relation to the traditional patterns and structures with which the process of rationalization has stood in conflict, and a frame of reference for determining the proper attitudes of "reasonable" men toward the social problems of the day. Its functioning as the "ideology" of social and political movements is a natural consequence. In a very broad sense it is the ideological patterns of the movements of the "left" which are in question.

Such a tradition of thought is inevitably compounded of various different elements which today we find it convenient to distinguish. In the first place, there are certain elements of genuine scientific insight which by contrast with previous stages may be considered new. Undoubtedly the "utilitarian" pattern of analysis of the division of labor and exchange and the corresponding analysis of the functioning of a system of competitive market relationships—in short the "classical economics"—is largely in this category. With the shift on this level from "economic individualism" in the direction of socialism, especially Marxism, certain changes of emphasis on different factors have occurred but a fundamental constancy of cognitive pattern, the "utilitarian," has remained.

From the perspective of a later vantage point we can now see that in spite of the undoubtedly sound elements there have from a scientific point of view been certain shortcomings in this scheme of

thought. Attention has been concentrated on one sector of the total structure of a social system—that of contract, exchange, monetary transactions—and others such as family life have been neglected. But even within the area of focussed attention the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" has, understandably enough, played a prominent role. The prominent patterns of thought have, that is, been inadequately placed in perspective and integrated with other elements of a total social system.

The scientifically relevant element has, at the same time, been closely related to certain patterns of value orientation—with both a positive and a negative aspect. In one connection the new social thought expressed a revolt against the old order and a rationalization or justification of the changes introduced by the process of rationalization. Its primary targets of attack have been traditionally established statuses of prestige, authority and privilege and the traditionalized patterns themselves which have been integrated with these. Positively, the rights of the individual both as against other human agencies and as against tradition itself have provided the main focus. A fundamental trend toward egalitarianism has also been prominent. Broadly the pattern can be described as one of "emancipation" from the control of forces without rational sanction, from unjust authority, from monopoly and competitive privilege, from the "tyranny" of ignorance and superstition.

Finally, apart both from questions of science and of ethical value the tendency has, it has been noted, been to extend patterns of rationality into the metaphysical realm. Science has been taken as the prototype of all sound cognitive orientation and all elements of tradition not scientifically defensible have tended to be "debunked." Here of course traditional religion has been the primary object of attack.

In the earlier phases of its development this scheme of thought overwhelmingly embodied positive value attitudes. It defined the situation for the emergence and establishment of a new and magnificent social order, for freedom against tyranny, for enlightenment against ignorance and superstition, for equality and justice against privilege, for free enterprise against monopoly and the irrational restrictions of custom.

Gradually, however, with the growing ascendancy of the associated patterns, in certain directions certain elements of the scheme of thought

have with altered emphasis and formulation come to be built into a pattern embodying quite different value attitudes. This has centered primarily on the developed system of emancipated and rationalized economic organization. The liberation of free enterprise from the tyranny of monopoly and custom has, it is said, led only to the system of capitalistic exploitation. The "profit motive" has become the object of deep reproach. Inequality, unemployment, and new forms of unjust privilege have been brought into the limelight. Political liberation from the tyrannical Bourbons has led only to a new enslavement under the "executive Committee of the Bourgeoisie."

This new negative orientation to certain primary aspects of the maturing modern social order has above all centered on the symbol of "capitalism," which in certain circles has come to be considered as all-embracing a key to the understanding of all human ills as Original Sin once was. But it is important to note that the main intellectual movements within which this has developed have retained, even in an extreme form, the rationalized patterns in other connections, particularly in attitudes toward ignorance and superstition—lurking behind which economic interests are often seen—and many other symbolic and unrationalized patterns of thought and social behavior. What in terms of the recent situation is "leftist" social thought is overwhelmingly "positivistic" as well as utilitarian.

With the wisdom of hindsight, it can now be clearly seen that this rationalistic scheme of thought has not been adequate to provide a stably institutionalized diagnosis of even a "modern" social system as a whole, nor has it been adequate to formulate all of the important values of our society, nor its cognitive orientation to the world. It has been guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness in neglecting or underestimating the role of what Pareto has called the "non-logical" aspects of human behavior in society, of the sentiments and traditions of family and informal social relationships, of the refinements of social stratification, of the peculiarities of regional, ethnic or national culture—perhaps above all of religion. On this level it has indeed helped to provoke a most important "anti-intellectualist" reaction.

On another level it has "debunked" many of the older values of our cultural tradition, and above all the cognitive patterns of religion, to a point well beyond that to which common values and symbols in the society had moved. Even

apart from questions of its metaphysical validity it cannot be said adequately to have expressed the common orientations of the members of the society.

But on top of these inherent strains a crucial role has been played by the emergence within the rationalized cultural tradition itself of a definition of the situation which has thoroughly "debunked" many of the institutionalized products of the process of rationalization itself. Surely the stage was set for a combination of this definition of the situation with a reassertion of all the patterns which the utilitarian scheme had omitted or slighted—an acceptance of its own indictment but a generalization of the diagnosis to make "capitalism" appear a logical outcome of the whole process of rationalization itself, not merely of its perversion, and the fact that in certain directions it had not been carried far enough. By the same token it is possible to treat both capitalism and its leftist antagonists, especially communism, not as genuine antagonists but as brothers under the skin, the common enemy. The Jew serves as a convenient symbolic link between them.

This reaction against the "ideology" of the rationalization of society is one principal aspect at least of the ideology of fascism. It characteristically accepts in essentials the socialist indictment of the existing order described as capitalism, but extends it to include leftist radicalism and the whole penumbra of scientific and philosophical rationalism.²

The ideological definition of the situation in terms of which the orientation of a social movement becomes structured is of great importance but it never stands alone. It is necessarily in the closest interdependence with the psychological states and the social situations of the people to whom it appeals. We must now turn to the analysis of certain effects of the process of rationalization on this level.

The fundamental fact is that the incidence of the process within the social structure is highly uneven—different elements of a population become "rationalized" in different degrees, at different rates, and in different aspects of their personalities and orientations.

It may be said that both traditional and rationalized patterns are, to a high degree, genuinely

² I am aware of the importance of other aspects of the total fascist pattern such as its romanticism and a tendency to ethical nihilism, but cannot stop to analyze them here.

institutionalized in our society. Indeed the distinction is itself largely relative and dynamic rather than absolute, and both are functionally essential to an even relatively stable society. Some elements of the population are relatively securely integrated but with varying emphasis in one direction or the other. Thus the best integrated professional groups would lean in the rational direction, certain rural elements in the traditional.

This difference of incidence has important consequences on both the structural and the psychological levels. Structurally it differentiates the social system broadly along a continuum of variation from the most highly traditionalized areas which have been least touched by the more recent phases of the process of rationalization to the most "emancipated" areas which tend at least partly to institutionalize the most "advanced" of the rationalized patterns or those which are otherwise most thoroughly emancipated from the traditional background.

For these and other reasons certain areas of the social structure have come to stand out conspicuously. In the first place is the area of "intellectualism" emancipated from the patterns and symbols of traditional thought, secondly of urbanism, particularly on the metropolitan scale with its freedom from particularistic controls, its cosmopolitanism and general disrespect for traditional ties. Third is the area of economic, technological, and administrative rationalization in the market system and large-scale organization, especially toward the top, with its responsiveness to *ad hoc* situations and its relation to conflicting codes. Fourth is the area of "cultural" emancipation in literature and the arts with its high susceptibility to unstable faddism, and its association with bohemianism. Finally there is the moral emancipation of "Society" with its partial permeation of the upper middle class, the adoption of manners and folkways not in keeping with various traditional canons of respectability, all the way from women smoking to polite adultery.

The uneven incidence of these various forms of emancipation results in an imperfect structural integration with latent or overt elements of conflict and antagonism. These conflicts in turn readily become associated with the tensions involved in other structural strains in the society. In particular may be mentioned here first, the difficult competitive position of the lower middle class, near enough to the realization of success goals to feel their attraction keenly but the great

majority, by the sheer relation of their numbers to the relatively few prizes, doomed to frustration. Secondly, the particular strains in the situation of youth engendered by the necessity of emancipation from the family of orientation and exposure to the insecurities of competitive occupational adjustment at about the same stage of the life cycle, and third, the insecurity of the adult feminine role in our urban society.⁸

An element of at least latent antagonism between relatively emancipated and relatively traditionalized elements of the society would exist even if all its members were perfectly integrated with institutional patterns, if there were no anomie. But we have seen that anomie exists on a large scale. In relation to the above discussion, however, two principal foci, each with a tendency to a different structuring of attitudes need to be distinguished. On the one hand certain of the population elements involved in the spearheads of the processes of emancipation and rationalization are subject to a high incidence of it with its attendant insecurity. These elements tend to find the main points of reference of their orientations in the relatively well institutionalized rational and emancipated patterns—in science, liberalism, democracy, humanitarianism, individual freedom. But being insecure they tend to "overreact" and both positively and negatively to be susceptible to symbolizations and definitions of the situation which are more or less distorted caricatures of reality and which are overloaded with affect. Thus negatively the traditional order from which emancipation has been taking place is characterized overwhelmingly as embodying ignorance, superstition, narrow-mindedness, privilege, or, in the later stages, acquisitive capitalistic exploitation. On the positive side there has been not only a marked abstractness but also some form of naive rationalistic utopianism. The pattern tends to bear conspicuous marks of the psychology of compulsion. It is held that if only certain symbolic sources of evil like superstition, or privilege or capitalism were removed "everything would be all right" automatically and for all time. Indeed there is every reason to believe that the psychology

⁸ A colleague (E. Y. Hartshorne in an unpublished paper) has noted that in Germany the most conspicuous support of the Nazis came from the lower middle class, from youth, and from women. On the two latter factors see the author's paper "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States," *Amer. Social Review*, Vol. 7, No. 5, October, 1942.

of this type of insecurity has had much to do with the cognitive biases and inadequacies of utilitarian thought as sketched above. It has contributed largely to the currency of a definition of the situation which contains conspicuous elements of utopianism and of distorted caricature.

The other type of reaction has been prominent in those areas of the society where traditional elements have formed the institutionalized points of reference for orientation. There the principal sources of anomie have often been derived from situational factors such as technological change, mobility and ethnic assimilation with relatively little direct relation to rationalized ideological patterns. There insecurity has tended to be structured in terms of a felt threat to the traditionalized values. The typical reaction has been of an overdetermined "fundamentalist" type. Aggression has turned toward symbols of the rationalizing and emancipated areas which are felt to be "subversive" of these values. Naturally there has at the same time been an exaggerated assertion of and loyalty to those traditional values. The availability of ready-made caricatured definitions of the situation and extreme symbols has of course greatly facilitated this structuring. The use of such slogans as "capitalism," has made it possible to exaggerate the "rotteness" of the whole modern society so far as it has departed from the good old values.

In the complex process of interaction in Western society between imperfectly integrated institutional structures, ideological definitions of the situation, and the psychological reaction patterns typical of anomie, at a certain stage in the dynamic process of its development this new structured mass movement has come upon the scene and at certain points in the Western world has gained ascendancy. It is perhaps safe to conclude from the above analysis that its possibility is at least as deeply rooted in the social structure and dynamics of our society as was socialism at an earlier stage.

Before turning to another phase of the problem a word may be said about the role of nationalism in the present context. Though not, in terms of the "old regime," itself strictly a traditional value, the complex of sentiments focussing on national cultures has involved many of these traditionalistic elements—varying in specific content from one case to another. Every since the French Revolution a functional relationship between the rise of

nationalism and the process of rationalization has been evident—they have developed concurrently.

For a variety of reasons nationalistic sentiment has been perhaps the readiest channel for the fundamentalist reaction to flow into. The national state assumed great actual importance. The actual or potential enemy in the power system of states, differing in national tradition, has formed a convenient target for the projection of many aggressive affects. At the same time many of the emancipated areas of the social structure have been defined as "international" and could be regarded as subversive of national interest, honor, and solidarity. Finally, nationalism has been a kind of lowest common denominator of traditionalistic sentiments. Above all, the humblest insecure citizen, whatever his frustrations in other connections, could not be deprived of his sense of "belonging" to the great national community.

Undoubtedly one of the most important reasons for the different degrees of success of the fascist movement in different countries has lain in the differing degrees in which national traditions and with them pride and honor, have been integrated with the symbols of the rationalized patterns of Western culture. In the United States, on the one hand, the great national tradition stems from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century—liberty, democracy, the rights of the individual are our great slogans. A radically fundamentalist revolt would have to overcome the enormous power of these symbols. In Germany on the other hand the political symbols of a liberal democratic regime could be treated as having been ruthlessly imposed on a defeated and humiliated Germany by the alien enemy. National sentiments instead of being closely integrated with the existing regime could readily be mobilized against it.

The second important element of the fascist movements, that of "vested interests" can be much more briefly treated. It is one of the most fundamental theorems of the theory of institutions that in proportion to the institutionalization of any pattern a self-interest in conformity with it develops. Self-interest and moral sentiments are not necessarily antithetical, but may, and often do, motivate conduct in the same direction. Though this is true generally, it has a particularly important application to statuses involving prestige and authority in the social system. There, on top of the broader meaning of an interest in conformity, there is an interest in defending higher status and its perquisites against challenge from

less privileged elements. For this reason the reaction of privileged elements to insecurity is almost inevitably structured in the direction of an attitude of defense of their privileges against challenge. For the same reason any movement which undermines the legitimacy of an established order tends to become particularly structured about an overt or implied challenge to the legitimacy of privileged statuses within it.

Western society has in all its recent history been relatively highly stratified, involving institutionalized positions of power, privilege, and prestige for certain elements. In the nature of the case the sentiments and symbols associated with these prestige elements have been integrated with those institutionalized in the society as a whole. In so far, then, as the process of rationalization and other disorganizing forces have undermined the security of traditional patterns the status and the bases of the legitimacy of privileged elements have inevitably been involved. But in addition to this they have been affected by threats to the legitimacy and security of their own position in the social structure. This situation tends to be particularly acute since the process of more general change is regularly accompanied by a process of the "circulation of the elite."

It is in the nature of a highly differentiated social structure that such privileged elements should be in a position to exercise influence on the power relations of the society through channels other than those open to the masses, through political intrigue, financial influence, and so on. Hence, with the progressive increase in the acuteness of a generalized state of anomie it is to be expected that such elements, which have been privileged in relation to a traditional social order should, within the limits provided by the particular situation, develop forms of activity, sometimes approaching conspiratorial patterns, which in these terms may be regarded as a defense of their vested interests. Exactly what groups are involved in this phenomenon is a matter of the particular structural situation in the society in question.

The general phenomenon would seem to be clear enough. It is also not difficult to understand the tendency for elite elements whose main patterns go far back into the older traditional society to become susceptible to the fascist type of appeal—such as the landed nobility and higher clergy in Spain, or the Junker class in Germany. But there is a further complication which requires some comment.

The process of institutional change in the recent history of our society has brought to the fore elite elements whose position has been institutionalized primarily about the newer rationalized patterns. The most important are the business and professional elites. The latter are, except where radical fascist movements have immediately threatened to gain the ascendancy, perhaps the securest elite elements in the modern West.

The position of the business elite has, however, been much more complex. It gained for a time a position of great ascendancy, but for various reasons this rested on insecure foundations. With the "leftward" turn in the movement of ideology its position came under strong attack as the key element of capitalism. With its position thus threatened by the leftward sweep of the process of rationalization the legitimacy, the moral validity of its position was under attack, and its actual vested interests became less and less secure. From this point of view Fascism has constituted in one respect a continuation, even an intensification of the same threat. The threat has been made concrete by the rise to power of a new political elite with the means in hand to implement their threat.

At the same time fascism has seemed to stand, in the logic of the sentiments, for "sound" traditional values and to constitute a bulwark against subversive radicalism. Very concretely it has been instrumental in breaking the power of organized labor. At the same time on the level of power politics there has been a distinct area of potential mutual usefulness as between a political movement of the fascist type and entrenched business interests. This has been especially true because of the fascist tendency immediately to mobilize the economy in preparation for war.

The relation between fascism and vested interests in general may thus be regarded as a constant. In the case of the older traditional interests it is relatively unequivocal, but in that of business it is highly ambivalent. Especially where, as in Germany, business interests have not been closely integrated with strong liberal institutions the relationship has tended to be very close. But even there the movement can by no means be considered a simple expression of these vested interests and there are elements in the Nazi movement which may, in a certain state of the internal balance of power, turn out to be highly subversive of business.

In such brief space it has been possible to analyze only a few aspects of the very complex sociological problem presented by the fascist movement—the analysis is in no sense complete. But perhaps it will serve in a humble way to illustrate a direction in which it seems possible to utilize the conceptual tools of sociology in orienting ourselves, at least intellectually, to some of the larger aspects of the

tragic social world we live in. To consider the possibility of going farther, of predicting the probable social consequences, of possible outcomes of the war and considering what we can do about fascism in other than a strictly military sense would raise such complex issues even on the scientific level, that it is better not even to attempt to touch upon them here.

METHODS OF GEOPOLITICS

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THE German philosopher of "understanding," Wilhelm Dilthey, once remarked that the question whether a knife was likely to cut a cake could only be answered by actually cutting the cake with it. This remark comes to mind when dealing with the methods of Geopolitics as they have been employed by the school of Karl Haushofer in Germany. It is in the sense of Dilthey's remark that Rudolf Hess, while Karl Haushofer's assistant, once responded to a request for material on fascist ideology by quoting the then famous Italian dictum: "A Fascist acts first and thinks afterwards." Accordingly, methodological questions have not been stressed in geopolitical literature, so that conclusions as to the methodology of Geopolitics can be derived only through a good knowledge of the basic concepts in the field.¹

These basic concepts, to be sure, are not peculiar to German Geopolitics, but are shared by German historians and geographers on the one hand, and by students of Geopolitics outside Germany on the other. Yet German authors writing in the field have been foremost in giving these concepts a new and stimulating expression. This is especially true for the central concept of "Raum,"

standing as it does for a dynamic field of force in the sense of a functional interrelationship in space and time. Such a functional interrelationship stresses the whole as over against the sum and implies, as we might call it, a Gestalt-sociology as a conceptual frame. Hence, the concept of field as employed in a Gestalt-sociology differs from the physical concept of space inasmuch as it includes the time aspect in addition to the space aspect. But it also differs from the concept of the field as it is usually employed within an isolating and generalizing sociology.

As a rule, we tend to isolate certain facts and then to generalize upon them. If we ask a person about his "field," we expect him to designate it as physical geography, population, government, and so forth. If we have investigated, say, the imperial institutions of Japan, we like to dignify our scholarly efforts by labeling them a study in autocracy. Geopolitical writers as exponents of a Gestalt-sociology, on the other hand, believe that they choose a more natural field by directing their attention to Japan as a segregated and dynamic whole. They take into account physical geography, population, and government as interrelated parts of that whole, rather than as parts of physical geography, population, and government in general. It was only in this way, they would say, that an all-inclusive and hence realistic political science could emerge, which was to comprise all the social sciences upon a geographical foundation and in their political aspect.²

The methods of Geopolitics follow from this

¹ For an extensive bibliography of Haushofer see *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* (quoted as "Z. f. G.") 1929, II, 709. A shorter bibliography in English is contained in Charles Krczewski, "Germany's Lebensraum," *The American Political Science Review*, XXXIV: 5 (October, 1940), 964. A paper which I am preparing for the *American Journal of Sociology* will contain an additional bibliography. See also Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942).

² Rudolf Kjellen, *Der Staat als Lebensform* (Leipzig 1917).

all-inclusiveness of their general approach. While a mastery of techniques rather than of facts is thought to be essential in an isolating and generalizing sociology, a comprehensive knowledge of facts is presupposed as a basis for adequate judgment as soon as one deals with social phenomena in a unique field of force.

The knowledge of facts which is deemed to be indispensable in Geopolitics is derived from various sources: materials of physical and political geography; records and files of public offices and private institutions; statistics of all sorts of social data; and wide reading.³

To physical and political geography no detailed reference seems to be necessary, since a good account is available in Richard Hartshorne's *The Nature of Geography* and in his paper on "Recent Developments in Political Geography."⁴ Records and files are used according to the principles evolved by historians.

The kind of statistics employed by Geopolitics is in the first place population statistics. In that respect, as in many others, it follows Friedrich Ratzel, who devoted a whole section in the second volume of his *Anthropogeographie* to a discussion of "the statistical image of mankind."⁵ He defines population statistics geographically as presenting numerical data with regard to people who are living in a certain area. Geopolitics, in accordance with its general nature, goes a step farther by turning the static notion of Ratzel into a decidedly dynamic argument. It uses population statistics chiefly in support of the contention that the pressure of population in overcrowded areas represents the foremost problem of a realistic sociology in our time, and indeed in all times. Overpopulation, especially in Middle Europe and in the Far East, is contrasted with the lure of the wide open spaces upon this globe which are not sufficiently settled by those who own them at

present.⁶ In the second place, statistics of geographical and meteorological features, natural resources, industrial production, exports and imports, traffic facilities and movements, are used and published.

Before 1933, most of the material was provided by the *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* in Hamburg; while after 1933 the whole official and semi-official apparatus of the State and the Party, especially the consular offices and the organizations of Germans abroad, was put into the service of the Geopolitical Institute. However, in contradistinction to American usage, only the raw material of statistical data is presented for publication, and no attempt is being made in the way of refinement of the data.⁷

When it comes to reading, no restriction to purely scientific publications is imposed or even recommended. Bibliographies, book reviews, and general recommendations in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* as well as in the various works of Karl Haushofer contain also news reports, novels and essays, and, quite in keeping with the tradition of German Geography since the days of Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Ritter, a number of travel stories on foreign countries.⁸ Anthropological data are freely employed in books such as *Die Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, but field studies of the American type have been left to anthropologists proper; a special acknowledgment is made to the *Kulturkreislehre* of Leo Frobenius and

³ Josef Maerz in Karl Haushofer and Josef Maerz, *Geopolitik des Selbstbestimmungsrechts in Suedostasien* (Muenchen, 1923), p. 12.

⁴ Richard Hartshorne, "The Nature of Geography: A Critical Survey of Current Thought in the Light of the Past," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, XXIX, Nos. 3 and 4 (Lancaster, Pa., 1939). Richard Hartshorne, "Recent Developments in Political Geography," *The American Political Science Review*, XXIX, Nos. 5 and 6 (1935).

⁵ Friedrich Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*, II, 95.

⁶ As typical examples for statements which are repeated over and over again, see Karl Haushofer, "Suedasiens Wiederaufstieg zur Selbstbestimmung" in Haushofer and Maerz, *Geopolitik der Selbstbestimmung in Suedost-Asien* (Muenchen, 1923), p. 124; Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin, 1924), 267; *Grenzen in ihrer Geographischen und Politischen Bedeutung* (Berlin, 1927), p. 196; *Japan und die Japaner* (Leipzig, 1933), p. 217; "Grundlagen, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik" in *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin 1928), p. 39.

⁷ As an example, see the tables and remarks in Karl Haushofer, *Japan und die Japaner*, p. 235, in *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, *op. cit.*, p. 267, and in *Grenzen*, *op. cit.*, p. 17. See also K. Saenger, "Die Statistik im Rahmen der Geopolitik," *Z. f. G.*, I (1930), and Robert von Keller, "Totale Statistik," *Z. f. G.*, I (1938); also Heinrich Stande, "Die Welt jenseits der Grossmaechte im Licht der Statistik," in Karl Haushofer (ed.), *Macht und Erde*, II: *Jenseits der Grossmaechte* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1932).

⁸ Karl Haushofer, "Geopolitik und Presse," *Bausteine*, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

his Forschungsinstitut fuer Kulturmorphologie in Nymphenburg near Munich.⁹

In a special chapter on "Culture-Geography," Haushofer remarks that comparative culture-geographical data, although still (1924!) rather rare both for Europe and in the Pacific area, should none the less prove useful in ascertaining how far native cultures had developed at the moment when they met with white intruders. Geopolitics, he adds, is especially interested in symptoms of a renewed vitality of native populations as in the case of the Japanese after 1853, or the Maori of today.

The emphasis upon the dynamics of an area makes the constant perusal of newspapers and periodicals *de rigueur*. Accordingly, political pamphlets are included in a geopolitical reading list, and cartoons which previously had been published in English, Japanese, and other newspapers are frequently reproduced in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*. Special attention is given to the development of the radio and to television.

To combine the quick perception of a journalist with the discerning thoroughness of a scholar is deemed desirable for workers in the field. An intimate knowledge of foreign languages is implied: a reading knowledge of the Mediterranean languages (Latin, French, Italian, Spanish) and also English is supposed to be widespread among educated readers; and at least a general impression about the language and culture of various Slavic and Asiatic peoples is considered to be a wholesome addition. Karl Haushofer, himself specializing in the Far East, has a command of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Russian. He quotes Charles V. as saying that every new language he had mastered had presented him with a new life.¹⁰ This shows that language is conceived of as representative of cultural uniqueness rather than as a mere vehicle of communication. Language embodies the images which people have and which the geopolitical worker should "understand" so as to employ them for the sake of social and political control.

Field observation in an area of special interest follows as a final step upon the background of geographical, statistical, and linguistic studies and a

comprehensive general reading. Specialization, however, is not too far stressed. On the contrary, Haushofer emphasizes that the worker in the field should have personal knowledge of at least one area in addition to his home area or the area of his special interest and that this additional area should be altogether different from what he had been accustomed to elsewhere. It is urged, for instance, that those who have primarily worked in a continental region should try to acquaint themselves with a more oceanic outlook lest they expose themselves to a conscious or unconscious bias.¹¹

The methodological position of Geopolitics as a Gestalt-sociology may be inferred from the fact that it is a descriptive science. But being descriptive does not mean that it is nothing else, as Ratzel has already pointed out in his chapter on "Methods of Anthropogeography."¹² Adequate description includes a knowledge of related cases and thus invites classification and comparison.

In an early paper in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*, Max Spandau, a pupil of both Max Weber and Karl Haushofer, admits readily that general laws of nature, inasmuch as they occur in the field of geography as well as in the wider field of the social sciences, can and indeed must be described in logical or mathematical terms and under the presumption of a repetition of identical phenomena of causation.¹³ But he goes on to say that significant parts of the earth's surface could not be described in terms of these presumptions except in a very general way because the core of their more specific problems was marked by individualization. He considers Geography as subject to "historical" explanation in the sense in which this term has been used by H. Rickert, because, like history, it is concerned with "unique facts of existence." Accordingly, he believes that no general causal nexus should be implied in investigations which are made into historic or geographic individualities, because he regards the regularities which could be explained in this way as of no historical importance. Instead in "historical" studies, an attempt at a genuine historical explanation should be made, indicating that a unique complex of causes had brought forth a unique complex of facts in a unique field situation. In

⁹ Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 79, 291, 302; Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik der Selbstbestimmung*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

¹⁰ Karl Haushofer, "Grundlagen, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik," *Bausteine*, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 38.

¹¹ Karl Haushofer, "Grundlagen, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik," *Bausteine*, pp. 37-38.

¹² Friedrich Ratzel, *Anthropogeographie*, I, p. 57.

¹³ Max Spandau, "Staat und Boden," *Z. f. G.*, I, II (1925).

other words, the individuality of a regional or social situation could not be ascertained by means of a logical definition and upon a general principle, but only by a descriptive and comparative evaluation of changing objects of observation. "Climate, for instance, may be much more important in characterizing region A over against region C than in characterizing region B over against region C." Comparison, then, in a descriptive or historical science, takes the place which experiment holds in a correlative or mathematical science. It is in this sense that Herman Lautensach, coeditor of the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*, regards his study on *The Mediterraneans as Geopolitical Fields of Force* (*Die Mittelmeere als Geopolitische Kraftfelder*) as a typical example of the comparative method in Geopolitics.¹⁴ Quoting Ratzel, he asserts that Geopolitics was in a position to use the experiment which nature itself produces by causing similar events "to take place under changing conditions as to position, area, and other geographic features." He compares the Mediterranean proper with the Caribbean and the region of the Australasian archipelago, endeavoring to prove a coincidence of primary geographic features with political developments; while at the same time trying to show that secondary differences between these three "fields of force" accounted for "individual deviations." Karl Haushofer himself employs the technique of comparison in his writings, especially in the study on *The Unity of the Monsoon Countries* (*Die Einheit der monsunaender*) and in his book on *Grenzen*.

Obviously, flexibility is essential in the comparative method as employed in the social sciences in general and in geopolitical studies in particular. This is the reason why strictly dogmatic minds are not in a position to handle that method in a proper way. They are inclined to formulate laws say, of political development in a Mediterranean area. Hence they either twist the facts which they find in an area of comparison to suit their general Mediterranean formula, or, recognizing that the facts are different, may come out with the statement that there was no comparison whatsoever. It should be recognized that, *ex definitione*, no whole or Gestalt can be equal to any other whole or Gestalt; and that accordingly tendencies rather than laws are to be ascertained in a Gestalt-sociology. The character of these tendencies, to

be sure, limits the free play of intelligent social or political action within the framework of the "Raum" as a unique "field of force," and yet allows for a variety of possible modes of action within these limits. In short, a comparative regional study, as indeed any comparative study in the social sciences, if conducted along the line of Gestalt-sociology, results in a flexible manifestation rather than in a rigid application of a general tendency.¹⁵

An example of what we have in mind is Fritz Seidenzahl's study on "Tanger—ein Beitrag zum Wertbestimmung eines Platzes," published in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* in 1927.¹⁶ Using Rickert's dichotomy of nature and culture (or history), Seidenzahl distinguishes between the "natural, general and lasting effects" of a geographic position (or location) as playing upon the "historical, individual and temporary effects" of that position. The resulting "geohistorical effect" would then determine the amount of "political utility" which a place has; whereupon politics puts that "effect" into application and thus produces the "actual political value of the position in question." In the case of Tangier, then, the historical position of the place on the seaway to India does not necessarily follow from its natural geographic position on the entrance to narrow straits of navigation. A similar purely geographic position in the Arctic or Antarctic would obviously have been of no historic significance. And even the particular position of Tangier on the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar is dependent on the interplay of innumerable forces which, however, should be evident to the trained worker in the field. Hence, the political utility of Tangier is derived from a proper evaluation of all these forces. "Utility" indicates not a fact but only an opportunity, or, as Seidenzahl expresses it in the language of Max Weber, a chance. In other words, opportunity is one thing, but whether opportunity actually materializes upon the political scene is another. The conclusion of Seidenzahl's illuminating study is that political action, in his day, did not utilize or, as in the case of British policy in that region, did not want others to utilize, the political value which

¹⁴ Otto Anderle, "Landschaft-Raum-Schicksal," *Z. f. G.*, II (1937); Louis von Kohl, "Biopolitik und Geopolitik," *Z. f. G.*, I (1933); Max Spandau, *op. cit.*, *Z. f. G.*, I, II (1925).

¹⁵ Fritz Seidenzahl, "Tanger, ein Beitrag zur Wertbestimmung einer Platzes," *Z. f. G.*, I (1927).

¹⁶ Hermann Lautensach, "Die Mittelmeere als Geopolitische Kraftfelder," *Bausteine*, p. 171.

appears to be inherent in both the natural and the historical position of Tangier. Unfortunately, not all the authors whose contributions have been published in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* measure up to the methods to which they pay lip service. Too often facts are twisted, not so much because of dogmatism, but because of an overabundance of flexibility in the service of a conscious or unconscious political bias.

Verbal description in geopolitics is aided by illustrative maps, be they of an orographical, topographical, economic, cultural, or political character. Karl Haushofer advocates anthropogeographical maps, which would show "geopolitical points of gravity" by depicting racial, cultural, and other characteristics (such as linguistic features or the density of population) rather than the merely static political divisions of the earth's surface.¹⁷ Otto Maull makes a similar distinction between analytical maps of a more or less static character which are in the first place used in physical geography, and synthetic maps which try to depict "the state as a whole, as a living and expanding geographic unit," that has either a homogeneous or a polygeneous structure.¹⁸ Synthetic maps may be said to correspond to the Gestalt-sociological character of geopolitics, because they stress the dynamic wholeness of a region which otherwise is likely to remain hidden in the detail of analytical description. The very term "Gestalt," however, combining as it does the aspects of shape and personality into the concept of a living form, suggests a combination of geography and psychology; not only in the sense that geographic position is instrumental in bringing about a certain sociopsychological outlook, but also in the sense that psychological devices penetrate into geographic presentation.

Karl Haushofer calls this kind of a presentation, which considers the customer rather than the merchandise, a "suggestive map."¹⁹ He asserts, however, that the suggestive map has by no means originated in Germany. He refers, for instance, to Robert Louis Stevenson's paper "On Maps,"

published in the *Roy. Soc. Geographical Journal*, Volume V. He points out that German scholars such as G. Maerz had to defend the use of maps for political propaganda before their public as a "justifiable deviation"; whereas the same method had always appeared as a "matter of fact" to British authors and readers. He emphasizes a good map as an artistic rather than a scientific creation, necessarily tinged with subjectivity and dependent upon the life history of the artist. By dependence upon life history is indicated that the categories of a sociology of knowledge are to be applied to maps and charts as well as to words and letters; while by subjectivity reference is made to the individual capability and imagination of the artist.

Haushofer knows full well how dangerous an ally this subjectivity is, but he also asserts that it is inescapable anyway, and that only a greater or lesser amount of sincerity is displayed in owning up to it. He himself, to be sure, does not always own up to his subjectivity. Yet he is probably correct in saying that the concept of a suggestive map does not so much point to a lack of truthfulness but to a power of abstraction in underscoring the most striking features of a region or a movement. He refers to art as the ability to leave out the casual in order to save the essential, and he confesses repeatedly that he was considerably influenced in his view on maps by the technique of empty spaces as employed in ancient Chinese and Japanese painting.

But Haushofer was also influenced by another example and one much nearer home. It should be recognized that the trend toward a greater visibility of forces and ideologies in politics constitutes one of the foremost features of advanced propaganda methods in a mass society. America, as we know, rather than Europe, has set the pace in this field with the introduction of big headlines in the dailies, of picture newspapers, and propaganda films. Meanwhile, however, Nazi Germany has by far out-Americanized America. Their propaganda has proved more successful in disintegrating old societies for two reasons. They were more unscrupulous in their efforts to please mass instincts; and they added an understanding of the images which people have and of the driving forces behind these images to the application of mechanical devices. The suggestive map is part of this development. Haushofer, to be sure, resents the materialistic aspects of a mass civilization. But he admits that if the rule of the masses were indeed

¹⁷ Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, p. 71.

¹⁸ Otto Maull, "Ueber Politische-Geographische-Geopolitische Karten," *Bausteine*, p. 325.

¹⁹ Karl Haushofer, "Die Suggestive Karte," *Bausteine*, p. 343; "Grundlagen, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik," *Bausteine*, p. 43; "Rueckblick und Vorschau auf des Geopolitische Kartenwesen," *Z. f. G.*, II (1932), 735.

inevitable, the task that lies before us is "to educate our masters."²⁰

We can now turn to considering the meaning of the methods which are employed in geopolitics. They become intelligible if one understands geopolitics as an applied science (*Kunstlehre*) within a gestalt-sociological system of thought. Haushofer's dictum that "the best-informed will win the final battle" not only fits excellently into the theoretical framework but also indicates the line along which practical application actually proceeds.²¹ Haushofer keeps in his Geopolitical Institute (aided by the Institut fuer Raumordnung) a file on almost everything and everybody in every country and in every part of every country on the face of this globe. In doing so, he is not only interested in population and production figures in the Balkans or in Canada, but also in the development of racial attitudes in South Africa and in the personal habits of a customs officer in Rio de Janeiro.

As we have already remarked, it is only upon a systematic and comprehensive knowledge of facts, based on geographic data and proceeding toward ethnological and psychological interpretation, that an adequate judgment in doubtful situations can be founded. Hence, Geopolitics according to point 5 of the Theses formulated by the Editors of the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* (Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, Hermann Lautensach, Otto Maull)²² is "an applied science which is to guide practical politics up to the point where it has to depart from the sure ground of science. It is in this way only that knowledge will find its opportunity to guide action; otherwise, ignorance will make the road longer and more dangerous." In other words, an all-inclusive and realistic political science is to overcome departmentalization and to supersede legalistic and idealistic concepts in order to make an intelligent orientation in the field of international relations at all possible. The assumption is that the venture into the unknown, although not to be avoided by those engaged in action, is to be based upon the realities of this earth so that careful students might be able to arrive at an adequate evaluation and subsequent prediction.

The editors of the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*

quote approvingly the remark of the Austrian geographer Rudolf Sieger, that Geopolitics differs from political geography because and to the extent to which it is a prognostic (or predictive) science.²³ We should like, however, to make the meaning of the terms "prognosis" or "prediction" perfectly clear. They do not indicate mere hunches. They are used in the sense in which an old family doctor would use them, who knows well the constitutional history of a patient and his family. Far from predicting upon a single trait or an agglomeration of single traits, he would form his judgment and draw his conclusions upon an evaluation of a whole configuration of traits in space and time. Another example, and one that is taken from recent history, would refer to the divergence of opinion between General von Blomberg and Adolf Hitler prior to the occupation of the Rhineland in 1937. Blomberg cautioned against the move judging upon the single trait of the numerical inferiority of his troops as over against the armed forces of the enemy; while Hitler, probably counseled by Haushofer, took into account the state of mind of the enemy together with his economic and military resources and, considering all circumstances, was ready to take the move upon his own responsibility.

In his various books, Haushofer attempts constantly to arrive at political predictions, and he stresses the necessity of a political prophylaxis upon that basis. In the *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, he is interested in the question whether the remnants of native cultures from bygone days could be revived and combined into what we would now call "neo-native" cultures, which in turn could be united under the leadership of the most vigorous native power in the area.²⁴ He thinks that Japan is going to be that power. His geography and ethnology of *Japan und die Japaner* closes with a chapter on "foundations, limitations and possibilities of prediction concerning the geographical, ethno-psychological and ethno-political dynamics of the political culture of Japan and the structure of the Empire." It contains 24 theses along that line which now, almost one decade after their publication, look amazingly accurate in the light of recent developments.²⁵

²⁰ Karl Haushofer, "Grundlagen, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik," *Bausteine*, pp. 30, 61; also *Bausteine*, p. 10.

²¹ Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, p. 356.

²² See the theses of the Editors of the *Z. f. G.* in *Bausteine*, p. 27.

²⁴ Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*, pp. 1, 100, 254, 275, 304; *Bausteine*, p. 75.

²⁵ *Japan und die Japaner*, p. 317.

Prediction of that sort should not be confused with a mere forecast based solely on uncontrolled intuition. It rather implies vision as a synoptic view born of knowledge plus insight. In a controversy published in the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik* as late as 1938, the editors of the *Zeitschrift* state in unmistakable though somewhat wordy fashion:²⁶

Our way of prediction does not imply prophecy. As a matter of fact, we have been consistently opposed to wild constructionists who believe they can indulge in power politics even though they are equipped only with a fountain pen and a compass. We have always preached modesty over against the mighty stream of political history, fed as it is by innumerable tributaries. We have repeatedly counseled the most thoroughgoing and comprehensive studies in the field. A proper geopolitical prediction does certainly not accrue from mere intuition. On the contrary, it is born of accumulated knowledge and experience which, however, is to be enlarged into a vista into the future and guided by an innate ability of understanding.

This line of procedure, to be sure, has not been followed by all the contributors to the *Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik*. Many of them have operated upon foregone conclusions and arrived at sweeping statements of a constructionist type.

It should be summarized, then, that good results do not necessarily follow even from the best methods. No mechanical sequence is implied. Good methods must be employed by a good man who is endowed with an "innate ability of understanding" in order to arrive at good results. Otto Maull quotes Friedrich Ratzel, who, in the preface to his *Political Geography*, points out that a "geographic feeling" should grow out of careful observations of geographic phenomena.²⁷ Max Spandau, following Ratzel, compares this geographic feeling with the sympathetic insight which to Leopold von Ranke formed the key to an understanding of historical processes.²⁸ Yet, all three of them also believe that a feeling of this sort could well be developed but not directly taught. The facts and tools to understanding are believed to be teachable, but not the act of understanding itself. The knowledge of the parts is as much presupposed by an apprehension of the whole as

the apprehension of the whole is presupposed by a knowledge of the parts.

A synoptic view (*Gesamtschau*) is deemed necessary, and with this the artistic element in scholarship is stressed. However, the terms "Kunst" and "Kuenstlerisch" should not be misunderstood. A translation of these terms simply with "art" and "artistic" would not do justice to what Haushofer and his disciples want to convey.²⁹ The term "art" in German usage implies not only the capability of seeing seemingly disconnected items together as a *Gestalt*, but also a thorough craftsmanship as a necessary presupposition. Accordingly, Haushofer is opposed to a lofty dogmatism which employs a set technique irrespective of the locale to which it is being applied. He contrasts Sir Thomas Holdich's remarks on "Boundary Making," which are said to have been born of good experience in India and in South America, with the artificial boundary making which was practiced in Europe after the last World War. Natural boundaries, he asserts, are not actual lines, but broad frontier areas, so that if a line has to be drawn the utmost sensibility as to its being as close to nature as possible should be exercised. The "creative power of an artist," he says further, should be combined with the "thorough training of a scholar" so that the conscientious worker in the field is constantly to step along a narrow mountain path, where he must avoid falling into the vague fantasies of a mystic on the one hand and the "psychic impotence and dryness of a taskmaster" on the other. Haushofer recognizes the danger which may be inherent in a new "Geomantik," as well as the danger which lies in a pseudo-scientific dogmatism. He admonishes his followers to beware of a "superstitional superstructure upon the matter-of-fact foundation of Geopolitics, which might push the representatives of Geopolitics farther along their path than the limits of ascertained knowledge would suggest."³⁰

All this is sound theory out of which, however, no equally sound practice has ensued in a number of instances. The Geopolitical School, it is true, have succeeded in avoiding a rather superstitious belief in tools and tests which is likely to be spread far and wide in a mass society; but they have not equally avoided the danger which goes along with "Esoterik." They have avoided the type of the

²⁶ Reply to Karl Mahrmann, "Verinnerlichung der Geopolitik," *Z. f. G.*, I (1938), 990.

²⁷ Otto Maull, "Friedrich Ratzel zum Gedächtniss," *Z. f. G.*, II (1929), 614.

²⁸ Max Spandau, *op. cit.*

²⁹ Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen*, pp. 89, 107, 115.

³⁰ Karl Haushofer, "Grundlage, Wesen und Ziele der Geopolitik, Bausteine, etc., p. 33.

nothing-but-routine technician who proceeds along methodological *pontes asinorum* instead of trying to inquire carefully into a complex reality; but they have produced a host of conceited dilettants who are addicted to the habit of dressing up the vagueness of their conceptions in a garb of high-handed geniality. A blood-and-soil "geomantik," if not actually believed in, at least has been em-

ployed all too lavishly. It has added the biologically tinged belief in the "genius of the race" that grows of the soil to the romantic belief in the "genius of the artist" that has access to the sources of wisdom. Such a belief in an inspired genius, however, loses meaning and object if only would-be geniuses are at hand. A firm compass of orientation is necessarily lacking in Geopolitics.

MOBILITY, ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL

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STATUS and mobility are complementary ecological processes that emerge in the give-and-take between the organism and the environment. Status implies the success of man's spatial adjustment to the environment, while mobility implies effective freedom of adjustment within the limits of the environment. Mobility is fundamentally freedom of mobility and of competition, and is both ecological or spatial and social.

Movement of organisms through space is an incidence in their selection and survival. Plant ecologists have made us familiar with the methods of mass migration of plant communities as well as of the less spectacular phenomenon of distribution of individual plants from a given ecological area by wind, water, and animals. In fact, the present green mantle of the earth amply testifies to the vast migratory movements of plants, especially associated with the climatic oscillations in the past. Small scale migratory movements are visible everywhere whenever a new bit of the landscape is laid bare, a forest cut down or burnt, a low land or marsh becomes dry, or a seashore captured for human occupancy.

Animals and plants live interlocked lives. Thus, wherever in mountains, sand dunes and marshes, intermittent migrations or mass invasions of vegetable communities take place from neighboring or distant areas, animals also move and swarm, adjusting their advance to that of the much less mobile plant matrix. Ecologically speaking, the change of human spatial distribution is brought about as a result of the process of competition and selection brought into operation by differential opportunities of living conditions in the habitat.

Change in the nature and distribution of resources, such as the destruction of forests and their animal inhabitants and desiccation or seasonal shrinkage of pastures, leads to primitive nomadism. Change in technology and arts of production, as for instance, the supersession of hunting and shepherding by agriculture stimulates migration. The gradual exhaustion of the soil in new lands due to inappropriate farming practice coupled with increase of population leads to trek or migration further and further into the pioneer fringes, whether in America, in South Africa or in Australia.

In the 19th century the advent of the new technology had a profound effect on the redistribution of population. Rural arts and handicrafts were everywhere disorganized or destroyed and industrial production was concentrated in a few favored regions. Later on an agrarian revolution followed up the industrial revolution. The introduction of agricultural tools and machinery and mechanized, large-scale farming have enormously reduced the proportion of population needed to produce the food and raw materials for the entire population. All this has promoted a cityward drift in most countries which has far-reaching effects upon the modes of living, social habits, and stratification of peoples all over the world. It is thus the transformation of the ecologic base of society, a shift of occupations and interests by the new technology, and improvement of the facilities of transportation during the last century or a century and a half which brought about a new spatial distribution of population. Such redistribution will also continue so long as the machine technology based on steam persists

in industrial production, and as improvements in agricultural technique and organization continue to create lesser and lesser demand for workers engaged in the farming enterprise. Physical mobility will thus increase in volume and intensity and it will have profound effects upon man's society and culture.

Various types of physical mobility are now discernible: First, there is the steady cityward drift in every country which becomes more intensive in periods of agricultural depression or industrial prosperity, and which gradually transforms the social composition of towns and cities. This trend coexists with industrialization and mechanization. Secondly, there is the daily ingress and egress of rural dwellers who come to the city for their work or for trade, business, and amusement and return to their village homes every evening. The hinterland from which the city draws its "daily passengers" gradually extends with the improvement of transportation and communication. Thirdly, the urban folk also go out of the bounds of the city on weekends and holidays for rest and recreation. Fourthly, there is the movement of urban dwellers from one room, flat, hotel or house within the city to another. The change in residence of urban dwellers tends to become more and more frequent in every large city and associated with many social pathological features. Finally, there are casual movements of urban dwellers within the city who daily or periodically set out in buses, trams or tubes in search of recreation or adventure. Not merely the new technology, which brings about improvements in industry, communication, transport, and organization but the entire technique of mass propaganda directed to engender new cravings, amusements, and excitements contribute to intensify physical mobility of the various types. Each type of mobility has its profound reactions on individual and collective patterns of behavior and values.

It is necessary at this stage to distinguish between ecological and social mobility and interaction. Ecological mobility is movement in space by which individuals come to compete or cooperate with one another for position and status, developing a characteristic type of human relationships. The interaction is dominated by reciprocal accommodation in relation to the limited resources of the ecological space; yet it is a social interaction. In ecological interaction man meets fellowman not as a person but as a competing or cooperating unit in the context of spatial and sustenance relations;

hence it is relationship characterized more by deliberate-contractual and less by instinctive-communal patterns. In the urban dweller's reactions to his fellowman there is the predominance of ecological reaction. In the fast moving cultural stream of the city his contacts are casual, transient, and fragmentary so that he does not know the person but only apprehends his role and builds up what Lippmann calls a "stereotype."

A stereotype is just a superficial picture of a person, empty of content, but useful in appraising the role he appears to play. It hides his unique individuality but concentrates on the performance which is the basis of immediate contact. The urban dweller reacts to his fellowman as a co-worker, or as a boss or subordinate, a customer or client, even "as a mere address or number," as a stereotype, a symbol or a figure which acquires interest simply because of its performance which may be objectively evaluated in terms of money. The emotional tone recedes into the background and thus an anonymous and superficial rather than an intimate and personal relationship finds favor. Ecological relationship may be defined as one of proximity in ecological space but of distance in social space. It actually hinders the development of personal and sympathetic relationships characteristic of rural contacts and associations that are stable, direct, and face to face, and in which both personality and performance are apt to be defined and valued reciprocally. It is all the same human relationship but of the abstract nonsentimental *Gesellschaft* kind, different from the consensus and communion arising in man's vital modes of association in rural society, such as the family, the neighborhood, the kinship group, and the community.

In urban-industrial society the ecological, formal and impersonal relationship increases with the size of the habitation and social group and the frequency and range of mobility. More and more of the contacts necessary for the satisfaction of the daily requirements, amenities, and conveniences are mechanized and mediated through the written communication and the telephone; the primary relationship being distributed over larger ecological space ceases to elicit emotion, and neighborliness or kinship feeling breaks down. The ecological relationship fosters and is promoted by money economy. In the network of utilities and services, which are implied in the casual and frequent social contacts in industrial society, attention is given only to the money token ignoring

the person who serves or mediates. The human bond becomes the impersonal cash nexus which gradually supersedes the natural and organic familial ties. In money-economy man's physical movement is accelerated as is the circulation of goods and services. Money economy also promotes social mobility. When an individual spends with greater and greater reference to his own status and standard of living and less and less reference to primary group associates, as he releases himself from his traditional obligations to the family or kinship group, he can climb up the social ladder faster. But he may also sink faster if he be not safeguarded in his status by the family or kinship group. It is the new machine technology and impersonal wage economy which furnish the basis of social mobility in urbanized and industrialized society.

Ecological mobility coexists with social immobility in both tribal and agricultural societies. Primitive peoples show a collective spatial adjustment. As they move out to a new environment, their food being relatively uniform, specialized or limited, they do not develop any new division of labor. Thus savages do not change their social or economic status nor shift their tribal or group affiliations as they follow the wild deer and bison or practice brand tillage from forest to forest. In urban-industrial society social mobility accompanies physical mobility and mobility is both an individual adjustment and a group process. Movement of individuals in space, a complex division of labor and specialization in machine technology with interchangeability of jobs and occupations, an impersonal wage system and change of social and economic status aid one another in the urban-industrial milieu.

In the peasant society status groups are stereotyped corresponding to the prevailing simple division of labor and specialization. The peasant's life, toil, and recreation are adjusted to the balance and rhythm of nature's processes, which cannot be speeded up. Just as simple routinized movements, dominated by nature's sequence of the distribution of sunshine and rainfall and synchronous human habits and traditions are true of rural dwellers, their status and position are also persistent and enduring; for hardly have they any opportunity of change of job, vocation, or even residence. In urban society individuals not only jostle with one another as they quickly shift from job to job, association to association, flat to flat, and one quarter of the city to another, but they

also quickly move up or down the social or economic ladder. The modern town or city has become a highly mobile social situation, where contacts between men are segmental, and their roles fractionalized, and the social habits and sentiments molded by the secondary economic and political rather than by the primary and intimate familial institutions and controls.

Individuation is the result of the impersonal machine and wage economy in which a man's income and expenditure, his standard of living and status become no longer matters of familial or collective concern or control. A pecuniary scale of valuation replaces the traditional hierarchy of social values. Money promotes abstract, non-sentimental relations between man and man, and hence both physical and social mobility. It fosters the rational-contractual standard as the norm of conduct. Since it buys everything and plays the major role in all phases of social life and relations, besides the intimate and the familial, the conviction gains ground that economic values are preferable to values which are intimate, ultimate, and non-transferable. It is the pursuit of limited, divisible, hedonic values and satisfactions in industrialized society which favors the development of an intensely individualistic rather than socialized personality. This completes the disintegration of primary groups and atomization of society. Individuation is connected with what Eucken calls "economism."

In rural society ecologic, social, and moral space coincide. Men live in close physical proximity with one another; social distance which exists in rural society is abridged by neighborly spirit and sympathy and community service; while all participate in a certain well-established set of moral values and social aims which are integrated with one another and are favorable to personality integration and the social and moral order of the village. In urban society culture becomes no longer an organized, integrated pattern of living adequate for the needs of individuals, but rather an agglomeration of individuals, associations, and institutions characterized by the constant conflict between individual achievements and moral values and social objectives. The urban dweller constantly strives to change his ecologic space, drift to jobs, occupations, and areas that represent higher levels of economic attainment; he strives to change his social space, attain higher social status and prestige; and he also aims at the realization of maximum goals of life although he actually secures

few of them, and the few he achieves often become incompatible with the well-being and progress of society. The urban dweller's ecological position, his social status, and his role and station in the network of moral values and social obligations which we call "culture" are constantly fluctuating. The individual is always off his balance in relation to his three levels of space and action, ecological, social, and moral. Society is also off its balance, there being a profound discord between its economic and technological acquisition, between man's freedom of mobility and struggle for status and social order and progress, and the lag in its moral organization.

The essence of the sociological method is to interpret the ecological, social, and moral interaction in the *gestalt* of the primitive, intermediate or peasant, modern or industrialized society as an integral whole. In each pattern there is a correspondence between ecological, economic, and personal relations. A synoptic analysis-synthesis of social life and relations in the different levels of collective adjustment so that every sector is seen in relation to the whole is the crux of modern sociological treatment. In contemporary industrialized society as contrasted with rural society the study would naturally stress social deviation and disequilibrium these having become the chief characteristics of the *gestalt*.

With this unified approach in mind we can discern mobility in its successive levels or phases, which are mutually interdependent, of social accommodation and relations with a certain social norm emerging in each level:

(1) Mobility has a physical and technical basis: modern large-scale production, development of rapid transit and communication, and the rise of modern sanitation. Without the rapid turn-over in factories, shops, and establishments employing millions of persons, and the vast technical progress in engineering, communication, organization, and industry which promote locomotion of persons, goods and power and communication of the word, the excessive mobility in the modern city is not possible. Speed and convenience of travel and intercourse and mobility help each other. From this phase of collective technological adjustment contemporary civilization has deduced the norm of increase in the tempo of life as the keynote of progress.

(2) Mobility has its biological basis—the preponderance of a heterogeneous, foreign-born, adult population, with an excess of single and unat-

tached persons and a deficiency of women and children, a high divorce rate and a low birth rate. Communities characterized by a dominant male sex ratio and a deficiency of children show an increase of competition as is indicated by the brisk, feverish tempo and the rapid rise and fall of individual status and position. Such communities are also characterized by an eat-drink-and-be-merry attitude towards life and by absence of community controls and traditional obligations which not only quicken mobility but promote family breakdown and social deviation and disorganization. On the other hand, the characteristic population pyramid underlies economic prosperity since there is a larger per capita earning power, which is constantly replenished by new migrants; while trade and business are stimulated by the cumulative demand for housing and for articles of luxury. There is a maximum of physical movement and of social change reflected in the ascent or descent to the different social and economic strata, promoted by the cycle of economic fluctuation and the cycle of demographic movement. The mobility and rapid tempo of contemporary society are biologically rooted in the social composition of groups, especially the age and sex composition. From this phase of biologic adaptation in the throbbing, fluid life of the exuberantly growing and heterogeneous city emerge the norms of sexual freedom and racial admixture, and of amelioration of the urban environmental conditions as proving the clues to progress.

Mixed strains exhibit intellectual and emotional plasticity, which favors mobility. Without the stress of nurture or environment instead of human nature or heredity in vast schemes of urban and regional planning and improvement, the breeding of slums by slums and of inferior stocks by slums would have endangered the racial stock. Biologically speaking, the mobile sections of the population perhaps show greater mental and social stimulation, activity and inventive capacity, which promote further mobility and tempo of life. But the fluid mass of persons and objects constantly calls for more numerous and quicker mental adjustments and causes excessive mental strain; while moral adjustments are also rendered difficult by the heterogeneity of mores and cultural patterns of different persons coming to the city with different social backgrounds. The urban dweller is a member of several secondary associations with different patterns of behavior and scales of values, and oscillates from one pattern and scale to another

without necessary loss of status in the anonymity of the city. Moral confusion or chaos of values thus accompanies mental break-down or inadequacy.

(3) Mobility has its economic basis. The vast complicated system of mass standardized production cannot be run without an elaborate division and interchangeability of jobs and occupations which demand quick movement of individuals. It is interchangeability of labor and the process of substitution which are characteristics of the modern industrial structure that make high mobility inevitable. From this emerges the economic norm of the freedom of mobility or competition that may permit an easy rise and fall of socio-economic status according to merit as the keynote of progress. Competition or freedom of enterprise has been regarded throughout the 19th century as the *sine qua non* of social efficiency, and economists have been prone to regard the primary groups and the social values and conventions they represent as causes of economic friction and backwardness. In spite of the classical economist's prophecy the movement from one pecuniary group upward has been found arduous, limited, and infrequent. In Germany an investigation found that only one-sixth of the professional people came from middle-income groups; now one-half of the intelligentsia has a middle-class background. The fact, concludes Nothaas, that the number of professionals who rise from the proletariat or the peasantry directly is negligible indicates that it takes a few generations to climb to the highest stratum of society. On the whole the range of occupational mobility, according to Sorokin, fluctuates from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 70 percent, the average of all occupational groups in Western society being 20 and 60 percent.

The middle occupational classes are more stable than the extremes. Yet there is no doubt that as industrialism has spread there has been a marked decrease in the hereditary transmission of occupations from father to children and a marked increase of the rise and fall of persons between the different occupational classes and strata of society. Even custom-bound India, China, and Japan testify to this social change. In India and Japan many of the premiers and ministers during the last few decades come from poor families. In modern industrial society occupations are more numerous and social levels more pronounced than in peasant society. Man is engaged here in constant struggle for his position with his fellowman. If he climbs

up he ousts another, and he must struggle on to retain his position. And, again, he may be brought up or down by the vertical movements of the group to which he belongs. A constant vertical movement of individuals and economic classes is the economic consequence of machine technology and presents a marked contrast with the rigid social stratification in rural society. In urban society the greater the mobility the greater are the economic contrasts of wealth and poverty, independence and insecurity.

(4) On its characteristic technic, biological, and economic base, mobility builds up an appropriate mode of group life and relationships. The fluid and heterogeneous mass of people in contemporary industrialized society have numerous group attachments, which develop in each individual numerous social selves. Each social self represents a fraction of the persons; each group satisfies some fractional needs and interests. Such a group is far different from the primary group in rural society, which is adequate for the total recurrent needs of the individual from birth to death. Groups in modern industrialized society are secondary associations based on a rational consideration of reciprocal convenience, needs, and interests of individuals. As the latter blend, integrate or contrast with one another, groups also coalesce or split up. With the increase of mobility in modern urban-industrial society we see a greater variety, complexity, and instability of groups, and the greater and greater predominance of the abstract, superficial, complex, and intensive system of contacts in secondary groups and associations over simple, enduring, and face to face primary group relations. From this complex and dynamic process of shifting group affiliations and individual relations emerges the norm of deliberate agreement or contract rather than consensus, rapport, and an established status or position of the individual in a traditional scheme of rights and obligations as the clue to progress. If the folk and the peasant society, the small kinship and neighborhood group, and the village community have been superseded today by the larger impersonal territorial group in the Great Society, election appears not as a mere political contrivance but a universal formal procedure underlying modern secular and deliberate forms of control.

(5) Finally, mobility develops its characteristic pattern of personal and moral relations and values. Mobility cannot be understood without reference to a characteristic background of ideology and

sentiment, moral ideal and cultural goal that stimulate and regulate the freedom of mobility and competition in economic and social adjustments. Contemporary industrial society is marked by a formal, objective, pecuniary standard which fits well into the machine technology, rapid tempo of life, interdependence of labor, and freedom of mobility. The complex and interdependent Great Society in which man lives requires not only an appropriate mechanism of communication, organization, and industry but also an appropriate value mechanism which may express and measure the widest range of human values. But the money token used in measuring and energizing various individual and social goals ends in subordinating to itself the ultimate values. Money is associated with man's health, comfort, and leisure and gives access to many cultural, personal, and spiritual values. There is in modern life an intermingling of economic with aesthetic and moral values. But as pecuniary value enlarges its scope, society slides into the acceptance of the principle that everything has its price. Pecuniary value becomes a real end rather than a

means and is used to manipulate a great number of social activities and values which should be outside the pecuniary domain. Thus the hegemony that belongs to the ultimate, underivative values ends. The cult of the hedonic and the useful supersedes the ancient adoration of truth, love, and goodness.

The norms of the rapid tempo of life, the fluidity of social relations, the freedom of competition and contract, and the deliberate-pecuniary standard that emerge in the successive levels of social accommodation are all reciprocally interdependent and express the *gestalt* of modern industrialized society of which physical and social mobility is the fundamental process. The contemporary social scene cannot be understood without placing mobility in the center of the perspective, nor can mobility be adequately interpreted without adopting an integrated and synthetic viewpoint in this regard. No significant feature of modern civilization can be delineated without introducing mobility as one of its causal factors operative on the levels of ecology, economy, and morality.

RATIONAL SELECTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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THE rights and the duties of the educator in selecting and passing on to the young societal ways have provided controversial issues of prime magnitude from time immemorial. This age-old controversy has gained momentum in recent years, and has been so well cloaked with the halo of liberalism on the one side, and patriotism on the other that nothing but confusion ensues in the minds of those who entrust their children to the educators. The present moment, on the threshold of impending realignments of international and national social and economic controls, seems opportune to inquire into the nature, scope, and limitation of educators' rights and duties in the deliberate rational selection of new ways for societal life and organization.

About a generation ago Professor A. G. Keller published his well-known volume, *Societal Evolution*. Inasmuch as this analysis impinges upon Professor Keller's work, it would be well to re-

capitulate very briefly the concept of rational selection as developed therein.

Man is not only the product of biological development or evolution, but also of a distinctly mental evolution. This is revealed in the mental reactions following upon experience.

Man's efforts to satisfy needs were in early times, and today if we were willing to admit it, clumsy and blundering. The oldest and always the most potent method has been that of trial and failure, which produces repeated loss, pain, disappointment, and now and then satisfactions of the needs. Pleasure and pain defined the area in which efforts must take place, and any way which answered the purpose better than others, or with less toil and pain, was more or less automatically followed by way of habit and routine in the individual and concurrence by the group. Concurrence made the practice a group way, or a folkway. Thus, mental reactions follow upon experience;

mental changes appear in the form of ideas which are capable of materialization or realization. But realization is rarely an individual matter; rather, it is a final resultant of the conflict of ideas of the members of the group itself. Conflict suggests the presence of innumerable tentatives or variants which more or less emphatically demand a competitive position. The competition of these variants, in which some degree of concurrence has taken place, is not that of the ideas as such in men's minds. It is, rather, a competition or struggle between the adherents of conflicting variants, and the variants of the victors tend to survive, sometimes only through the annihilation of those supporting the rival variants. After selection of various tentatives has operated for a time in the societal unit, variation comes to be more and more restricted, especially as certain of the group ways, or folkways, receive societal and religious sanction as being vital to the welfare of the entire group.

In the past, the great bulk of selection was of the unreasoned or automatic societal type. The great underlying strata of our folkways and mores were undoubtedly automatically or irrationally selected by the group. But viewed over a generation or so adaptations in many of the folkways and mores are evident, revealing selection still at work. And from what one can observe, in many instances the means and ends are visualized, and selection does seem to take place on rational grounds.

There are two fundamental requisites for rational selection. In the first place, it must be performed in the light of knowledge. The more extended and precise the knowledge, the more highly educated the individual or the group, the more rational may be the selections, and the more frequent their occurrence. The second requisite for rational selection is foresight, a virtue which seems to have developed quite late in human history. Foresight suggests the power to see a perspective of individual or of group development, and the ability to follow through or to visualize the consequences of such selections as are made. With the development of writing, a record of the variations and their consequences could be kept, rendering more complete the body of ideas or knowledge about the conditions of life which could be held true subject to correction. Thus, we have resort to the tools of science—investigation, observation, and verification—which may be applied to societal selections.

For the purposes of this discussion, selection will be referred to as rational selection if apparently made under the conditions just cited, even though

the tentative selected proves to be a mistake or maladaptation, even though the results may be different from those predicted, and even though the masses who subsequently adopt the new way, originally rationally conceived by the few, do so without adequate knowledge as to its purpose or consequences.

In keeping with Sumner's description of the genesis of a folkway and later, perhaps, of a *mos*,¹ it is evident that there was individual reaction, selection of a way without premeditation or conscious effort, success in meeting the need, and finally concurrence. In the light of knowledge and supported by foresight some ways are selected rationally and deliberately. But the number of persons who are capable of initiating rational selection is small indeed. If the ways selected are to find acceptance, especially if there is no immediate and conclusive test, it is necessary that the initiators have the additional qualifications of prestige and authority. Then qualities of the initiators are carried over to the tentatives selected by them; they lend weight and support to the ways selected, and stimulate concurrence. Thus, we may have rational selection on the part of the initiators, and irrational or automatic selection on the part of the masses. It is, of course, admitted that where the tests are immediate, self-evident, and conclusive, rational selection of a given variant may take place in the masses, irrespective of the prestige or authority of initiators.

Who are the deliberate, conscious, initiators of new tentatives or ways which are presented in devious manner for concurrence by the group? In general, these are the members of the society who possess knowledge, foresight, prestige, and authority. They may belong to the priestly class; they may be economic leaders, politicians, or simply schoolmen. In a restricted sense all are educators in that they try to inculcate into the masses the particular views or selections which they have made.

Our special interest is centered chiefly around the professional educator and his use of rational selection. In the primitive society it is often hard to discern what one might call the professional educator. The functions of the educators were performed not only by family members, as in our own society, but on a more specialized plane by the war chief, the priest, and even the members of the secret society. The content of education was al-

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, (New York: Ginn & Co., 1906), chap. 1.

ways that of fitting the individual for life in his group. Content was largely conditioned by the past, by conformity with the ways of the ancestors and the sanction of tradition. There was little room for innovations; in fact, the deep-seated conservatism of primitive peoples practically precluded any selection other than slowly moving automatic selection in the societal realm. Of course evidence of rational selection is available where the innovation is in the economic area, and the tests of a more perfect adjustment are clean cut and self-evident.

In our own culture, instruction in the folkways and mores under the auspices of the professional educator begins with the first step into the school system—in kindergarten, or conceivably in pre-kindergarten classes. At that early stage, and for several years thereafter, the teachers' duties consist in the instruction of the fundamental folkways and mores of the group—ways which have already received societal acceptance and sanction, and in large part have been handed down by tradition and authority. The function of the teacher is to equip the child with such elemental knowledge, tested and verified over past generations, as society deems necessary to fit him for adjustment to the group. The educational process at this early period of life is almost entirely one of instilling the old well-established ways of life by tradition, memorization, and example or imitation. There is little need felt for societal change in elementary education. The child is too young and immature to weigh or recognize various possible tentatives.

Even in the higher grades of grammar school a similar situation prevails, although the opportunities for rational selection on the part of educators are greatly increased. Why is rational selection by the professional educator not more frequently resorted to? Is not the child mind—say from the eighth to the fourteenth years at the most plastic stage, where any innovations in culture or societal ways could most easily be implanted by the educator with the least resistance? Yes indeed! But the fact remains that the public is very closely identified with the education afforded in the grades. The adults of today know, understand, and have experienced the training which they expect shall be given to their own children. There is but one pattern; it is true and safe. It covers the approved behavior patterns and the beliefs which are to be accepted or rejected. The public expects maintenance of the existing sanctioned and approved codes. Slight variations, where the tests

are clear cut, do take place, but except for these occasional instances, the public is suspicious and intolerant of attempted rational selection by educators. The purse strings of the public are quickly closed to unsanctioned changes. Furthermore, the educators themselves are, for the most part, women from the ranks, and in course of time will return as wives and mothers. They are close to the standard folkways and mores, and belonging to the more conservative sex, are less prone to follow variants. Again, let it be noted that education at this stage concerns itself very little with social problems where deliberate experimentation actually is invited because of the difficulty of getting early and conclusive verification.

As one advances to higher education, the scene shifts. The educators in this realm hold a peculiar position. They form an intelligentsia which is both revered and suspected by the common man. In the physical sciences—in medicine, engineering chemistry, and other subjects anchored to the bed-rock of natural law, the educator is trained in scientific method; he has no philosophical unverifiable tentatives to offer in his own field. There he is a skeptic and accepts only that which can be demonstrated. In his field rational selection of new ways which may have a profound influence upon societal life is relatively simple. And, with advancing intelligence of the masses, such rational selection meets with little resistance. The physical scientist today does sway public opinion, and is in a position whereby he can stimulate rational selection by a large part of the societal group. Experience has shown that society is more often than not the beneficiary.

At this point, a few words about beneficiaries are in order. Every societal selection, whether rational or automatic, is made to satisfy a need. It is generally assumed that this need is a societal one and the selection is socially justifiable. It is an adaptation. But often the need is a private one, appertaining to a limited group or class, with society's welfare a matter of secondary interest. The initiators of such programs exercise rational selection in their own favor and by devious ways may be able to secure adoption by the majority group. Obviously, the selectors are the beneficiaries. But the pretense is always made, and society generally accepts the belief, that the public is the beneficiary until the new way proves to be a painful maladaptation.

When one turns to deliberate rational selection in the societal field—the stamping ground of the

sociologist, the political scientist, the economist, and the psychologist, the entire situation is changed from that observed in the physical realm. Experience has not shown that society is invariably a beneficiary of the tentatives selected. The public is suspicious and skeptical, because here selection is bound to impinge upon deep-seated fundamental folkways and mores of property, of religion, marriage, and the family.

Social science teachers who may have opportunities to set in motion rational selections seem to fall readily into three distinct classes. These are (1) those who have been trained in scientific methods and who actually endeavor to apply such methods to societal phenomena. A sociologist belonging to this class, for example, before advocating a new societal adjustment, would no doubt study the historical background of societal phenomena affected, and would acquaint himself very thoroughly with the economic aspects and probable consequences of the new variant. He would have reasonably definite proof of the need and the value of the variant before he would either privately or publicly support it. As a consequence, he would invariably be acting within the sphere of the rights and duties which society expects of the educator. The sphere in which the authority of the scientist is acknowledged, as pointed out by Professor O. O. Norris,² consists in his exhibition of the postulates of his thought, and of his objectives, and of how he came by these, and in his exhibition of his evidence and of how he secured this. Indeed, such frankness must characterize the intellectual commerce of the teacher with his students, as he seeks to lead them to a similar critical candor and to the acquisition of skills in exhibiting such candor without giving offense.

(2) There are those who have had their training in one specialized field, for instance, sociology, and have neglected the contributions of economics, anthropology, history, and political science. Without such auxiliary knowledge it is impossible for these restricted specialists to trace the probable course of new variations which they may propose. Consequently, they feel little compunction in backing innumerable variants suggested by incomplete knowledge.

(3) There are those who have had no particular training in the social sciences, but who are attracted to these verdant pastures for social experi-

mentation. Some remain mere dabblers, as must be the case with instructors whose training and teaching is in religion, English, Romance languages, and other nonrelated subjects, while others become pseudo experts and shift over to the social sciences entirely. It is from the last two classes that those individuals who strain the rights and neglect the duties of educators, as understood by society, are most frequently drawn.

It is true that society's determination of the rights and duties of the educator varies from period to period and from place to place. For the moment, however, let us note present day concepts of the limits of freedom of teaching. The profession itself has defined this freedom in full accord with the folkways and mores of our day. In a statement of principles relating to academic freedom formulated by representatives of the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges we find the following statement:

- (a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of results, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
- (b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(In a similar vein the conference statement of 1925 asserted, "No teacher may claim as his right the privilege of discussing in his classroom controversial topics outside of his own field of study.")
- (c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances.³

The major part of the criticism directed against educators on the higher academic levels arises out

²O. O. Norris, "Loyalties and Freedom in Education," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, XXV, No. 3 (June, 1939), 267.

³*American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, XXV, No. 1 (February, 1939), 27, 29.

of the violation of these generally accepted canons. Perhaps this is something that we must expect, since the academic group is composed of diverse types of individuals with varying interests, points of view, temperaments, backgrounds, ranges of ability, imagination, mental balance, and judgment. Furthermore, among academicians there seems to be a somewhat greater volume of sentimentalism, sympathy, and emotionalism than in the public at large. And, unfortunately, in the minds of a vociferous minority there seems to be a decided passion for making the world over, for introducing personal concepts of social justice, for reversing the position of the economic classes, for leveling processes, and for self-selected uplift projects. Hence, to the average man, there seems to be a constant array of proposed societal adjustments (or maladjustments) coming from academic halls well afield from the specialization of the proposer. These are the proposals which evoke popular condemnation, and since, for that reason, they are the ones most widely and unfavorably discussed, the notion gains ground that all socioeconomic tentatives springing from educators, no matter how well qualified in the field in which they speak, are those of "crack pots." The enthusiastic, or better, the "possessed" educator feels it his duty and right to carry the message to his pupils, regardless of how irrelevant it may be to his work. He may do so directly or indirectly. Thus, an instructor in English, imbued with communistic philosophy, may assign topics for compositions which impinge upon the pros and cons of the communistic order, and thus throw the class open for irrelevant political discussions. Similarly, *Southern California Business*, published by the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, reports a case where a college professor was showing his aesthetics class a movie. Suddenly the light in the projector flickered out and the performance had to stop while the burned-out bulb was replaced.

"This is just a sample of the general unreliability of machine-made products under capitalism," said the professor during the interruption. "Products are made fragile and cheap in order to increase the replacement business. Under socialism everything would be made to last because the producer's motive would be service instead of profit."⁴

It is the passion for setting in motion new societal ways, seldom studied or carefully explored and always expected to be socially beneficent,

which makes some educators such remarkable "joiners." The joiner's vanity is touched, and he does not eschew the opportunity to parade his personally labeled "liberal" views, so fashionable in recent years, and to secure much needed publicity, all in connection with his pet social hobby. Very often he finds his name linked up with subversive movements under the guise of some league, front or committee.

Society objects; the tentative selected mis-carries, and in due course of time the educator in question is just another martyr, a martyr to his concept of academic freedom.

The abuse of the currently accepted limits of the "right" to rational selection by a small minority of educators helps to open the doors for attacks from every direction. In our own society, where democracy is deeply ingrained in the folkways and the mores, and where rational selection by educators has perhaps reached the highest level of achievement, the question may legitimately be asked, "Is it a proper function of the educator, and does he have the right with the aid of formal educational processes to experiment upon an unwilling society?" Emphatically not beyond the limits of tolerance sanctioned by the societal group. Thus is joined the struggle wherein one minority group of educators, experimenting in a rôle for which they are unfit and untrained, is arrayed against the rank and file of teachers, the school boards and trustees, the public, the church, and finally clever politicians eager to capitalize on the indiscretions of the unbridled experimenters.

The bad judgment of a few educators makes it easy to encourage and to develop fears and suspicions as to the nature of the tentatives and selections which are being formed or initiated within the currently accepted framework of experimentation by all of the learned. Astute political leaders, as has happened in certain European countries, often aspire to become the rational selectors of new ways of their own choosing, and gain their ends by supporting public indignation, by singling out and condemning totally unqualified social experimenters as though they were representative of all, and, by presumption, championing the old well-established ways. Through such a wedge, the power of all educators, particularly in the realm of the social sciences, to initiate new tentatives is curbed, thus eliminating the possibility of rational selections which might not be in line with the philosophies of those in political control. The more powerful the political group, the more likely

⁴ O. V. Watts, "Socialism in the Classroom," *Southern California Business*, II, No. 28 (September 28, 1940).

it is to seek control over the content and nature of public education. This can best be done by a careful check on any new tentatives arising in academic halls, and by insistence backed by the mailed fist, that educators absorb and teach the programs deliberately and rationally selected by the political leaders. In this manner the oncoming generation is captured and indoctrinated with the desired ideology.

In summation, society at all times has endowed those entrusted with the education of the young with some rights of rational selection. In fact, one might say, society has regarded it as the duty of the educator to exercise rational selection within certain well defined areas which vary from group to group. The opportunities for rational selection and the likelihood of societal acceptance are greatest in the field of the natural sciences where tests of material value, and by inference of societal value, are immediate, and seem to be conclusive.

In the social sciences the educator is suspect. Rational selection on his part involves modification of the folkways and mores, and very often does not satisfy immediate tests either of material or of societal values.

Nevertheless, in progressive and democratic societies the social scientist has come to have some limited rights of experimentation and rational selection with a full measure of public tolerance and approval. Danger, however, lies in aggressively pushing any of these tentatives beyond the margin of public sympathy and tolerance, and the educator who does so quickly generates public antipathy. This, in turn, may give rise to political and social checks, and, in some instances may provide a situation where educators, stripped of the power to initiate social tentatives, merely become the tools for the inculcation and perpetuation of ways rationally selected by political and other self-interested leaders.

THE FAMILY IN SKYSCRAPER-DWELLINGS

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Much has been written on the social effects of technology. Concrete, empirical studies recording the factual and specific results springing from the introduction into society of mechanical inventions as well as general, conceptual, theoretical frameworks classifying and delineating the types of social influences and processes involved in the impingement on and the adjustments of society to the various inventions have been made.¹

It is fairly obvious that while a causal relationship might appear to exist between a mechanical invention and societal changes (such as the relation of skyscrapers and size of families discussed below), the inert, lifeless, material, technological contrivance has to depend on its adoption and its use by humans before it can have any effects on them and on any of the groups that humans form. Furthermore, while the adoption, spread, and use of an invention constitute immediate social influences of an invention,² the invention may give rise to additional indirect or derivative social influences. Thus, the most significant invention conducive to the control of the birth rate and consequently the size of family are those of contraception. The use of the contraceptive invention has as its immediate inevitable social consequence, small families. However, another invention, such as skyscraper-apartment-dwellings, although not *directly* responsible for small families, can act as a reinforcement of the invention (contraception) to make the use and adoption of the latter more widespread and consequently act as a further indirect derivative influence towards the spread of the smaller family.

Table I illustrates the influences of living in skyscraper apartment houses by acting as a reenforcing agent in the use of contraceptives to limit the size of family. This table compares the median size family of the skyscraper apartment dwellings in Hyde Park with those families of all the dwelling units of Chicago as a whole, as well as

¹ Joseph B. Gittler, "Social Effects of Inventions," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXII, (1941), 142-9; John H. Mueller, *The Automobile: A Sociological Study* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928); Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (New York: Ginn and Co., 1931); Joseph B. Gittler, *Society's Adjustment to Mechanical and Social Invention: A Study in Social Change* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1941); S. McKee Rosen and Laura Rosen, *Technology and Society* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940); S. C. Gilfillan, *Inventing the Ship*, (Chicago: Follett Publishing Company, 1935); W. F. Ogburn, "The Influences of Invention and Discovery," in *Recent Social Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1933), pp. 153-6.

² The influence of an invention on society is a function of the degree of its adoption. The extent of adoption determines an immediate degree of social change, because to the extent that an invention spreads through and is used by the members of a group—to that extent it has changed the mode and content of the life of the group from its previously existent, pre-adoptive state. The adoption of an invention adds to, replaces part of, or supplements the culture of a society.

(Continued on p. 193)

TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF OBJECTIVES FOR INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY*

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I

ALTHOUGH many studies of the Introductory Course in Sociology have been made there is still considerable doubt about the purpose and content of the course. Factors which may be extraneous seem to influence the selection of material. Because "many students will take only one course in sociology" a number and variety of concepts, problems, and interpretations are offered in some academic situations. In others the course may contain those segments of sociology which do not appear in the freshman orientation nor in the advanced specialized courses. Available time may determine whether a full or abridged version is given. In some instances the version itself may be the individual point of view or "message" of a particular teacher. There seems to be lack of consensus with respect to the major purpose of the general introduction—whether it is to develop interest in social relationships, stimulate attitudes of social responsibility, catalogue facts and problems concerning society, shock the naive, debunk folklore, or provide tools and training for analyzing social phenomena.

Some previous studies¹ have taken the choice of

* Read before the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 3, 1942.

¹ Paul Foreman (*Social Forces* 17: 211-219) made an effort to place concepts on a scale ranging from "not mentioned" to "mandatory" and noted a trend away from the "social problems" focus to the "special science" focus. In connection with this study he did an excellent bibliographical service with respect to the problem of Introductory Sociology.

concepts to indicate the nature and scope of the beginning course. But the inclusion of such concepts as human nature, personality, cooperation, economic competition, race, and others which might be chosen at random, is no indication of the purpose they are to serve. They may be treated as analytical tools, points of departure for proposed reforms, or mere "pellets of knowledge" to be consumed. Likewise, "social problems" may be transmitted as encyclopaedic information, cited as demands for action, or utilized for illustrative or analytical purposes very much as the physical scientist uses his material. Whether consensus is emerging with reference to what is basic and preliminary sociological training may be determined best by an examination of objectives. Objectives are generally stated as purposes or ends to be achieved—skills to be mastered, knowledge to be gained, habits of analysis to be formed, procedures to be understood and followed by learners.

The program of testing to be launched by the Commission on the Teaching of Sociology of the Southern Sociological Society led to the present exploratory study of objectives. It has been assumed that we must know what we are trying to accomplish before we can test its attainment. The study is regarded as preliminary or exploratory because the instrument by which data were obtained has not been refined and perfected; nor has a statistically reliable sample been obtained. Only members of the Southern Sociological Society and 30 authors of introductory texts were asked to participate. Some members of the Society cooperated by asking instructors in the beginning course who were not members to mark the sched-

ules. Out of 125 schedules sent to members, 60 were returned and tabulated. Eleven of the 30 authors of introductory texts returned schedules.

It was first thought that authors of introductory texts, most of whom resided outside of the south-eastern region, might be regarded as a control group. But it was later recognized that they were first of all teachers, and therefore, a part of the same group with other teachers of sociology. Data were kept separate, and reference to the authors in comparison with the members will occasionally be made. But, on the whole, significant differences did not appear. The 11 authors included 10 full professors and 1 associate professor; whereas the members included 23 professors, 15 associate professors, 9 assistant professors and 11 instructors—leaving 2 who did not state their rank. All combined are now teaching an aggregate of 5390 students. The average number of years of teaching introductory sociology by the authors is 23 years; whereas the members' average is 7.5 years. Of 64 in the combined group who reported, 22 are teaching a full year course, 26 are on a semester basis, and 16 give practically the same number of hours of teaching in a quarter as others give in a semester. Thus, three-fourths of the introductory courses represented in the sample are 50 hours long; while one-fourth of them extend a little more than 100 hours.

Of 69 in the combined group 3 report use of the lecture method alone, 5 accept the lecture-quiz as descriptive of their method of teaching, and 52 mark lecture-discussion as the most frequent teaching procedure. None marks laboratory as the most frequent procedure. This latter point is confirmed by the rejection of all objectives having to do with the construction of tables and graphs and the application of measures and criteria—as well as the relative absence of exercises and projects carried on in connection with the course. Opportunity was provided for checking whether no attention, little attention, or considerable attention had been given to the conscious formulation of objectives. Eight authors and 48 members stated that they had given considerable attention whereas 11 of the latter and one of the former had given little attention. All of the returns, save two in the member grouping, expressed the belief that considerable advantage would be gained by the conscious formulation of objectives. Two thought there would be little value in such effort. Opinion was quite divided as to whether students should help formulate the objectives or be given them.

Twenty-four of the member group and 4 of the authors felt that students should participate in the formulation of objectives; whereas 22 of the former and 5 of the latter believed that objectives should be stated for the students. Many marginal notes suggested that beginning students would lack the experience necessary to help with the formulation of objectives. One thought students should not have a statement of objectives from any source.

Authors and members combined are now using 23 different texts but there is definite concentration on two of these; one being used by 29 and the other by 11 of the member grouping. Three of the authors are not using their own texts. Four persons do not center their work around any text, but through the use of a syllabus organize material from a variety of sources. Others use a syllabus with one text as a point of departure.

Although pertinent to the study of objectives a separate paper would be required to analyze the variety of teaching materials and procedures which are being utilized throughout the region. A glimpse of these may serve as a clearing house for useful suggestions, and may furnish a lead for further effort by the Commission on the Teaching of Sociology. Twenty-five courses do not follow the order and organization of material in the text. Sometimes this involves supplementation or selection; but represents in many instances a rationale of pedagogy. When objectives are clear, it might be profitable to investigate the most effective organization of material so far as learning is concerned.

The use of reference material varies all the way from prescriptions of 100 pages per week in two instances to no supplementary reading in seven situations. One person states that the library is short of books and those in the library are out of date. Another states that it is difficult to get the freshmen through the one text. A third states that only the honors type of student can do additional reading with profit. The most frequent practice is to allow freedom of choice from a very long list of reference materials, including not only books and monographs but also scientific journals, government reports and bulletins, and newspapers. Book reports and term papers are the most frequent means of reflecting the varied choice and amount of reading. Such reports are suggestive of a laboratory approach; but exercises and projects are more indicative of the well known formula of "learning by doing."

While 18 state that no exercises or projects are

carried on in connection with the course and none claims a major emphasis upon laboratory procedure the activities reported are most interesting and suggestive. They include: (1) weekly essays analyzing familiar situations in terms of previous week's lectures, (2) filing of newspaper and other clippings with comments showing pertinence of material to structures and processes being discussed in class, (3) scrap books or books illustrative of social structures and processes, (4) building word lists or sociological vocabularies, (5) writing students' own family histories, (6) collecting data on local community and campus life, (7) constructing population pyramid for local community, (8) field trips to local institutions and government projects, (9) use of work book, (10) written answers to questions at end of chapters in text, (11) abstracting periodical literature, (12) taking race attitude tests, (13) interracial conferences, (14) use of pertinent motion pictures and charts as visual aids, (15) use of Colcord's guide to local community analysis, (16) three hours per week assignment to local agencies as assistants and observers (prospective majors only), (17) panel discussions, (18) subdivision of class into small groups for discussion.

II

In building the questionnaire on objectives an attempt was made to represent the various approaches and emphases which have been included in various introductory courses. A number of stated objectives which have been used to aid Vanderbilt students to define their goals and guide their independent study were taken as a nucleus. To these were added a number dealing with problems of delinquency, crime, man-land relations, philosophical considerations, table and graph construction and so on. There was no way of knowing whether all points of view had been included, so additional space was provided for writing in any objective which a teacher regarded as "highly essential." Provision was then made for rating objectives on a scale from Highly Essential, Essential, Uncertain, Non-essential, to Wholly Improper. The instructions stated that there were more objectives than any one course would contain and that a critical selection of objectives was the object of the study.

It is an interesting commentary on divergency of judgment that every objective was rated "highly essential" and "uncertain" by someone. Only five goals escaped the label of "non-essential" or "wholly improper" by some teacher. In spite of

this divergency a rather high degree of consensus was exhibited through the rating process. By giving the "uncertain" rating a value of minus one, "non-essential" a minus two, and "wholly improper" a minus three, negative reactions could be balanced against the positive, "highly essential" with a value of plus three, and "essential" with plus two. Thus, an index number for each objective, which can be placed upon a scale from the highest positive rating (144) to the highest negative (-79), may represent the composite judgment or consensus with reference to the appropriateness of objectives for Introductory Sociology. If the ratings are accepted as a measure of consensus those objectives with a minus index would probably be excluded; and those with low positive scores would be subject to careful scrutiny.

The objectives were classified roughly and a mean index computed for each classification. It is recognized that the basis of classification as well as the assignment of objectives to each category might be highly debatable. But, for the purpose of determining whether any class of objectives may be regarded as "wholly improper" and others "highly essential" the procedure is suggestive. The objectives are set forth in rank order of indices within each classification. And the classifications themselves are placed in descending order by the mean of the indices for each class.

TEN CLASSES OF OBJECTIVES

I. Objectives concerning the meaning and structure of groups, including status structure. (Mean Index 100)

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To understand the nature of race and race-conscious groups in contrast to nationality and culture groups.	132
2. To recognize the significance of primary groups in the development of stable or unstable personality.	127
3. To show how social groups are formed and how they maintain their continuity	120
4. To understand the meaning of status, how determined, how recognized, and how maintained within and among groups.	118
5. To contrast class and caste; and apply to American social structure.	106
6. To understand and illustrate the concept of social distance.	94
7. To differentiate social groups from other collections of people; and to classify social groups.	91

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
8. To recognize the minority groups in American society; and analyze some of the conditions of tension with respect to majority and minority group relations.....	57
9. To analyze the factors of group morale in time of crisis.....	57

II. Objectives dealing with general social processes—communication, cooperation, competition, conflict, accommodation, assimilation, public opinion, and social movements. (Mean index 91)

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To understand the meaning and significance of communication in group relations, and to define interaction....	144
2. To understand the process of assimilation and analyze the factors which promote and retard the process.....	140
3. To demonstrate how group life has been affected by the development of modern means of communication.....	138
4. To understand the significance of race in the process of conflict; and recognize the forms of race conflict.....	132
5. To know and illustrate the ways in which a person or group may be isolated; and point out the general effects of such isolation.....	128
6. To describe the process of cooperation.	125
7. To define the process of conflict and analyze its chief forms.....	122
8. To define accommodation and analyze its chief forms.....	117
9. To understand the meaning of competition and show why it is inevitable..	117
10. To show how secondary relationships are dependent upon language; why such relationships are becoming ascendant in the modern world; and why this is significant.....	111
11. To explain suggestibility and nature of leadership in crowd behavior.....	100
12. To describe the process of public opinion.....	97
13. To understand the relation of public opinion to democracy.....	97
14. To interpret the place of the newspaper and radio in secondary society; and point out the sources of error which may distort the report of events.....	95
15. To note changes in behavior when competition becomes a conscious process.....	88
16. To understand the factors necessary to the existence of public opinion.....	87

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
17. To show the relation of public opinion to the establishment and destruction of mores.....	79
18. To trace crowd behavior emerging from crises.....	62
19. To explain how crises may be precipitated by conscious manipulation of the means of communication.....	61
20. To recognize levels of communication; contrast human and animal communication.....	57
21. To trace series of events leading to mob violence; and explain methods used to "break" or control crowd action.....	55
22. To analyze the democratic process....	53
23. To contrast the democratic process with authoritarian forms of control...	37
24. To see the relationship of language growth to "the development of mind".	21
25. Trace the process, and analyze the phases of two or more social movements	2

III. Objectives concerned with the nature of science—including the attitudes, fields, and difficulties involved. (Mean index 85)

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To recognize indifferent, practical, dogmatic, emotional, common sense and scientific attitudes toward knowing or learning about the world in which one lives.....	140
2. To understand the meaning of science and scientific method.....	140
3. To recognize that social interaction is the area and the social group the unit of study in sociology.....	127
4. To see self and others objectively, that is, to survey the behavior of human beings from the same angle that he would use for any other type of object moving about in a field of force.....	102
5. To know what constitutes a problem and to define some social problems....	94
6. Recognize some of chief difficulties which handicap the social sciences as compared to physical sciences.....	76
7. To recognize false and spurious inferences from data; and pseudoscientific manipulation.....	66
8. To recognize the necessity of an area and unit of study in a particular science	42

IV. Objectives approaching the structure of society by way of culture and cultural analysis, including the detailed study of institutions. (Mean index 79)

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>	<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To learn the meaning of culture as a scientific category in contrast to the common-sense use of the term; and in contrast with civilization.....	128	3. To understand the reasons for differential rates of change and the meaning of culture lag.....	123
2. To differentiate folkways, mores, and laws as tools for cultural analysis.....	126	4. To understand the processes of social disorganization and reorganization as natural concomitants of change.....	123
3. To recognize basic needs of man; and show how these serve to integrate major behavior patterns.....	124	5. To show the relation of changing culture to stability of personality.....	101
4. Know what language is; and its significance for group life.....	122	6. To explain diffusion; and give examples of the several types of diffusion.....	100
5. To differentiate traits, complexes, and patterns as tools for cultural analysis..	110	7. To analyze the factors which promote and retard diffusion.....	96
6. To understand and trace the cumulative nature of institutions and culture	109	8. To explain cultural inertia.....	94
7. To recognize how culture patterns transmitted by specific groups define behavior by race, sex, age, status, etc..	108	9. To know meaning, types, originating factors, and significance of inventions..	90
8. Know meaning of cultural variability; and compare two contrasting cultures.	94	10. To understand the process of family disorganization and point out its symptoms.....	81
9. To recognize culture as social structure; and to analyze it accordingly.....	86	11. To analyze the factors producing increased urbanization and some of the emergent problems.....	80
10. To understand the types of marriage and forms of the family.....	83	12. To analyze the shifts in patterns and functions from the family to other institutions since the Colonial period in America.....	67
11. To know the meaning and point out examples of cultural survivals.....	64	13. To recognize the relativity of indices of social disorganization between differing cultures.....	45
12. To analyze origin, chief characteristics, principal changes, and vestigial elements in political, economic, religious, and educational institutions.....	53	14. To recognize the principal indices of community disorganization.....	42
13. To analyze the factors in family stability; and show how these may be used in prediction of marital success.....	47	15. To recognize crises as undefined situations.....	41
14. To trace the origins and interdependence of subdivisions of culture.....	39	16. To trace the ramifications of change associated with a given invention.....	28
15. To recognize the meaning of social order in which "situations are defined."	39	17. To anticipate some major changes in the future.....	18
16. To outline the universal culture pattern; and show why and in what sense it is universal.....	38	18. To arrange the principal inventions and achievements of man in time perspective.....	-12
17. To trace the cumulative phases of the family institution.....	29		
18. To describe courtship patterns, or approach to marriage in several cultures, including romantic complex.....	20		
V. Objectives emphasizing the phenomena of social change—invention, diffusion, disorganization etc. (Mean index 76)		VI. Objectives seeking to understand original and acquired nature in relation to personality. (Mean index 61)	

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To recognize some of the far-reaching culture changes which are going on in our generation.....	135
2. To understand the meaning and two basic sources of culture change.....	123

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
1. To recognize the meaning of self; and the process of developing self and role..	108
2. To show how man acquires human nature; and how human nature changes from age to age.....	105
3. To recognize the popular contradictory and unscientific interpretations of human nature.....	91
4. To understand the integration of selves in the maturing of personality.....	91

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>	<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
5. To show how personality may be unorganized, organized, disorganized, and reorganized.....	76	11. To account for the origin, know how to locate; and explain the significance of the American open-country community	-9
6. To point out the unspecialized, modifiable, and relatively plastic nature of man's neuro-physical structure.....	67	VIII. Objectives concerning particular social problems and programs of action. (Mean index -9)	
7. To understand the criteria of normal personality.....	66	<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
8. To recognize the meaning of feral man; and the characteristics of human nature.....	53	1. To recognize the chief measures of population; and the major trends which these reveal.....	99
9. To explain and illustrate the phenomena of marginal man.....	48	2. To understand the process of family disorganization and point out its symptoms.....	81
10. To compare the race conflict attitudes and patterns in Japanese-American relations on West coast; Negro-White relations in South; historical Indian-White relations in early America.....	34	3. To recognize some of the principal causes and by-products of poverty.....	32
11. To define the procedure of achieving adulthood as a task to be accomplished rather than as natural inevitable process.....	22	4. To understand the problems involved in the attempts of the laboring classes to better their lot through unionization	20
12. To learn the age of man; and the probable recency of significant structural or biological change in man.....	-16	5. To understand the necessity for conserving and planning the use of natural resources.....	15
VII. Objectives dealing with the local world—community, neighborhood, city, and region. (Mean index 46)		6. To analyze the principal factors associated with juvenile delinquency.....	12
<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>	7. To contrast the historical and later methods of dealing with juvenile offenders.....	8
1. To recognize the principal functions of communities.....	84	8. To recognize the areas of chronic poverty.....	7
2. To trace the operation of ecological processes in urban growth; and describe the general spatial pattern which results.....	73	9. To analyze social security and other programs of amelioration and rehabilitation.....	-4
3. To explain the meaning of "human ecology".....	69	10. To translate the democratic process into school control.....	-11
4. To analyze the principal factors which influence location and growth of communities.....	68	11. To know the basic problems of American youths, rural and urban, and to assess the various attempts which have been made at solving them.....	-11
5. To know the origin, characteristics, and significance of slum and residential suburb.....	50	12. To detect the maladjustment between the vocational demands of modern society and our educational-training program, particularly that of the student's own college.....	-18
6. To compare daily life in a community now and a generation ago.....	45	13. To analyze the practices which waste natural resources—exploitive and erosive uses of land and destructive methods of lumbering and mining.....	-20
7. To recognize the interdependence of communities in a metropolitan region..	44	14. To outline the principal problems of rural life.....	-21
8. To differentiate community from neighborhood.....	40	15. To recognize the factors in undergraduate life which facilitate and/or interfere with the effective selection of a mate.....	-28
9. To know how a natural region is located or defined.....	30	16. To gain direct acquaintance with the work of health, welfare, and other social agencies in the local area.....	-28
10. To know the chief criteria by which communities are classified; and what the principal classes are.....	13		

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
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21. To analyze the factors producing, extending, and perpetuating land tenancy.....	-53
22. To learn the origin and present status of penal systems.....	-57
23. To gain experience in leadership of some group in community.....	-60
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IX. Objectives involving ethical or philosophical evaluation and interpretation. (Mean index -11)	

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2. To realize the responsibility of a democracy to ameliorate the severity of caste discriminations.....	39
3. To recognize the integrating function of religion in personality and in society.....	36
4. To appraise religion as a secular guardian of cultural values rather than a manipulator of the supernatural.....	6
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7. To understand the significance of the theory of social determinism which asserts that "choice" is an illusion, and that the human "will" must be restated in terms of social forces.....	-20
8. To understand the necessity for men of science to help stay the march of fascism, which destroys all science.....	-24
9. To distinguish between the fundamental and the superficial values in the urban way of life.....	-26
10. To strengthen belief in progress.....	-41
11. To recognize the general aimlessness and chaotic nature of American Education.....	-44
12. To evaluate tenancy in relation to other forms of land tenure.....	-60
13. To understand the statement: "Love without science is powerless; science without love is destructive".....	-67

X. Objectives emphasizing direct or laboratory contact with materials together with utilization of systematic analytical procedures. (Mean index -22)

<i>Statement of Objectives</i>	<i>Index</i>
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3. To gain experience in making class reports.....	-9
4. To gain experience in cooperative projects.....	-11
5. To construct simple statistical tables..	-29
6. To construct simple graphs of social data.....	-29
7. To learn simple criteria, and directly observe accessible institutional care— orphanages, reform schools, penal institutions, etc.....	-41
8. To gain first-hand acquaintance with three or more levels of living.....	-49
9. To list and explain factors involved in an exhaustive personality analysis.....	-79

This exploratory study seems to indicate that sociology is being "introduced" as a special science; but it raises some questions which were not anticipated. Those objectives which are regarded as "Highly Essential" or "Essential" are concerned with the structure and processes of society, and with the nature of science itself. The three classes of objectives which seem to be regarded as "Non-essential" or "Wholly Improper" concern (a) social problems; (b) direct acquaintance with social phenomena, and the utilization of simple statistical and analytical procedures; and (c) philosophical interpretations and value judgments. It may be significant that those objectives concerning community and neighborhood—the local world—rated lowest on the positive side of the scale, which might be interpreted as "Uncertain" for inclusion in the course. A possible interpretation of these facts would be that the abstract concepts and principles of sociology as well as the abstract conception of the nature of science are regarded as highly essential for Introductory Sociology, whereas direct acquaintance with social phenomena in the social world and the utilization of problems as materials for analytical experience may be regarded as Uncertain, Non-essential or Wholly Improper. There are other possible interpretations; and further

study may sharpen the instrument to determine whether students become "acquainted with" or merely "learn about" sociology when they are "introduced" to it. The physical sciences have for a long time taught "principles" through laboratory experience. The nature of social science data handicaps a similar approach; but whether the conceptual framework of any science can be

learned with a minimum of direct or even vicarious experience is open to question.

A revised instrument for studying objectives may now be constructed and submitted to a wider group. By such a process consensus may be advanced. Introductory Sociology may come to have some reliable meaning; and testing may come to measure a known kind of mastery.

DOES YOUR NAME IDENTIFY YOU?

CLARENCE SCHETTLER

Western Reserve University

IT IS customary in our western civilization that a man shall be known by the name of his father. In past decades, the family name was frequently a distinctive appellation. It indicated a man's association with a place, an occupation, or with some distinguishing physical characteristic which at one time might have been useful in identifying his family. Illustrations of locality-names are Atmoor, Bathgate, Birdrock, and Johnston; of occupational-names are Smith, Miller, Carpenter, Archer, and Butcher; of physically-identifying-names are Longfellow, Fairchild, Blackhead, and Short. These examples do not exhaust the kinds of near or distant associations between names and individuals. They do serve to remind us that a name is a sort of face whereby one is identified.

In the United States today, surnames have lost much of their preciseness of identification. The Smith of this generation may be an iceman, and Fairchild may be the name of a Negro. Although some persons depend upon the sound and spelling of a name for clues to an individual's ancestry, even these are frequently of little value as identifying marks. How long one may consult the city directory and telephone book for examples of nationality names, depends upon the demoralizing experiences of minority members who carry these names. A foreign name, which, when properly pronounced, is very beautiful, becomes slightly comic when bandied about by careless strangers. It lends itself most ungraciously to pronunciation by tongues accustomed to the letter arrangements and phonetics of the English language. The intricacies of foreign spelling as well as the difficulty with correct pronunciation create innumerable complications,

and make it almost impossible for a foreign name to remain true to its original form.

Persons of minority nationality groups learn through experience that certain names always awaken certain prejudices. These persons realize that it is their names that constitute the common enemy for them as well as for members of the majority group. Evaluation of themselves stops with the judgment placed upon their names. Without consideration, much of their personality has been thereby discarded. These persons act upon the lesson learned, and they decide that a new or false name is an effective mask for disguising themselves. They change their names. Taraskevicia is translated as Rasko, Strakovsky is recast as Stark, Berkovitz evolves as Burke, Trofinov turns up as Travis, and Keidansky is shortened to Kay.

Six hundred and seven different names, involving 1020 persons were legally changed in the Probate Court of Cuyahoga County in Ohio from June 5, 1939 to August 22, 1940. The recorded characteristics of these persons and the reasons why they changed their names were analyzed.

The ranking of the nationalities by the number of names changed and the number of persons involved reveals which nationalities have encountered the greatest social distance or discrimination with their names. Table 1 includes both native and foreign born of both sexes.

In Table 1 as well as in most of the other data collected, the Polish, Hungarian, Russian, and Czechoslovakian are the four top ranking nationalities. Among the Germans, there were 18 names involving 29 persons who were Jewish. Among the English, there were 8 names involving 17 persons who were Jewish. In both instances, the

change of names was to avoid Jewish identifying names rather than German or English names. For the most part, the nationalities from eastern Europe and the Balkan region encounter the largest number of crises with their names.

Nine hundred and sixty five persons changed only their last name; 31 changed only their first name; and 24 changed both names. Since last names are seldom used in primary group relationships, the conflicts arising out of discriminations

TABLE 1
NUMBER OF NAMES CHANGED AND NUMBER OF PERSONS INVOLVED BY NATIONALITIES

NATIONALITY	NUMBER OF NAMES	NUMBER OF PERSONS
Polish.....	148	265
Hungarian.....	85	160
Russian.....	85	137
Czechoslovakian.....	47	79
German.....	44	71
Italian.....	36	63
English.....	35	50
Jugoslavian.....	29	50
Slovenian.....	18	30
Lithuanian.....	17	19
Austrian.....	16	36
Roumanian.....	6	7
Bohemian.....	6	10
Swiss.....	5	5
Belgian.....	5	5
Hollander.....	4	4
Carpathian.....	3	9
Croatian.....	3	4
All Others*.....	15	16

* The remaining ten nationalities—Swedish, Serbian, Greek, Bulgarian, Irish, Armenian, Chinese, Danish, Palestinian, South African—had two or less name changes each, and three or less persons each.

based upon names must occur in secondary group contacts.

The direction of changes in names is classifiable into seven categories. First, the name is Americanized or shortened though the first syllable or two letters, at least, will be the same as in the original name. Jaszany is changed to Jason; Mandarella to Mandell; Medoglia to Medal; Boruscivich to Borch; Chenchinsky to Chester; Grazulevic to Grady; Masojidik to Mason. Second, the original name is shortened without changing the spelling of the syllables retained and without adding any letters. Berkowitz becomes

Berk; Soltisz, Soltis; Feuerisen, Feuer; Vandercoy, Van; Filakovsky, Filak; Cappolecchia, Cappel; Divjakinja, Divjak; Zelechowski, Zele; Balanescu, Balan. Third, the name is changed completely. Examples are Petschauer to Reese; Sedivy to Grey; Karuza to Brown; Skatik to Penny; Gluckmann to Fay; Piechochinski to Walker; Kozlowski to Cody; Seoz to Martin; Velisek to Stillman. Fourth, the new name may be just as foreign as the old name. Trovato is changed to Amabite; Fiorelli to Valiquet; Kopczynski to Tatulinski; Pawelski to Lewandowski; Sabo to Sabold; Novak to Matuska; Felix to Musheff; Mesers to Mezaros. Fifth, the new name may be phonetically similar, e.g., Kuzsma, Cosma; Snajt, Snayd; Svatek, Swatek; Zinsli, Zinsley; Kozeluch, Kozluch; Zeman, Seaman; Kruppman, Krupman; Schwegler, Swegler; Csabra, Chabra; Lukacs, Lucas; Jakob, Jacob. Sixth, the new name rectifies a misspelling in the former name. Accordingly, Wagener is changed to Wagner; Smith to Schmidt; Bachler to Bechler; Bolanski to Balanchuk. Seventh, the full name or a part of it is translated, e.g., Braunstein to Brown; Eisenstein to Stone; Kaltwasser to Coldwater.

Approximately 73 percent Americanized or changed their name completely. If one includes those who shortened their original name, the percentage is almost 89. Although shortening of the original name might be considered as showing greater loyalty to the ancestral name, in many instances the change in name is almost as great as where the name was Americanized or changed completely. Among the nationalities in which a name was changed to one just as foreign, the Italian ranks highest in number and in percentage, namely, 17 and 27.5 of the total number of Italians. This might indicate a greater pride in family name than is characteristic of the other nationalities. Local persons are inclined to interpret the fact in terms of the prestige that such an Italian as DiMaggio has had in recent years. Nevertheless, a preponderant number of persons sweep aside matters of loyalty to family name, and make a clean break in the new name adopted. Even among the Italians almost 50 percent either Americanized or changed completely their name. It would be interesting to know if the Americanization of the name is indicative of complete assimilation into American life.

There were 55 persons who changed their first names, including the 24 who changed both names. The order of rank for those who changed only the

first name together with the number of persons is as follows: Hungarian (6); German (5); English (5); Polish (3); Russian (2); Yugoslavian (2); and one each for the Swedish, Slovenian, Italian, Danish, Czechoslovakian, South African, Austrian, and Croatian. The order of rank for those who

TABLE 2
DIRECTION OF CHANGE OF LAST NAME AND NUMBER OF PERSONS BY NATIONALITY INVOLVED

NATIONALITY	I*	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	TOTALS
Armenian.....		1						1
Austrian.....	12	10	6		7			35
Belgian.....	1	1	2	1				5
Bohemian.....	1	1	1	1	6			10
Bulgarian.....	1		1					2
Carpathian.....			9					9
Chinese.....			1					1
Croatian.....	3							3
Czechoslovakian.....	28	15	29	5	1			78
English.....	17	1	18	9				45
German.....	31	8	16	5	1	3	2	66
Greek.....			2					2
Hollander.....		2	1	1				4
Hungarian.....	51	30	57	9	3	4		154
Irish.....			1	1				2
Italian.....	18	15	12	17				62
Jugoslavian.....	14	9	24	1				48
Lithuanian.....	8	2	9					19
Palestinian.....							1	1
Polish.....	130	30	86	16				262
Roumanian.....	1	1	4	1				7
Russian.....	42	30	59	3		1		135
Serbian.....	2		1					3
Slovenian.....	4	1	16	4	4			29
Swedish.....			1					1
Swiss.....	4				1			5
Totals.....	368	157	356	74	23	8	3	989

*I. Americanized.

II. Original Shortened.

III. Changed Completely.

IV. Just as Foreign.

V. Phonetically Similar.

VI. Corrects a Misspelling.

VII. Translation.

changed both names is Italian (5); Polish (5); Czechoslovakian (4); Hungarian (4); Russian (3); and one each for Austrian, Roumanian, and Bohemian.

The direction of changes in first names was preponderantly toward Americanizing them (18 per-

sons), or toward changing the name completely (32 persons). Only 2 persons took names that were just as foreign. Only 2 persons corrected their names for misspelling, and 1 person shortened his original name. Illustrative of some of these changes are Isral to Irvin; Casimir to Karl; Franciszek to Frank; Ignatz to John; Alador to Andrew; Dezso to David; Vito to Nick; Vendell to William; Sarah to Sonia; Isadore to Robert; and Christopher to Christ.

The sex distribution of persons obtaining name changes was 670 males (533 native born and 137 foreign born) and 350 females (273 native born and 77 foreign born). There were 1.95 and 1.78 as many men as women respectively for the native born and foreign born. Comparing the native born with the foreign born, there were 3.89 and 3.54 as many men and women respectively for the native born. This sex distribution suggests that possibly the women have fewer contacts with the outside world and hence there is less incentive to change their names.

Concerning marital status, there were 482 married and 535 single. Among the native born there were 64 more single persons than married, and among the foreign born there were 8 more married than single.

The Ohio law permits change of name by either an individual or by an entire family, filing one petition. Of the total number of names changed almost two-thirds were by individuals (326 males and 59 females). Among the native born, the number of names changed by individuals was 333 and by families 173. Among the foreign born, it was respectively 52 and 49. A part of the large number of individual changes consists of children who change their name against the wishes of their parents. Not infrequently, one or both parents as individuals will later adopt legally the new name of the children.

The average age of persons who have their names changed varies considerably for native and foreign born. The arithmetic average for the native born including both sexes was 26.66 years and 34 years for the foreign born. In families without children, the mean for the youngest member was 28.9 years among the native born and 34.4 years among the foreign born. The average age of the oldest member of such families was 32.57 years for the native born and 37.5 years for the foreign born. The average age for the oldest member in a family with children was 36.81 years for the native born and 47.3 years for the foreign born. Where the peti-

tion for change of name was filed by an individual, the average age was 26.61 years for the native born and 29.2 years for the foreign born. The age range among all native born was from the age group 0-4 with 39 persons to the age group 70-75 with 1 person. For the foreign born it was from the age group 0-4 with 3 persons to the age group 65-70 with 2 persons.

In general where a childless couple or an individual changes his name, the age indicates that the person encounters handicaps early in his search for employment or in undertaking a business. Where people of an older age change their name, they have children usually who make persistent requests that the family name be changed. Detailed analysis of families with children discloses the fact that children in the elementary school, high school, or college play an important part in influencing the decision of the parents to change the family name. There were 80 families that had children 14 years of age or younger; 39 families with children in the age group of 15 to 19; and 38 families with children in the age period of 20 to 24.

Regarding the nativity of persons getting their names changed, the one outstanding fact is the large number who were born in Cleveland, Ohio. Among the native born, the birthplace of the head of the family whose name the other members bear was Cleveland in 97 out of 162 persons, or about 60 percent. The birthplace of other family members was Cleveland in 180 out of 280 persons, or about 65 percent. The birthplace of individuals (non-family members) among the native born was Cleveland in 226 out of 364 persons, or approximately 62 percent. The birthplace of the family members of foreign born heads of families was Cleveland in 52 out of 114 persons, or 45½ percent. Only 33 family members in addition to the foreign born heads were foreign born, constituting about 29 percent. The number of foreign born persons among families of native born heads was 9, or 3 percent. The number of foreign born heads of families and foreign-born individuals (non-family persons) was 100.

The prominence of the native born Clevelanders indicates that the name conflict probably arises when the individual begins to have social contacts outside of his family group, outside of his neighborhood or nationality group. When a person lives in his nationality neighborhood and maintains his business contacts in the same area, there is little need to change his name.

The occupations of these 1020 persons were

classified according to the United States Census "Classified Index of Occupations," plus the addition of three categories, namely, housewives, students, and not given.

The occupations which bring the person into contacts with people outside of the nationality group are likely to have the largest number of name changes. In the three high ranking occupations, crafts, operatives, and clerical, persons seek employment outside of their neighborhood and they have associations with many other groups, nationalities, and Americans. Their security and status depend upon their ability to identify themselves with the other group. Professionals, semipro-

TABLE 3
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF ALL PERSONS IN
THE STUDY

OCCUPATION	NUMBER
Professional workers.....	51
Semiprofessional workers.....	18
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm.....	27
Clerical and kindred workers.....	123
Salesmen and saleswomen.....	41
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers..	147
Operatives and kindred workers.....	143
Domestic service workers.....	6
Protective service workers.....	8
Service workers, except domestic and protective.....	26
Laborers, except farm.....	18
Housewives.....	175
Students.....	188
Not given.....	49
Total.....	1,020

fessionals, and proprietors are in positions of greater natural security because they are usually their own boss, and hence there is less need for name changes. A special check on professionals and proprietors showed that those who change their names had a clientele or patronage other than that of their own nationality. On the other hand, the professionals and proprietors within the nationality neighborhood, serving their own nationality, seldom changed their names. That the domestic ranks lowest may be due to the infrequent use of her last name by employers. The low rank of protective service workers is due to the fact that they are in civil service positions or community service positions in which the symbolic uniform as

in the case of firemen, policemen, etc., takes precedence over the individual's last name. It is significant that the largest single number of name changes is among students. In school, the individual is exposed to frequent use of his last name. Unpronounceable names are open to ridicule and jests by fellow students. Unwelcomed nicknames are given to the individual. He finds it difficult to be accepted as one of the group. He hesitates to correct continued mispronunciations of his name. The climax is frequently reached when he applied for a part-time job or a future full-time position. Then he discovers that his name is a very serious handicap.

The reasons given by persons for changing their names can be classified into nine categories. First, 428 persons stated that they wanted to change their name for business reasons. The original name was regarded as a definite handicap. Second, 406 persons mentioned that their name was difficult to pronounce in English and was constantly being misspelled, causing them embarrassment. Third, 67 persons had been using their new name for years and now wished to legalize it. In some instances, these new names were the nicknames given to persons by associates. Fourth, 49 persons said that the new name was that of a relative (e.g., mother wishes daughter to legally bear her name; person wishes stepfather's name, or aunt's name, or foster parent's name, or name adopted by other relatives). Fifth, 26 persons wanted their original name (e.g., restoration of maiden name; name of blood father rather than of stepfather; name of first husband). Sixth, 16 persons stated specifically that they wanted to avoid prejudice. Two persons in this group Americanized their name for patriotic reasons. Four persons implied that the prejudice was a religious one. Seventh, 12 persons contended that too many other persons had the same name (e.g., Cohen, Smith, Gold). Eighth, 7 persons gave misspelling as the only reason. Some of these misspellings occurred on birth certificates; others on marriage licenses, only to be discovered at a later date. The advent of social security has influenced some of these persons to correct inaccuracies in their names in order to better protect their security in the future years. Ninth, 2 persons gave religious reasons.

The Polish rank first in the following categories of reasons with the number of persons given in parentheses: business (130); difficult to pronounce and constantly misspelled (127); used new name for years (10); to avoid prejudice (3). The Germans rank first under the reason to correct a misspelling (4). The English rank first in new name being that of a relative (10); want original name (6); too many others with same name (5); and religious (1). Austrian is also represented by one person under the religious reason.

Seldom does one experience any trouble in changing his name. One case did occur recently when a group of colored men who were starting a Mohammedan church wanted Mohammedan names. The judge refused the petition on the ground that it would result in confusion. He suggested that they use their religious names only in conjunction with their work.

Despite the fact that most persons can readily have their name changed, the Ohio law does in one instance attempt to reestablish identities through names. A candidate for any elective political office who has changed his name must have his original or real name appear on the ballot and also on any campaign literature.

An individual doubtless experiences a certain degree of hesitancy when he formally declares his intention to change his name. In some instances, he is reluctant to be the target of slurs and wisecracks about the taste expressed in the newly selected name. He may be rebuked for the lack of racial pride. Some of the older members in most foreign groups take the attitude that the name which was good enough for a man's father is good enough for him. Nevertheless, these name changes establish without question the fact that there is such a thing as name status; a social distance, a discrimination based upon name introductions. Some members of minority groups perceive that only a name stands between them and acceptance in the dominant group. Telling names of nationality and ancestry are displaced by names that have merit and prestige in the judgments of members of the majority group. It is almost literally true that the individual who changes his name, changes his character.

A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF STANDARD OF LIVING¹

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NO CURRENT definition of standard of living is wholly acceptable to social scientists. To certain writers it means one of several forms of specific behavior while to others it includes broad patterns of living. While certain definitions refer to consumption of material goods, others emphasize satisfactions. A widely accepted definition is that of Faith M. Williams who regards standard of living as "... an ideal or norm of consumption" which may be described "... in terms of goods and services of a specific quantity and quality."² To Elizabeth Ellis Hoyt, standard of living refers to "... more than material things consumed... a sum total, not of things, but of satisfactions."³ The importance of social values, attitudes, and habits as a part of standard of living is emphasized by Thomas D. Eliot who believes that the concept "... refers sometimes to the actual distribution of real income in goods, services, and advantages received. In other connections it means rather a set of habitual valuations,—of attitudes of insistence toward certain goods and services and advantages."⁴

¹ The definition stated in this article was used as a frame of reference for the operational definitions of level of living, social participation and social adjustment used in the research described in the following reports: A. R. Mangus and Howard R. Cottam, *Level of Living, Social Participation, and Adjustment of Ohio Farm People*, The Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 624 (1941); Howard R. Cottam, *Methods of Measuring Level of Living, Social Participation, and Adjustment of Ohio Farm People*, Department of Rural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Mimeographed Bulletin No. 139 (1941); Howard R. Cottam, *Level of Living, Social Participation, and Social Adjustment: A Study of the Standards of Living of 299 Ohio Farm Families*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (University of Wisconsin, 1940).

² Faith M. Williams and Carle C. Zimmerman, *Studies of Family Living in the United States and Other Countries: An Analysis of Material and Method*, United States Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication No. 223 (1935), 4.

³ *The Consumption of Wealth*, (New York, 1928), 242, and *Consumption in Our Society* (New York, 1938), 266.

⁴ *American Standards and Planes of Living* (Chicago, 1931), 1.

Similarly, the place of habits and customs as a part of standard of living is implied in the work of W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller.⁵ E. A. Ross used the words standards and folkways synonymously.⁶ An effort was made by E. L. Kirkpatrick to clarify the concept by adding modifying adjectives to differentiate between *prevailing* and *desired* standards of living.⁷

Perhaps the most inclusive definition is that of Carle C. Zimmerman who writes that standard of living "... is the type of behavior which most adequately expresses the dominant values found in the associated manner of living." Standard of living is a *species* of his *systems of living*, which he defines as "... the total individual and group behavior as it is integrated about the efforts to satisfy desires."⁸ This definition which emphasizes behavior is called by Zimmerman a "typological" definition. He classifies other definitions as either "attitudinal"—those dealing with satisfactions, or "scientific"—those referring to scientific norms. Hazel Kyrk speaks of manners and modes of living as expressing the dominant values of persons and groups.⁹ L. L. Bernard reserves the term *standard* to apply to "... an ideal or scientifically constructed scale of expenditures... worked out as a means to an approved social end."¹⁰ Included in many studies of standard of living are inventories of possessions. The term *socioeconomic status* which is a related concept of standard of living, is defined by F. S. Chapin as "... the position an individual or a family occupies with reference to the prevailing average standards of cultural possessions, effective income, material possessions, and participation in group activities of the community."¹¹ Many investi-

⁵ *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1927), 71-79.

⁶ *Principles of Sociology* (New York, 1931), chap. 51.

⁷ *The Farmer's Standard of Living* (New York, 1929), 9-28.

⁸ *Consumption and Standards of Living* (New York, 1936), 3 and 6.

⁹ *A Theory of Consumption* (Boston, 1923), 232-233.

¹⁰ "Standards and Planes of Living," *Social Forces* (Dec., 1928), 190.

¹¹ *Contemporary American Institutions* (New York, 1935), 374.

gators consider participation in social groups an aspect of the concept.¹²

While the term standard of living may be used to designate any of several specific factors it may also be used as a generic term embracing many specific types of behavior and emphasizing their interrelatedness. In this article the concept is broadly defined as a theoretical frame of reference for the subsequent development of more specific concepts.

DEFINITION

The standard of living of a group consists of the types of human activity common to a group which are in harmony with cultural requirements which most completely meet the biological urges and social goals of individual members. The most common forms of behavior through which human needs or interests may be satisfied are generalized into group standards of living. Each group has its common forms of behavior or standards and larger groups encompass, in broader generalizations, the standards of component groups.¹³ Standards of living of a community include the standards of many families, neighborhoods, churches, lodges, and other component groups. Regional standards are more broadly generalized to include many communities and American standards of living are still more inclusive. This viewpoint implies the existence of fewer representative types of behavior in complex groups than in simple ones. American standards, in so far as they can be identified, can be described only in terms of behavior which is common throughout the nation, such as monogamy in marriage. In certain religious groups more specific standards may be identified such as marriage by a clergyman and absence of birth control. Standards of particular families may be typified by many specific forms of behavior. The more homogeneous the group the wider is the range of behavior that is common to the group. Standard of living is here defined in terms of configurations of behavior rather than Utopian ideals. If cannibalism, nudism, or atheism are common to a particular group they are aspects of the standards of living of that group.

¹² Nearly 150 studies of family living reviewed by Faith M. Williams and Carle C. Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, 456-609, included information on formal social participation.

¹³ Unique or contradictory behavior may exist but the common forms are the "standards."

STANDARDS AS BEHAVIOR

Implicit in the verb "living" is activity of some sort. Most of the currently accepted viewpoints of the concept either imply or denote explicitly human behavior, but many of the studies in the field of standard of living research give the impression that goods, services or statuses rather than the activities engaged in to acquire and to use them are the basic elements of the concept. From the standpoint of the present research, goods, services or statuses are not *per se* objects for study; the meanings of these objects are fundamental elements for study. Much behavior, however, can not be observed directly and must be imputed from presence or absence of various criteria.

Narrowly conceived, behavior is defined in terms of observable activities, but equally important is the behavior which occurs on a covert (anticipatory or retrospective) level. Particular types of covert behavior have been classified in an elaborate but overlapping and inexhaustive conceptual framework. The nomenclature is confused, and some of the more common terms such as values, attitudes, interests, needs, wants, wishes, desires, and satisfactions, are used indiscriminately. Although no widely acceptable classification of social purposes, goals or objectives has been prepared, there is substantial agreement among social scientists that there are such values. The important point here is not the classification of the goals, but the recognition that such values grow out of social experience and become the objectives about which individuals organize their lives.

CULTURE AND STANDARDS

Man is not wholly intelligent or utilitarian. He may act on the basis of motives he does not understand and for aims of which he is not fully aware. It is assumed in this paper that behavior of an individual is largely habitual, yet many of these habits have been determined by the culture. Patterns of activity favorable to satisfaction of needs are passed on from one generation to the next and serve as fundamental guides for individual behavior. In the American way of life, for example, monogamy in marriage, democracy in government, and public education are recognized guideposts for individual behavior. Certain groups within America emphasize some of these more than do others. Such ideals or norms are not wholly determinative of individual behavior, however,

for particular acts are carried out partly in response to the person's conception of the particular situation confronting him. Moreover, the culture allows persons many alternative ways of behaving to achieve the purposes implied in culture norms. In American culture all persons are expected to live in houses and to wear clothes, but the individual has wide latitude in choosing the kind of house he will occupy and the kind of clothes he will wear. He is also allowed choice in meeting other social aims by playing social roles through occupations, and by participating in various ways in social groups. Each person may decide, within certain limits, which roles are most congenial to his nature.

It must be emphasized that standards of living are social phenomena. Persons do not exist apart from the social groups in which they live. A way of living considered satisfying to a particular individual may be disapproved by the group and out of harmony with social standards and socially sanctioned modes of behavior. The criminal, the pauper, and ne'er-do-well, the hobo, indicate a few roles or ways of living that depart from cultural standards and are socially disapproved regardless of how much satisfaction the particular individual might derive from them. Similarly, the saint, the reformer, or the scientist may not live in full harmony with cultural standards.

HIGH AND LOW STANDARDS

The definition given above is normative, but it does not preclude the use of evaluations of standards as reference points for analysis. For example, "Scientific" standards may be determined as goals, and those which approach these standards may be called "high." From another viewpoint "high" standards of individuals or groups may be considered as those which conform most closely to norms

of larger groups or cultures. Viewed in this manner persons who adjust to their social environment in such a way that their personal needs are satisfied without departing too far from group standards of behavior are achieving a maximum standard of living. Theirs is the "highest" standard of living. Such persons are characterized by minimum frustration and maximum contentment; their biological needs are met on continuing bases; their imperious cultural wants are satisfied with facility; and their social goals are achieved through the roles they play. They are not without degrees of mental or emotional conflict, but their adjustment to conflicts is made with relative ease.

SUMMARY OF DEFINITION

Standards of living consist of forms of behavior which are common to a group and which conform to cultural norms. Both observable activities and subjective goals or attitudes are embraced in the concept. It implies a configuration of social activity which characterizes the group. Some forms of behavior may be observed directly; some activity can only be imputed from possession of goods, services, or statuses; and covert behavior can only be inferred through expressions, gestures, or possessions.

This definition does not deny the existence of inconsistencies in behavior, but it emphasizes a high degree of relatedness of behavior. Standard of living is not a congeries of random behavior of isolated individuals. Nor may standards be understood in terms of man's overt activities alone; they must be related to the adequacy (the completeness) with which these activities serve him in the realization of human values. The meaning of these instruments to individuals together with the overt behavior involved in their acquisition and use determine standard of living.

FAMILY SIZE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS IN MAINE

H. D. LAMSON

University of Maine

THIS is a study of the classes of 1940 when they were freshmen at Colby College, Bowdoin College, and at the University of Maine. The data were secured on schedules filled out in class in the fall of 1936 through the cooperation of various instructors. After editing we had 475 usable cases from Maine, 153 from Colby, and 140 from Bowdoin. Our primary interest was in determining the size of the student and parent generations in relation to education of parents, occupation of father, religious affiliation of family, and size of community. Students were asked to state the number of brothers and sisters living and dead in their own generation and in that of their mothers and their fathers. It is assumed that the figures secured in this manner are underestimates. W. S. Thompson in a similar study found that, in checking with parents, students underestimated the parent generation size on the average by one-half a child and their own generation by one-tenth of a child.¹ In our study no attempt has been made to correct for this error, the figures being summaries of the statements of the students. These families are of course all fertile. In all three colleges the largest number of cases in the student generation occurred at the two-child level. In the mothers' generation the largest number fell at the three-child size in the Colby and Maine series, but for Bowdoin it was at the five-child level. In the families of the fathers the mode occurred for Colby and Bowdoin at three children, and for Maine at four.

Based upon the average number of children per family as shown in Table 1 the students at Maine come from the largest families with 3.67, then comes Colby with 3.28, and finally Bowdoin with 3.04. Stating this in another manner, for every hundred families in the Maine series there are 367 offspring, for Colby 328, and for Bowdoin 304.

In the parent generation (secured by combining the mothers' and the fathers' generation figures) the average number of siblings for the Maine families is 4.95, for Colby 4.88, and for Bowdoin

4.59 per family. Comparing the average size of the parent and student generations we find that for the University of Maine there is a decrease of 1.28 children per family, for Colby 1.6, and for Bowdoin 1.55. On a percentage basis there is a decline from parent to student generation for the Maine series of slightly more than twenty-five percent (25.8). In the Colby and Bowdoin cases the drop is roughly one-third (32.8 percent and 33.8 percent respectively). The corresponding decline in the Thompson study was 33.6 percent.² Holmes found for a California series a decline of 29.8 percent.³ Baber and Ross discovered for native families a drop of 38.4 percent.⁴ A study made at

TABLE 1
FAMILY SIZE BY COLLEGES, CLASSES OF 1940 AS FRESH-
MEN, NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER FAMILY BY
GENERATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE,
COLBY, BOWDOIN

	TOTAL FAMIL- IES	A	B	C	D	E	PER CENT DE- CLINE D TO A
		Average size of generation				Differ- ence be- tween D and A	
		Student	Mother	Father	Parent		
Maine.....	475	3.67	5.00	4.89	4.95	1.28	25.85
Colby.....	153	3.28	5.08	4.67	4.88	1.60	32.78
Bowdoin.....	140	3.04	4.82	4.35	4.59	1.55	33.76

Mt. Holyoke College in 1920 revealed a decline from mothers' to students' generation of 38.1 percent (from 5.09 to 3.15 average offspring per family).⁵ A similar study at Mt. Holyoke made fifteen years later revealed an even larger percentage decline from mothers' to students' genera-

² *Op. cit.*, p. 482.

³ S. J. Holmes, "Size of College Students' Families (California)," *Jour. of Heredity* (Oct., 1924).

⁴ R. E. Baber and E. A. Ross, *Univ. of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History*, No. 10 (Madison, 1924).

⁵ Amy Hewes, "A Study of Families in Three Generations," *Jour. Ass'n. Collegiate Alumnae* (March-April, 1920).

¹ W. S. Thompson, "Size of Families from which College Students Come," *Jour. of the American Statistical Ass'n.* (Dec., 1925), 481.

tion, 41.7 (from 4.8 to 2.8 offspring per family).⁶ Mangold's study in California published in 1940 showed a decline of 30.2 percent.⁷ This is very close to the rate of decline found by Holmes sixteen years earlier in California in the study already mentioned, in which the drop between the two generations was 29.8 percent.

AGE OF MOTHER AND SIZE OF FAMILY

In the University of Maine series, the mother was dead in 14 families, in 38 others the age was unknown or not stated. In 423 cases we have the age as estimated by the student. The largest single age group is that of 40-44 years inclusive in

TABLE 2

AGE OF MOTHER AND SIZE OF FAMILY, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE, CLASS OF 1940 AS FRESHMEN

AGE OF MOTHER	MOTHER BORN IN PERIOD	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	PERCENT OF FAMILIES WHOSE MOTHER IS LIVING AND AGE STATED	AVERAGE AGE SIZE, STUDENT GENERATION	AVERAGE AGE SIZE, PARENT GENERATION	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PARENT AND STUDENT GENERATION
30-34	1902-1906	3	0.7	—	—	—
35-39	1897-1901	41	9.7	3.29	4.91	1.62
40-44	1892-1896	135	32.0	3.32	4.80	1.48
45-49	1887-1891	122	28.8	3.56	4.91	1.35
50-54	1882-1886	68	16.1	3.76	5.17	1.41
55-59	1877-1881	42	9.9	5.00	5.12	0.12
60-64	1872-1876	12	2.8	4.25	5.13	0.88
Total*	423	100.0			

* Of the living mothers whose ages are stated, 57.6 percent are aged 45 and over. There are fourteen dead mothers and 38 for whom no age was stated.

which slightly less than one-third of the mothers fall, 32 percent of those whose ages were stated. The next largest group is that of 45-49 with 28.8 percent. The average age of the 423 mothers is between 46 and 47 years. About 10 percent are under forty. Table 2 presents the family size data by mothers' age groups.

When we examine the average size of student

⁶ Ruth O. Truex, "The Size of Family in Three Generations," *American Sociological Review* (Aug. 1936), 581-591.

⁷ George B. Mangold, "The Changing Size of the Family Unit," *Sociology and Social Research* (Nov.-Dec., 1940), 150-156.

generation we find that, starting with the mothers' age group 35-39, there is a steady increase from 3.29 to the 55-59 group in which it reaches just five offspring. We may assume that the 122 mothers aged 45-49 have completed their families at just three and one-half children on the average. About forty-two percent of our mothers are under 45 years of age and presumably in some cases there will be other offspring. But if we compare the size of families of women 55-59 years old, which we have said to be five children, with the group of mothers just ten years younger, aged 45-49 with 3.56 offspring we find a difference of 1.44 children per family on the average. This is a decline of almost twenty-nine percent from mothers born 1877-1881, and probably married around 1900, to those born 1887-1891 and probably married around 1910.

TABLE 3

FAMILY SIZE AND COMMUNITY SIZE, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE STUDENTS, CLASS OF 1940 AS FRESHMEN, INCLUDING ONLY THOSE LIVING IN MAINE

SIZE OF PLACE	PER-CENT OF FAMILIES	AVERAGE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN STATED GENERATION				PER CENT DECLINE FROM PARENT TO STUDENT GENERATION
		Student	Mother	Father	Parent	
Less than 2,500...	44.8	4.27	5.14	4.77	4.95	13.7
2,500 and over...	55.2	3.56	4.50	5.22	4.85	26.6
Total.....	100.0	0.71	0.64	— .45	0.10	

COMMUNITY SIZE AND FAMILY SIZE

The University of Maine series was used as a basis for a study of difference between size of family and the size of the community in which the family resides within the state of Maine. Of 364 families residing in the state 44.8 percent are in communities of less than 2,500 persons (according to the 1930 census), and 55.2 percent in communities of 2,500 and over. The average size of the student generation for the smaller places is 4.27 per family and for the larger places 3.56. This is a difference of 71 children per hundred families. The difference in the parent generation in the two types of communities is less, only ten children per hundred families. The decline from parent to student generation within the smaller communities is from 4.95 to 4.27 which is 0.68 child per family, or 13.7 percent. For the larger places the drop between generations is from 4.85 to 3.56, which is 1.29

children per family, or 26.6 percent. This is almost twice as great as in the smaller places.

As might be expected, the state of Maine male students in the College of Agriculture come in larger proportions from smaller places. Of the two-year and four-year men combined almost six out of ten come from places under 2,500 (59.2 percent) while four out of ten (40.8 percent) come from places over 2,500. For the College of Arts and Sciences 44.9 percent, and for the College of Technology 42.4 percent, come from the smaller places. We may be surprised to learn that when we turn to the Home Economics girls only 27.7 percent come from places under 2,500, and 72.3 percent from the larger communities.

EDUCATION AND FAMILY SIZE

In this section we consider only whether or not the parents of our freshmen did or did not attend college. Graduation and attendance are considered together. Four combinations are made: (1) neither parent attended college. (2) both attended college, (3) father only attended college, (4) mother only attended college. Tables 4 and 5 give the data. For the University of Maine series both parents attended college in 12.8 percent of the cases, for Colby 17.6, and for Bowdoin 19.3 percent. Neither parent attended college in 59.8 percent of the cases for University of Maine, almost the same for Colby (58.9 percent), and 48.5 percent for Bowdoin. The father only attended college in the following ratios: Maine 21.3 percent; Colby 18.3 percent; Bowdoin 28.6 percent. The reverse situation, in which the mother attended college but not the father is much less common, the percentages being: Maine the largest with 6.1; Colby next with 5.2; Bowdoin last with 3.6.

The number of siblings in the student generation in the University of Maine series in which both parents attended college is smaller than for families in which neither attended, 3.44 to 3.86. The situation is reversed for the other two colleges although the difference is less. For Colby the average number of siblings in the student generation is 3.37 for the 27 families in which both parents attended college and 3.33 for the 90 families in which neither parent attended college, a very slight difference. In the Bowdoin series the 27 families in which both parents attended college have an average of 3.04 siblings, and for the 68 families in which neither parent attended 2.97 per family. Perhaps the small number of families in the both-parent series (27 in each case) does not

warrant any definite conclusions, but the absence of the contrast which we found in the state university series was a little surprising in view of statements often made concerning the childbearing performance of college parents.

If we take the category "neither parent attended college" and compare the average size of student generation for the three institutions, we find a regular downward progression from University of Maine (3.86) to Colby (3.33) to Bowdoin (2.97). The percentage ratio of Colby in relation

TABLE 4

EDUCATION OF PARENTS, CLASS OF 1940 AS FRESHMEN
BOWDOIN, COLBY, AND UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

ATTENDANCE AT COLLEGE	PERCENT		
	Maine	Colby	Bowdoin
Father only.....	21.3	18.3	28.6
Mother only.....	6.1	5.2	3.6
Both parents.....	12.8	17.6	19.3
Neither parent.....	59.8	58.9	48.5
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE 5

EDUCATION OF PARENTS AND FAMILY SIZE, CLASS OF
1940 AS FRESHMEN, BOWDOIN, COLBY, AND
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

	AVERAGE SIZE, STUDENT GENERATION			AVERAGE SIZE, PARENT GENERATION		
	Maine	Colby	Bowdoin	Maine	Colby	Bowdoin
Both parents attended college.....	3.44	3.37	3.04	3.57	3.80	4.33
Neither parent at- tended college.....	3.86	3.33	2.97	5.35	5.38	4.98

to Maine is 86.3, and that of Bowdoin in relation to Maine is 76.9. If the other group "both parents attended college" is considered, a similar progression is found for the student generation: Maine 3.44; Colby 3.37; and Bowdoin 3.04. Here the percentage ratio of Colby in relation to University of Maine is 98, and that of Bowdoin in relation to Maine is 88.4. The three institutions are closer together in size of student generation for those families in which both parents attended college than in those in which neither attended.

Turning now to the size of the parent generation

for the three colleges we find that those families in which both parents attended college have a smaller number of siblings than those in which neither attended. The contrast for the University of Maine is 3.57 to 5.35; for Colby 3.8 to 5.38; and for Bowdoin 4.33 to 4.98. The difference between collegiate and noncollegiate families is greatest for Maine (1.78 parent siblings per family), next for Colby (1.58), and lowest for Bowdoin (0.65). Probably Bowdoin families, even if fairly large, were better able financially to afford college education in the parent generation than those from which the parents went to University of Maine. In other words these figures suggest that in the parent generation of the Bowdoin series even a member of a fairly large family was more likely to get to college than in the Maine series. If we trace the average size of siblings in the parent generation for those families in which both parents attended college, we find a regular upward progression from the University of Maine group (3.57) to the Colby (3.8), to the Bowdoin series (4.33).

OCCUPATION OF FATHER AND FAMILY SIZE

For 428 University of Maine families we have arranged the size of student generation by descending order according to eight types of occupations in Table 6. The 82 fathers engaged in some form of agricultural work head the list with an average of 4.55 offspring per family. Next follows the small group of 20 unskilled laborers who have 4.4 children per family. Considerably below the first two is a class termed "Merchants and Small Managers" embracing 68 families which average 3.69 children in the student generation. The fourth grouping is termed "Public Service" which includes for the most part government employees and a few in privately operated public utilities. Here the 47 families average 3.62 offspring.

The skilled trades furnish 65 families with just three and one-half children apiece. The sixth class is that termed "Commerce" which includes such occupations as salesmen, accountants, bankers, realtors, bookkeepers, statisticians, and insurance men. For these families there are slightly over three children each (3.13). The next group is a small category of manufacturers and superintendents including 27 families, the average number of offspring in each of which is 3.07. Our last group consists of 73 professional men who have slightly less than three offspring (living and dead) on the average (2.96). Thompson found that for 64 New England professional families studied in

1925, the average number of children per family was 2.97, practically the same as ours.⁸

When we look back over our eight classes of occupations we find that they fall into three major groups according to number of offspring. At the top are the unskilled laborers and those engaged in agriculture averaging about four and one-half children. Then we have the next three categories, merchants and small managers, public service, and skilled trades. For these the average of children in student generation is slightly more than three and one-half. At the bottom we lump together commerce, manufacturers, and superintendents,

TABLE 6
OCCUPATION OF FATHER AND FAMILY SIZE, ARRANGED
IN ORDER OF AVERAGE SIZE OF STUDENT
GENERATION, CLASS OF 1940 AS FRESHMEN,
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

OCCUPATION	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	AVERAGE SIZE OF STUDENT GENERATION	AVERAGE SIZE OF PARENT GENERATION	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GENERATIONS	PERCENTAGE DECLINE
Agriculture.....	82	4.55	5.07	0.52	10.3
Labor (unskilled).....	20	4.40	5.30	0.90	16.9
Merchants and small managers.....	68	3.69	5.35	1.66	31.0
Public service.....	47	3.62	5.10	1.48	29.0
Trades (skilled).....	65	3.54	4.91	1.37	27.9
Commerce.....	46	3.13	4.11	0.98	23.8
Manufacturers and superintendents.....	27	3.07	5.04	1.97	39.0
Professions.....	73	2.96	4.40	1.44	32.7
Total.....	428				

with the professionals. For these there is a tendency to center near the three-child level. When we contrast the agricultural with the professional families we discover a difference of 156 children per 100 families, a fact which emphasizes the "population reservoir" idea as applied to agricultural families. The percentage decline between the parent and the student generation for agricultural families is about ten (10.3 percent), for unskilled labor almost seventeen (16.9 percent), for commerce group about twenty-four (23.8 percent), for skilled trades twenty-eight (27.9 percent), for public service 29, for merchants and small managers 31, for professionals 32.7 and for for manufacturers and superintendents 39.

⁸ Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 484.

The student-generation figures by occupation for Colby and Bowdoin cannot be quoted for all classes because of the small number of cases, but in the professional group for 36 Colby families the figure is 3.16 offspring. For the 35 Bowdoin professionals it is 2.97, very close to the Maine size of 2.96 per family.

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND FAMILY SIZE

The student was asked upon the schedule to state the religious denomination with which his family is connected. Nearly three-quarters of the University of Maine freshmen were from Protestant families (73.9 percent), nearly fifteen (14.9 percent) Catholic; and about five percent (5.3) Jewish. No denomination was given in 5.3 percent of the freshmen. At Colby and Bowdoin slightly larger proportions of Protestants were

TABLE 7
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND FAMILY SIZE TRENDS
UNIVERSITY OF MAINE

DENOMINATION	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	AVERAGE GENERATION SIZE				AVERAGE AGE, MOTHER
		Student	Mother	Father	Parent	
Catholic.....	71	4.20	5.87	6.44	6.15	47.0
Hebrew.....	25	3.64	6.76	6.52	6.64	45.0
Protestant.....	351	3.54	4.73	4.49	4.61	46.5

found in the freshman class, 80.4 and 77.1 percent respectively. Catholics comprised 8.5 percent at Colby and 12.2 percent at Bowdoin. Jewish freshmen made up 9.8 percent of the Colby and 6.4 percent of the Bowdoin class. Summarizing the situation we may say that for the three colleges about three-fourths to four-fifths of our freshmen are protestants, between eight and fifteen percent Catholics, and between five and ten percent Jewish.

At the University of Maine the average size of the student generation is highest for the Catholic families, who have 4.2 children per family. Next come the 25 Jewish families with 3.64, then the Protestants with 3.54. These last two groups are fairly close together. However, in the parent generation the situation is different, the largest size being in the Jewish group which averages 6.64 siblings per family, then comes the Catholic group with 6.15. Considerably lower stand the Pro-

testant families with 4.61. It is significant to glance at the decline between the two generations for these three religious groups. The greatest is that in the Hebrew families which show a decrease of three children per family (from 6.64 to 3.64). Then follow the Catholics with a drop of almost two children (1.95). The Protestant decline is least, about one child (1.07) per family. The percentages of decline from parent to student generation are: Jewish 45.2; Catholic 31.7; Protestant 23.2.

It would appear that forces working toward smaller families are present in all three religious affiliations, but that these factors have been at work longer among the Protestants than among the other two. In the case of 17 of the 25 University of Maine Jewish families, the father was born in Europe (68 percent). Of these European-born men 12 had wives also born in Europe. In addition, two other students' mothers were born abroad. When these began to bring up their own children in this country, cultural conditions at work here operated to cut down the size. In the case of the 71 Catholic families of the University of Maine group, in only 15 (21 percent) were the fathers foreign-born, and 10 of these were Canadians. The differences between these three groups cannot be assigned merely to religious beliefs; there are also at work factors of economic level, rural-urban residence, as well as cultural factors involving attitudes toward family life. The studies previously referred to by Thompson and Holmes likewise found a larger family size for Catholic than for Protestant families. A study of confinement rates between 1919 and 1933 by Stouffer in Wisconsin showed that in more than forty thousand urban families fertility declined at a faster rate among Catholic than among non-Catholic families.⁹ That the Roman Catholic Church is feeling this decline is suggested by an item appearing in *Time* reporting a threatened shortage of entrants to the various American Catholic Sisterhoods. Among other reasons advanced for this decreasing number of candidates was the declining size of the Catholic family. Girls from large families were stated to be more apt to embrace a religious life in a nunnery.¹⁰

⁹ S. A. Stouffer, "Trends in the Fertility of Catholics," *American Jour. of Sociology* (Sept. 1935), 143-166.

¹⁰ *Time* (Aug. 11, 1941), 51.

DIVORCES

In the University of Maine series 36 students did not answer the question concerning divorce; one said he did not know. Out of 438 families remaining there were 21 in which there had been a divorce, about 4.8 percent. At Bowdoin the figure is 3.6, and at Colby 5.3 percent of those answering.

STEP- AND HALF-SIBLINGS

For Maine in the student generation 6.7 percent of the families had offspring which were not related by full blood to the student. The corresponding figure for Colby is 7.6, and for Bowdoin 2.1 percent. In the parent generation at Maine 7.3 percent of the families showed half-brothers and sisters or step-brothers and sisters. For Colby the corresponding figure is 8.2 and for Bowdoin 6.8 percent. Except for the Bowdoin student generation figure, the focal point seems to be about seven out of every hundred families having siblings not fully related by blood. There seems to be a slight tendency toward larger families in this group in contrast to those in which the offspring are fully related by blood.

SUMMARY

1. Average number of children in families of University of Maine students in class of 1940 as freshmen was 3.67, at Colby 3.28, at Bowdoin 3.04.
2. The decline in average number of children from parent to student generation is 25 percent for University of Maine and 33 percent for Colby and Bowdoin.
3. If a student was born in Maine the likelihood is that he comes from a larger family than if he was born elsewhere. This is true of all three colleges in which the contrasting figures for size of student generation are: University of Maine 3.95 to 3.08; Colby 3.40 to 3.16; Bowdoin 3.42 to 2.88.

4. In the University of Maine series there is a difference of 71 children per hundred families between those Maine state families living in places with less than 2,500 people (427) and those in places over 2,500 (356).

5. The average age of mothers of these freshmen was between 46 and 47 years. For University of Maine series the average number of children per mother aged 55-59 was five; for those aged 50-54 it was 3.76; and for those 45-49 it came to 3.56. A decline of 28.8 percent in number of children from mothers in the late fifties to mothers in their late forties.

6. In the University of Maine series the average size of student generation in families in which *both* parents attended some college was smaller (3.44) than in those in which *neither* attended (3.86). In the Bowdoin and Colby series this difference was not found.

7. Parents of University of Maine freshmen whose occupation was farming or unskilled labor had the largest number of children, four and one-half. Professional parents had three children per family. Contrasting the agricultural with the professional families there is a difference of 159 children per 100 families. This emphasizes the rural population reservoir concept.

8. Catholic families had the largest number of children averaging 4.2 per family; then the Jewish with 3.64, and finally the Protestants with 3.54. From parent to student generation the greatest decline in size was in the Hebrew families (45.2 percent), next the Catholic (31.7 percent), then the Protestant (23.2 percent).

9. In the University of Maine series nearly five percent of the freshmen reported a divorce in the family.

10. In about six or seven percent of the families there are siblings not fully related by blood.

INSTITUTE IN GEO-ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

O. E. Baker, after thirty years in the United States Department of Agriculture, is leaving his present position as Senior Social Scientist in the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare to become Head of the Department of Geography in a new Institute being established at the University of Maryland, bearing the tentative title, "Institute in Geo-Economics and Politics." The purpose of the Institute is to train men and women for administrative and technical positions, both governmental and private, in foreign countries after the war. The Institute will include departments in Modern Languages, Political Science, Economics, Military Tactics, Psychology, History, Geography, and International Trade. Except for the last two departments named, existing University departments will be expanded to offer instruction in the above subjects. It is expected that informal co-operation will be arranged with several governmental departments, and that students in the Institute will study some of the problems which these governmental departments are facing. The teachers will hold consultant or other positions in departments of the Federal Government.

PUBLIC WELFARE AND SOCIAL WORK

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

A CONTRIBUTION OF ETHICS TO SOCIAL WORK*

BERNARD SAIBEL AND ANNE F. FENLASON

University of Minnesota

THE ETHICAL BASIS FOR SOCIAL WORK

A VITAL problem for social workers is at the same time one of the most perplexing problems in ethical theory, that of the obligation to be altruistic or benevolent. It is commonly felt that selfishness, the seeking of one's own happiness, is natural; but that altruism, the seeking of another's happiness, is unnatural; and that consequently altruism requires its base in something other than natural desire, in pure reason, perhaps, or in the will of Deity. Kant, for example, believed that it was a principle of reason that a person should act in such a way as to permit universal generalization of the principle of the Act. As a special case of this principle, he deduced the maxim that one ought to treat another as an end in himself, never as a means. Although there are serious empirical objections to Kant's abstract rationalistic method, the maxim does provide an exquisite formulation of the essential meaning of altruism and could be used as a canon for case workers, crystallizing a basic factor in the client-worker relationship. For to treat a client as an end, never as a means, is to grant him his dignity as a person, and to refrain from using him as a tool in the personal aggrandizement of the case worker. At the same time, the maxim distills out of the relationship any self-indulgent feelings of pity. Hobbes, on the other hand, could find no room in his philosophy for altruism. It was part of prudence to be farsighted enough to arouse gratitude

in another through doing him a favor in expectation of a return.

In professional social work, we often find the appeal to enlightened self-interest as a device to enlist the benevolent activities of the community. The presumption is that the hard-headed and sensible business man is not going to help someone merely for the sake of helping him. He has got to be shown that indirectly it is to his own advantage. Tuberculosis or syphilis or delinquency are causal entities which can affect him and his immediate family. The spread of poverty can endanger his security and class position. The cost of the ill effects of inadequate housing in terms of police protection, penal institutions, and so forth, far exceeds the cost of adequate housing. All these arguments are familiar and perhaps sound enough. They are all based on the appeal to self-interest.

There are two principal points to be clarified in any discussion of selfishness and altruism. One is whether "psychological hedonism"—the view that it is a psychological impossibility for one to seek anyone else's good except his own—is true. The other is whether selfishly motivated actions can be the cause of good for others.¹ The answer to the one question is independent of the answer to the other. Both questions are pertinent to an ethical orientation for the profession of social work.

With respect to the first question, it appears to us that the argument for psychological hedonism is important in one sense, but trivial and verbal in

* This study is part of a larger contemplated study on Ethical Principles Applicable to Social Case Work. It has been made possible through the Graduate Research Funds of the University of Minnesota.

¹ A special case of this problem is found in the current controversy over trade unionism for social workers. Advocates of unionization are often accused of unprofessional selfishness.

another. It is important when it indicates that benevolent motives are a source of satisfaction to the person with those motives. This is undoubtedly true. In fact, as Stace contends, such motives are probably a much greater source of satisfaction than are selfish motives, and his appeal in this argument is to the profoundest experience of man as reflected in the great ethical and religious teachings. The argument of psychological hedonism becomes verbal, however, when it seeks to reduce the altruistic motive to the satisfaction derived from it. The argument briefly is that when a man seeks another's good, he does so for the pleasure he himself derives from that motive. The argument would have no foundation whatever if it were not for the fact that it does happen to be one of those contingent blessings that one does, as a matter of inexplicable fact, derive pleasure from helping another; but if one were to aim deliberately at his own pleasure in so doing, he would miss both another's pleasure and his own. John Dewey has brilliantly given us the insight that people who deliberately seek pleasure for themselves rarely find real satisfaction, and that pleasure is a concomitant state to activities directed, not toward pleasure, but toward people or objects. Fundamentally, the fact is that any activity issuing freely from a person is accompanied by pleasure. To reduce the reason for an action to that inevitable accompaniment of satisfaction is to indulge in verbal trickery. It would surely be paradoxical to condemn a case worker for getting satisfaction out of his job on the grounds that he was concerned only with his own satisfaction.

The second question, that of the possibility of ethical acts issuing from selfish motives, can be settled more easily. Most ethical theorists distinguish motives and the acts resulting from these motives in such wise as to characterize both the motive and the act with any combination of the attributes of selfishness or altruism. An act and its motive may be either both altruistic, or both selfish, or the act altruistic and the motive selfish, or the motive altruistic and the act selfish. An instance of the latter alternative might be viewed with skepticism, since we generally infer the character of the motive from its effects; but it is possible for one to misjudge the effects of an act whose motive is altruistic in such a way that the benefits of the act accrue to oneself and not to the person toward whose good the act was intended. However, an empirical ethics is concerned with the

observable effects of a motive. If these effects increase the sum total of happiness, then the action is good, whatever the motives behind it.

One must admit, though, that there is a greater probability that a person whose motives are generally altruistic will initiate more altruistic acts than one whose motives are selfish; the reason being that a person who acts on selfish motives will act benevolently only in such situations as cater to his self-interest, whereas the other can be more or less consistently relief upon to act benevolently in any situation. It would be unfortunate, for example, if the above mentioned arguments used to enlist the charitable activities of the community were factually false, for in that case the prospective donor, on the basis of self-interest alone, could justifiably withhold his charity. Whereas, if the appeal were to his benevolence, he would not have that justification for refusing his donation.²

In the appeal to self-interest, one must show three things: that there is a need for help, that his donation will be used in such ways as effectively constitute help, and that by helping, he is helping himself. In the appeal to benevolence, one must show the first two things, but not the third. An important distinction can be made here within the concept of benevolence itself, a distinction which has almost always been referred to the concept of selfishness, namely, that of being enlightened or unenlightened. Enlightened selfishness is that which waives immediate gains for the self for greater gains in the future. Enlightened benevolence determines the need for help and explores the efficiency of the ways in which that help is to be given. Unenlightened benevolence, on the other hand, although deriving from the same motive of altruism, neglects fact finding and neglects reflec-

² The following paragraph from Horace Taylor's *Contemporary Economic Problems and Trends* is an illustration of our argument on a national scale, and also indicates how the short termed effects of different motives may coincide: "...the adoption of this program [social insurance] in various industrial countries has arisen from social conditions, although the motives for adoption have differed in the several countries concerned. Thus the program of Social Insurance inaugurated in Germany by Bismarck was inspired by political motives; i.e., to break the rising strength of Socialism. Exactly the same considerations have not applied in Great Britain or in the U. S." (p. 465) When the German program which was benevolent in act no longer met the needs of class self-interest, it was discontinued.

tion upon how best to deal with the facts. Unenlightened benevolence is sentimentality. The reason that we place more value on enlightened than on unenlightened benevolence is that the former produces more good than the latter. The difference in value is not intrinsic to the two types of benevolent motives, but is relative to the fact that, in general, enlightened benevolence is more effective in the production of good. The criteria are the observable results.

With respect to this discussion, a definition of social work could well be the practice of enlightened benevolence. Our use of the word *benevolence* is deliberate notwithstanding its archaic quality. *Benevolence* has become *assistance* or *service*. Benevolent societies are now welfare societies or service organizations. But *benevolence* is still a technical term in ethics, and we have attempted to orient social work to an ethical system. We think, however, that the definition we have given to the term *enlightened benevolence*, namely, that it involves two factors—the determination of facts of need and the determination of the best known means to meet the problem of these facts—removes any stigma that might otherwise be attached to the use of the term.

Any discussion of the contribution of ethics to social work would be incomplete without a consideration of the issue of *ethical relativity* versus *ethical absolutism*. *Ethical absolutism* maintains that there are ethical truths which are universally binding; which are, that is, applicable to all persons, at all times, and in all places. *Ethical relativity*, on the other hand, maintains that ethical truth varies with different sets of circumstances; what is true in one situation might be false in another. John Brown in Leonard Ehrlich's novel, *God's Angry Man*, expresses the absolutistic view with great feeling and poetry when he says, in reply to the charge that this was the nineteenth century, not Biblical days, "The nineteenth century! The nineteenth century! You fool! Does God reckon what century it is? Do men change in their hearts? Do you think right things change to wrong or blood turns to water because a minute of His time passes?"

The absolutist charges that the relativist disregards the notion of truth altogether. This would be a valid accusation if relativism is taken in its most extreme form. In its most extreme form, relativism says, "Y is good, if X thinks Y is good." There are as many truths as there are opinions; and one cannot contradict the other.

If something is good means that someone thinks it is good, then the only question of dispute could be in connection with the confirmation of the fact of its being thought. *De gustibus non disputandum est*. Head hunting or cannibalism or dishonesty in business practices is good if anyone or any group thinks so. Social work could not very well subscribe to this view unless it was willing to disclaim any responsibility for anti-social behavior.

Since Protagoras, however, this view is not generally held in this extreme form, but is transformed into what may be called sociological ethics; that is, that what the group thinks, not what the individual thinks is good, is good. This view only amounts to the fact that the group can enforce its ideas of what is right over the individual; not that its ideas are any truer than those of the individual.³ It also means that various cultures are incommensurable with respect to moral progress. There would be no foundation to claim that Christian morality was better than the morality of Australian Bushmen. Social work might accept this position, and perhaps some social workers or social agencies do, but it would be those who accept the status quo without question. Those social workers, however, who are interested in social action and social change could not hold this position without contradicting the assumptions involved in their activity. Intended as a realistic way of thinking, we do not believe that it is a realistic position. Actually, individuals do change the morality of the group through such means as education and organization. Perhaps as important a fact to democracy as the sovereignty of the will of the majority, is the right of the minority to express its opinions.

Our objections to extreme ethical *relativity*, however, do not remove us from the relativist camp. A naturalistic and empirical point of view entails a certain degree of *ethical relativity*. This position asserts that although value is relative to a specific nature, and can vary with different natures, it is nevertheless independent of what a specific nature thinks, in the sense that what a person thinks is good for him contains the possibility that he can be in error. Expressed formally, we assert

³ Absolute Idealism particularly that of Hegel, impinges at this point upon this position. For it, the group is more real than the individual, consequently the group's notions of the *right* are truer. The doctrine leads from here to that of the subservience of the individual to the State.

that the sentence, "This is good for me" is not identical with, or reducible to, the sentence, "I think this is good for me." That is why we have such professions as those of medicine, law, and social work. The community, too, can be in error regarding its good, and often does seek expert advice.

This position is, in fact, so native to common sense that its formulation seems unnecessarily forced. All that we mean is that when we are sick, for example, the doctor knows better than we do what medicine is best for us. This illustration differentiates our position from that of extreme relativism. At the same time, it indicates relativity in the sense that the good is the good for this or that person. Whereas three bromides might kill one person, they may cure another. Social

case workers will recognize the importance of maintaining this point of view. It is the basic assumption for the principle of individual treatment. The content of the principle will be based in each case on scientific judgment of the form, "If X is of such and such a character, involving the factors a, b, and c, then the application of factors d, e, and f will be good for X." We are not concerned with ethical absolutes; we are concerned with the good for the specific individual.

We must conclude that social work is both selfish and altruistic. Its selfish aspect does not of itself detract from its effectiveness in helping others. Altruism, as a motive, is not enough of itself to insure helpfulness to others. Altruism plus a knowledge of ways and means, however, is the soundest foundation for constructive social work.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON TRANSIENT GIRLS

ROBERT C. MYERS

War-time Civil Control Administration

I

THE transient girl, within the meaning of this paper, is an unattached, adolescent female between the ages of fourteen and eighteen who has left her home community without the permission of her parents or guardians, and who is financially unable to pay for her transportation on the usual means of public conveyance—trains, buses, or boats. She is, in fact, a runaway who has put considerable distance between herself and her home, and who is not simply a disobedient, unruly, or truant child. There are a good many girls who are traveling with indigent migrant families, but such girls are not unattached and are generally supposed to be traveling with relatives or husbands. They might be called "migrant girls" rather than transient girls.

Most of the literature pertaining to transients, hoboes, tramps, and runaways is concerned with boys and men. The roving nature of our forbears, the mobility of our population, the great size of our country, and the favorable attitude of our people toward adventuresome exploits has given the runaway boy an accepted place in our folklore. During ordinary times the public attitude toward

the runaway boy is usually sympathetic.¹ Both laymen and judges are inclined to deal leniently with him, remembering their own adolescent longings for independence, adventure, new sights and sounds. American communities, however, tend to deal harshly with their runaway girls. The popular belief is that it is "unnatural" for a girl to set out for herself; that, if she does, she must be by nature "bad." The great proportion of girls in reform schools are there for running away, for being sexually delinquent, and for being incorrigible. Conversely, the great proportion of boys in reform schools are there for stealing or damaging property, for willfully injuring persons, and for disturbing the peace.

Partly because life on the road is not easy for a girl and partly because the transient girl is more

¹ To be sure if in the depths of an economic depression—as in 1932 and 1933—the number of wandering, jobless boys grows to such proportions that communities unable even to provide adequately for their own indigent residents, begin to feel the burden of responsibility for the swelling hordes of transients, attitudes change. In such times the transient boy becomes a menace and attempts are made to anchor him.

liable to arrest than is the transient boy, the 'teen age girl does not leave home as often as does the boy of that same age. With this in mind, the writer felt that transient girls must undoubtedly have stronger antagonisms toward the environment from which they had run away than do transient boys. In an effort to come to some understanding of these antagonisms and the reasons for them, the cases of 23 runaway girls which had come to the attention of the Santa Clara Juvenile Court in San Jose, California, were intensively studied. Certain revealing commonalities in the background of these cases were found to exist.²

Of the two environments in which we live—the physical or material and the psychic or attitudinal—the latter appears to be more important to the happiness of the adolescent girl than the former. Frequently, covert attempts are made to escape from an uncongenial environment; the girl day-dreams, frequently attends motion picture shows, reads romantic magazines and books. But, when the environment grows unbearably uncongenial, she attempts overt escape, the most spectacular means of which are suicide and running away. It would appear that plural marriages of parents and the broken home are the two most important contributing factors in the development of an attitudinal environment from which the adolescent girl feels impelled to flee. A disorganized psychic pattern—disorganized at least according to standards of our modern civilization—is, in some form, most often in the background of the transient runaway girl.

Transiency with girls is even more strikingly a phenomenon of adolescence than it is with boys. The median age of transient females is younger than that of transient males. The girls of the road seem to limit themselves to that age group, between fourteen and eighteen, to which the present writer's study was restricted. In a random

² It should be mentioned that by the laws of California a transient girl is a delinquent girl and is subject to arrest and a hearing before the juvenile court of any county in which she may be found. If, at such a hearing, it is determined that she has no relatives who are able and willing to provide a proper home for her, she may be adjudged a ward of the juvenile court until she reaches the age of twenty-one. As a juvenile court ward she may be placed in one of various State or private institutions, or in any "foster home" or "wage home" that has been approved by the Department of Social Welfare.

sample of 29 female tramps, Minehan³ found that all but one of them fell between the ages of thirteen and nineteen, and that 13, or 45 percent, of these girls were in the age group of from fifteen to less than seventeen years old. Gilpin,⁴ studying 27 runaway girls who had been brought to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital for examination, found that the oldest of these girls was nineteen, but that 22, or 81.5 percent of them, were younger than eighteen. Girls do not leave home at as early an age as do boys, nor do they continue a vagrant life as long. Gilpin states that of the 75 boy and girl runaways studied by her, three-fourths of the boys in comparison with one-fourth of the girls ran away when they were less than fourteen years of age. Minehan said that he seldom saw a female tramp who appeared to be over twenty-one years old.

For purposes of generalization, then, we may picture the typical transient girl as being an adolescent between the ages of sixteen and seventeen. This is important. The fact that the transient girl is an adolescent girl is the key to an understanding of the development of those psychic antagonisms which may force her to desert her home. Only within the past half century has there been any general recognition in America that the problems of adolescence are neither similar to those of childhood nor of adulthood.⁵ And it was not until around 1920 that the adolescent girl began to be studied from the viewpoint of social psychology as distinct from the adolescent boy.⁶

³ Thomas Minehan, *Boy and Girl Tramps of America* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1934).

⁴ Florence Gilpin, "The Runaway Child: A Case Study", *Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. & Soc. Science*, 149, Part III (May, 1930), 47-58.

⁵ When our first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899 we had embarked upon a program of separate legal treatment for juvenile delinquents; but the principal effect, insofar as adolescents were concerned, was to have sixteen-year-olds judged along with ten-year-olds instead of with persons in their twenties or thirties. It was not until 1904 that Dr. G. Stanley Hall published his compendious two volume work (*Adolescence; its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion, and Education*, N. Y.: D. Appleton & Co.) entirely devoted to a description of the adolescent and the problems peculiar to that age.

⁶ The two outstanding books which appeared at that time were: Phyllis Blanchard's, *The Adolescent Girl* (N. Y.: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1920); and William I.

It would be well, therefore, to briefly review some pertinent facts about adolescent girls in general.

The adolescent girl is an individual who has recently reached sexual maturity; she is physically able to bear and rear children. Such a girl is considered nubile and old enough to care for a home of her own in most primitive societies soon after she first menstruates. But, based on 1930 census figures, not even half our girls in America are married by the age of twenty-one.⁷ Such a girl is interested in boys and wants to be noticed by them. In order to attract their attention she dresses, if she can, in brightly colored clothes, arranges her hair in the latest style, and is inclined to ostentatious use of facial rouge and powder. This individual who is making such an effort to attract attention, trying to be accepted as grown-up, and longing to be taken to parties and dances, is terribly self-conscious. She is likely to show great irritation at the slightest rebuke, she may at any moment construe an innocent remark as a personal insult and as an affront to her character. She constantly assays her daily liabilities in terms of being "snubbed" or "high-hatted" or "on the receiving end of a line."

Her emotions are mercurial. At one moment she may be in the depths of despair and in the next be giggling hysterically. Should any mature person habitually run the gamut of the emotional releases of the adolescent girl, he would probably be ordered to an asylum as a hopeless manic-depressive. She has scant respect for the "stodgy" opinions and beliefs of her parents and high-school teachers, and feels that, above all, they lack understanding. If asked to do any work about the home she is apt to fly into a tantrum and think of herself as a slavey Cinderella who is badly in need of rescue by some Prince Charming. The normal adolescent girl yearns to show her independence and ability to "manage her own life." One way of asserting such independence is to run away in the hope of finding some adoring man who will propose matrimony and give her a home of her own. Prey to such conflicting compulsions, the adolescent girl can be made from her point of view the most unhappy person in the world if things do not work

out "right." The transient girl is, in most cases, nothing more than an adolescent girl for whom things have worked out "wrong."

II

It is in the home that the adolescent girl experiences her most intimate mental contacts. It is here that she demands sympathy and understanding; that she demands status as an individual rather than as a child. Girls may become delinquent because of conflicts and desires which have been created outside their homes, but these outside compulsions will, of themselves, very seldom result in runaway behavior. When outside compulsions are seen to exist in the case of a transient girl, they are almost always found to be *in addition to* factors which have led to an uncongenial home situation. It is not necessary to examine minutely the peculiar personality of the individual transient girl to determine why her particular home was uncongenial to her. Even the most casual observer can see the elements leading to conflict situations in the homes from which such girls have escaped once the relationships within the homes have been established.

It happens sometimes that a girl will not run away from a most unsatisfactory home situation if only she has been able to even partially satisfy her wishes, and to maintain patterns of sympathy and understanding, in groups outside the home. But if elements should creep into these outside relationships so that they too become unsatisfactory, she will attempt to escape.

With transient girls, poverty is a contributing irritant rather than a direct cause of running away. If poverty prevents a girl from having the things her friends have, keeps her boy friends away, or results in her getting an unequal share of whatever may be purchased for the family as a whole, it may be conducive to the development of hostilities which result in running away. Wandering boys often explain that they have left home because they felt themselves to be a burden on a poverty stricken family, but this is seldom true of runaway girls. Girls, in explaining their reasons for running away, mention drunken and cruel fathers, unsympathetic stepmothers, sisters who receive more affection and clothing than they, the inordinate strictness of their parents, and so on. But they do not say, as do boys, that they have run away because their families were so poor that they did not have enough to eat. No matter how poor

Thomas', *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1931) (1923).

⁷ "In the United States in 1930 only 1.7 percent of the girls were married at fifteen and at twenty-one 54.8 percent still remained single."—R. H. Lowie, "Marriage," *Enc. of the Social Sciences*, X, 152.

her family may be, a girl will not run away from it if she feels secure in its affections.

Girls will run away from homes that are too strict. A common complaint of the transient girl is: "My family would not let me bring my friends home, and never let me have any parties at home"; or, "My father always 'bawled out' any boy who came to call." Strictures of parents seem unreasonable to the adolescent girl and this feeling is often justified. The writer interviewed one mother whose seventeen year old daughter was in what might be called the pre-runaway stage, i.e., staying overnight at the homes of friends or relatives without permission, being sulky and impertinent about the house, given to weeping tantrums. The mother indicated that she blamed her trouble with her daughter on "bad companions." When asked to specify which companions she included under this heading, she burst out: "Why, everybody, simply everybody at W—— High School. The whole lot of them are bad, both boys and girls, and I refuse to let a single one of them into my house!" It was apparent from this that the mother's attitude was having a more adverse effect upon the girl than were her companions.

Of course many parents will, for various reasons, be remiss in the duty of teaching their daughters the folkways and mores of the society in which they live. The daughters of such parents may well grow into amoral adolescents and become delinquent, but a too lenient home situation does not impel a girl to escape. There are instances, such as the interesting case of Bertha Thompson described by herself with Reitman's help,⁸ where politically anarchistic parents have encouraged a daughter to become a tramp simply in defiance of the prevailing social codes, but, in general, the too lenient home may be disregarded as a cause of runaway girls so long as a harmonious interrelationship prevails there.

III

Ties of affection and sympathy between the adolescent girl and her family are likely to be stronger when she lives with her own biological father and mother and with siblings who have been born of the same parents—i.e., not half-siblings—than they are when she lives in a broken home.⁹

⁸ Ben L. Reitman, *Sister of the Road* (N. Y.: Macaulay, 1937).

⁹ This is because of our social customs and beliefs, not because of any biological necessity. To achieve

And the rubric "broken home" should be understood to include, not only those homes which have been broken *subsequent* to a girl's birth through the death or desertion of one of her parents, or through divorce, but also the condition that exists when the home has been broken *prior* to her birth, resulting in the presence of half-brothers or half-sisters with whom she must live.

The broken home is important for our purposes only in that it serves as an instrument to build up an uncongenial mental atmosphere within the primary group which makes up the household. An outstanding illustration of the point that harmonious relationships within the home are more important to the girl than to the boy is the undisputed fact that girl delinquents, although comprising only from a fifth to a tenth of the total delinquent population, are more predominantly the products of broken homes than are boys.¹⁰ And, it happens that of the cases studied by the writer, all of those whose home backgrounds could be ascertained had come from homes which had either been broken, or in which one or both parents had been married more than once before the girl was born.

A considerable disparity in age between the natural parent and the step-parent seems to contribute to a heightened tension in the home, possibly leading to runaway behavior by a girl. Too, if one parent has died, and the surviving parent is more than thirty years older than the daughter,

this close bond of affection, it is not important that the child *actually* be the biological product of its parents' ovum and sperm, but it is important that the parents *believe* the child to be their own mutual creation. Human beings are provided with no sixth sense enabling them to identify their own infants in the crèche of a hospital maternity ward, and they will readily accept any infant whose pigmentation is not strikingly different from their own. The divergence of mental attitudes of parents toward "natural" children on the one hand, and "step" or "foster" children on the other, is founded entirely on social and cultural factors, not on biological relationship as such. The same is true regarding the difference in attitudes as between actual siblings and half-siblings.

¹⁰ See: T. Earl Sullenger, *Social Determinants in Juvenile Delinquency* (N. Y.: J. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1936), 21-23; Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lipincott Co., 1934), 144; Katharine D. Lumpkin, "Factors in the Commitment of Correctional School Girls in Wisconsin," *Am. J. of Sociol.*, 37 (Sept. 1931), 222-230.

greater than ordinary tensions are likely to develop. Antagonisms between half-siblings are greater than those which occur between natural siblings. Adolescent girls resent the authority wielded over them by half-siblings as much as they do that displayed by step-parents. When there are younger half-siblings in the home, the girl tends to build up resentment over the fact, real or fancied, that she does not receive the same favor, attention, love, and worldly goods as are bestowed upon her younger half-brother or half-sister. Some runaway transient girls give as the only excuse for their behavior this differential

treatment in the home between themselves and half-siblings.

It should be readily apparent that, based on his investigations, the writer finds himself in complete agreement with the statement made by Sullenger¹¹ that: "One may conclude that it is the youth from unhappy or broken homes—the youth that does not belong anywhere—that is prone to roam. . . . Unhappy or abnormal home life is a paramount cause for young people's leaving home." It is only necessary to add that this proposition is even more valid in the case of girls than it is in that of boys.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

(Continued from p. 164)

with various other types of dwellings found in Hyde Park such as, family and row dwellings, two family and double dwellings, three family dwellings, multi-family dwellings, and hotels and apartment hotels.³

TABLE I
MEDIAN SIZE FAMILY BY TYPE OF DWELLING, 1934

KIND OF DWELLINGS	MEDIAN SIZE FAMILY
City of Chicago	
all dwellings.....	2.97
Hyde Park dwelling units	
all kinds.....	2.25
1 family and row.....	3.55
2 family and double.....	3.14
3 family.....	2.62
Multi-family.....	2.49
Hotel and apartment hotel.....	1.52
Elevator apartments over 5 stories.....	1.35

Sources: Charles S. Newcomb and Richard O. Lang (eds.), *Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1934* (University of Chicago Press, 1934); Sanborn Maps of Chicago; Original schedules covering the Hyde Park tracts of the 1934 census of the city of Chicago.

It is to be noted that the median size family of tall elevator apartment dwellings is smaller than the median size family of any of the other types of dwellings.

The data for the size of families in the Hyde Park area by kinds of dwelling and for Chicago as a whole were obtained from the census data of Chicago of 1934.⁴ From the Sanborn maps⁵ we were able to locate the elevator apartment buildings over five stories in Hyde Park and from the original schedules of the census we obtained the number of persons in each family in those buildings. From this we determined the median. Table I shows that there is a definite relationship between size of family and living in tall apartment houses. This does not mean that living in such buildings is responsible for small families. It was pointed out above that all that living in apartment houses does is reinforce the inventions that directly make for small families, as contraception. Moreover, an invention like tall apartment houses may be associated with other elements or inventions such as educational status,

³ Hyde Park is a residential, apartment house community of about one and one-half square miles, located on the southeast side of Chicago, six or seven miles from the central business district. Hyde Park may be termed a natural area,—i.e., "a geographical area characterized both by physical individuality and by the culture characteristics of the people who live in it." Harvey W. Zorbaugh, "The Natural Areas of the City," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, XX (December, 1925), 192. Hyde Park area includes census tracts 600-622 of Chicago as of the local 1934 City of Chicago.

⁴ *Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1934*, eds. Charles S. Newcomb and Richard O. Lang (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934).

⁵ Sanborn maps, obtained at the Chicago Sanitation Department, consist of thirty-five volumes of maps, each volume giving the heights and distribution of all buildings in every square block in the City of Chicago as of 1935.

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THE COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress, in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AMONG LOW-INCOME RURAL FAMILIES IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST¹

JOE J. KING

Farm Security Administration

DURING late 1941 the County FSA Supervisor in the Methow Valley of Northern Washington faced a perplexing problem. How were the low-income farmers of the valley, discouraged and burdened with accumulative rural poverty, going to contribute to the Food for Freedom program?² How were these relatively disadvantaged rural folks going to understand the reasons for total war, the significance of agricultural production goals, and the serious importance of immediately discussing post-war aims, objectives, and plans?³ His answer did not come easily.

For several weeks he thoughtfully reviewed the economic and social environment of these small, family-type farm operators. His review gradually led him to conclude that individually these low-

income farmers were helpless against well-financed competition and other circumstances. Once this conclusion was reached, it was not difficult for him to word the answer to his perplexing problem. It was a firm reliance on the principle of democratic group action.⁴

With a clear philosophical approach, he actively proceeded to introduce in the valley a purposeful and aggressive program of rural neighborhood action.⁵ First he divided the valley into sociological neighborhood groupings. After this was accomplished, he verbally persuaded one representative family in each grouping to invite its neighbors to attend an informal home gathering. The plan took hold immediately. Within a short time twelve Neighborhood Groups were meeting semi-monthly, democratically, and earnestly discussing their common problems.

But the plan did not stop there. Chairmen of the twelve groups began meeting semi-monthly to discuss, not just their neighborhood, but also their community problems in relation to the Nation's role in World War II. No longer were they dependent upon the County FSA Supervisor. These low-income farmers had at last found their mutual voice; and they were determined to use it.

Today, out of these enthusiastic and regular neighborhood group meetings, the Methow Valley farmers understand the deathly seriousness of assuring a successful Food for Freedom program.

⁴ J. Roy Allgyer, "Group Action and Progress," *Land Policy Review* 3: (January-February, 1940), 45-48.

⁵ "How Neighborhoods and Communities aid Farm Security Administration Group Programs" FSA Publication # 108.

¹ This paper was read at the Spring Meeting of the Pacific Sociological Society, Northern Division, Hood River, Oregon, May 1-2, 1942.

² Considerable literature exists on the reasons for, the objectives of, and the operations of the United States Department of Agriculture "Food for Freedom" program. Among scores of outstanding articles on the subject, the following may be indicated: "Agriculture-Hunger" *Time* Vol. 38: (July 21, 1941), 12-15; "Food is also power" *Fortune* 24: (August, 1941), 102-4; C. R. Wickard, "Food for war and peace" *New Republic* 105: (December 15, 1941), 818-20; C. R. Wickard, "Agricultural Supplies for war" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 220: (March, 1942), 125-35. Then, too, the Department has published many pamphlets on Food for Freedom.

³ "When Peace Comes: planning for Post-war Agriculture," entire issue *Land Policy Review*, 4: (July, 1941).

They recognize, furthermore, the opportunities for the low-income farmer in this program. Not long ago, they organized the Methow Valley Cooperative Dairy Association. Their first objective was the cooperative processing of the valley's milk production. But after the initial objective was efficiently achieved, they contemplated, and are already discussing, the establishment of additional cooperative marketing facilities for other agricultural crops, cooperative cold storage lockers, cooperative herd improvement activities, cooperative purchasing organization, etc. In fact, it seems safe to predict that these Methow Valley farmers, through their Neighborhood Groups, will continue to utilize the cooperative technique in effectively solving their mutual problems and in vigorously participating in an all-out Food for Freedom program.⁶

But this graphic and spirited example of rural community⁷ and cooperative action is not the only one of its kind in the Pacific Northwest. Actually there are many more; and the purpose of this paper, from henceforth, is to provide a bird's-eye view of cooperative development among rural low-income families in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.

To begin with, what is meant by the term "low-income?" According to the 1940 U. S. Census,⁸ a total of 187,178 farms are located in the combined states of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. Of this total, 52,287 farms are less than 20 acres in size. A careful examination of the census data reveals that the number of farms in this category, rather than decreasing, has been increasing. For instance, in Washington in 1920 there were 16,073 farms with less than 20 acres; in 1930, 23,394

farms; and in 1940, 31,301 farms out of a total of 81,686 farms. A similar trend is shown in the two remaining states. In passing, it is worthy to mention that a distinct trend toward large-scale farms in the region is strikingly revealed in the 1940 Census material. One reflection of farm size figures is evidenced in farm incomes.⁹ The picture is startling. In 1940 in combined Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, 93,509 farmers received less than \$800 gross annual earned farm income. Stated in another way and using a lower figure, in 1930, 22 percent of the farm families in the region received total gross incomes of less than \$600; and in 1940 43 percent fell in the low-income group. They are the farm families who lack the elements which comprise "the good life," both spiritually and physically.

Some would argue that these low-income rural families are heavily benefiting from the so-called financial prosperity which is accompanying the war effort. The facts of the matter are that this is far from the truth, particularly when looked at in relative terms. These low-income farmers *actually are under-employed*.¹⁰ Their labor potential is not efficiently and fully utilized. Their farms are too small, their equipment is "hay-wired," and their farm management inadequate. Many of them are reluctant to desert their small farms for defense plant employment because of a haunting fear of the war's aftermath; many are unskilled; many are past middle-age; many are marginal workers; many are socially backward; many prefer farming to industrial employment; and so on. Whatever the reason, thousands of low-income farmers constitute a vast reservoir of partially tapped agricultural production potentials.

⁶ Original information collected from letters written by members of the neighborhood groups and by Wistar Burgess, Ben Phipps, Ernest Koller, and Loyal Saum, all FSA field employees. It is interesting to note that the neighborhood groups tend to assume the name of their geographical area; for instance, one Group is called the Cub Creek group. Others have equally distinctive rural names.

⁷ The experience of Methow Valley compares favorably with "Rural Victory Plan" by Meyer Berger, published in *The Washington Post* (February 24, 1942).

⁸ United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Agriculture, First Series, "Uses of Land, Principal Crops and Classes of Livestock" for Idaho, Oregon, and Washington (United States Government Printing office, Washington, 1941).

⁹ United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Agriculture, Third Series, "Value of Farm Products, Farms Classified by Major Source of Income" for Idaho, Oregon, and Washington (United States Government Printing office, Washington, 1941).

¹⁰ Much of rural poverty results, not from hereditary factors, but from underemployment. The importance of this concept was vividly presented before the U. S. House of Representative Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration by James G. Maddox. His prepared statement on "The Role of Low-income Farm Families in the War Effort" was given in Washington, D. C., on February 13, 1942. Also see: Philip G. Hammer and Robert K. Buck; "Idle Manpower" *Land Policy Review*, 5: (April, 1942), 9-18.

Of course, these low-income farmers are scattered all over the Pacific Northwest. But the areas of heavy density may be found in the cut-over sections of Western Oregon, Western Washington, and Northern Idaho and the new irrigation districts of Eastern Oregon and South-central Idaho. The Bureau of Agricultural Economics, in its published studies of these sections,¹¹ focuses attention on the causes for poverty and in its remedial recommendations calls attention to one or more types of cooperative enterprise. For example, in the 1941 BAE study *Migration and Settlement on the Pacific Coast Report No. 5. Cut-over Lands of Northern Idaho*, the authors devote considerable space and attention to the advisability of community or cooperative land-clearing association.

Federal government agencies, however, are not the only ones who are interested in these rural black spots. Washington State College has published several bulletins on the subject.¹² Northwest Regional Council has done likewise. The Washington State Planning Council has recently published *The Elma Survey*.¹³ This study is a very exhaustive and coordinated examination of the Elma, Washington, community and its rural surroundings. Incidentally the study contains several recommendations for specific cooperative activity. Many of these recommendations, it is encouraging to report, are being acted upon at the present time.

Up to this point, then, we can say, first the Pacific Northwest has a sizeable group of small, low-income farmers and, second, the problem is recognized by numerous writers, institutions, and agencies. Our next question must be: Is any

tangible action being taken to meet the problem on a cooperative or group basis?¹⁴

The answer must be a strong "yes." Farm Security Administration, as one element of its broad, over-all rural rehabilitation activities, is vigorously conducting a community and cooperative services program for low-income farmers. The agency believes that steady cooperative expansion is a wholesome development, first for the farmers concerned, and second for the economy as a whole. Low-income farmers, acting individually, are quite helpless in this day of large-scale, mechanized, and industrialized farming. But working together, these same farmers can save on capital investments, on machinery repair, on purchases of needed supplies, on sales of produced crops, etc. In substance, these low-income farmers can produce their crops at a cost which permits them to sell in imperfect-competition markets.¹⁵

The active encouragement of an expanding cooperative program among low-income farmers, who are chiefly family-type operators, is strictly based on the premise that a democracy can scarcely advocate the elimination of the family-type farm and its subsequent crowding of farm families off the land. Can a democracy, in other words, exist if it permits thousands of people to become homeless and dependent upon day labor for subsistence? Moreover, can a democratic nation govern itself harmoniously when a condition arises where a small group of machine-owners operates large tracts of land with hired laborers, who own no machines? Carey McWilliams in his recent book *Ill Fares the Land*¹⁶ knocks around questions like these, harshly describes the agricultural economic trends which are attacking the family-type farm, and expertly sets the stage for a strong cooperative movement.

With this sort of thinking, Farm Security Ad-

¹¹ Series on Migration and Settlement on the Pacific Coast, United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, in the form of reports. Also see Carl C. Taylor, "A Statement on Rural Problem Areas," presented before the U. S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Washington, D. C., May 6, 1940; W. Paul O'Day and Leland N. Fryer, "Settler Progress and Living Standards on New Land", (1939), not published but available from Farm Security Administration.

¹² See Series in Rural Population, Agricultural Experiment Station, State College of Washington, Pullman, Washington.

¹³ *The Elma Survey* Washington State Planning Council (Olympia, 1941).

¹⁴ An answer on a national scale is given by John D. Black, appearing before the U. S. House of Representatives Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration on February 13, 1942.

¹⁵ R. W. Hudgens, "How Farm Security Administration Programs fit into Agricultural Cooperation" before American Institute of Cooperation, Atlanta, Georgia, January 13, 1942.

¹⁶ Carey McWilliams, *Ill Fares the Land* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942). At the present time the tractor-out rural folks are making guns in place of butter. But what is to be their lot when the war ends?

ministration has aided in the organization of 1,538 farm machinery cooperatives, group sire services, purchasing and marketing associations, and cooperative agricultural processing plants. These cooperatives may be found in practically every county of the Pacific Northwest. When a cooperative is established in a rural neighborhood, its successful operation tends to influence other farmers into organizing cooperative ventures of their own. In this way the cooperative program is steadily expanding among the low-income farmers.

The Farm Security Administration cooperative program is divided into four major divisions: (a) neighborhood groups; (b) joint-owner services; (c) participation loans; (d) associations. At the outset are neighborhood groups, actually the foundation of FSA cooperative development. They permit the County FSA Supervisor to meet with more low-income farmers at one time than by following the individual approach to each farmer. During war time, the neighborhood group approach assumes considerable importance in view of rubber tire shortages and gasoline rationing. In normal times, this group approach is important in view of its saving in time and effort for everyone concerned.

County FSA Supervisors organize these neighborhood groups on the basis of present friendships and institutions. Neighbors come together to discuss mutual problems; and out of these discussions the families determine their solutions. It is the democratic way!¹⁷

The second major division is the joint-owner service. A low-income farmer with 20 or 40 acres of land frequently can hardly afford to purchase many types of heavy pieces of farm equipment. He generally uses them only a short time each year and the investment cost, therefore, becomes very heavy. But if several low-income farmers get together and purchase single equipment for all of them to use, they can obtain modern equipment at a comparatively low figure.¹⁸ Farmers,

following this plan, have purchased tractors, combine harvesters, fertilizer spreaders, spraying tools, sawmills, mowers, feed grinders, pressure cookers, hay balers, and many other kinds of equipment. They have also established pure bred sire services. Loans for these purposes usually run from 1 to 5 years with a 3 percent interest rate.

The next division is the participation loan. Low-income farmers frequently do not need to organize new cooperatives; they can join well-established, old cooperatives. Most low-income farmers, however, lack the capital to purchase a membership in an existing cooperative. In such cases the farmers can come to Farm Security Administration for 3 percent participation loans to pay the membership fee or to purchase a share of stock. Under this form of assistance, numerous low-income farmers have joined grain elevators, cheese factories, fruit and vegetable packing plants, livestock pools, etc.

The final division is the association loan, the most complicated part of the cooperative program. Occasionally the low-income farmers lack adequate facilities for handling, storing, or processing their crops. When such is the case, they can organize into a cooperative association and come to Farm Security Administration for a 3 percent loan. Scores of different types of association loans have been written. For example, cooperative associations have been established for fruit packing, creamery, cheese, gasoline and oil sales, veterinary service, seed cleaning plant, health services, etc. One of the most interesting associations is the Washington Forest Products Cooperative, located near Everett, Washington. In this association, a group of low-income farmers are "farming" their forest lands in accordance with recommendations advanced by the U. S. Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service. The products are poles and fuel wood. Another instructive association is the Caldwell Consumers' Cooperative Store, located at the Caldwell, Idaho, Migratory Labor Camp. Agricultural laborers operate their own cooperative store and pay patronage dividends on purchases. Needless to add, the region has many instructive cooperative associations, consisting largely of low-income farmers.

¹⁷ Arthur E. Morgan, "The Community," *The Atlantic*, 169 (February, 1942), 222-228. Mr. Morgan answers the questions: "If I do not love my neighbor whom I know, how can I love the human race, which is but an abstraction? If I have not learned to work with a few people, how can I be effective with many?"

¹⁸ "Report of the Inquiry on Cooperative Enterprise in Europe" (United States Government Printing

office, 1937). This study presents the results of an American examination of European cooperation activities.

By no stretch of the imagination can Farm Security Administration be justly accused of attempting to build up and to control a cooperative system. The agency is rigidly opposed to a paternalistic government, controlling cooperatives. Rather, its aim is simply to bring group and cooperative services to those low-income farmers who require the assistance.¹⁹

In conclusion, a further word should be said about these low-income farmers in relation to the War effort. Active participation in the Food for Freedom program, neighborhood groups, and cooperative enterprise enables these low-income farmers to know that they are helping to defend their own democracy. This is important. Democracy is no stronger than its weakest link. And low-income farmers are certainly not a weak link if they are given the opportunities to improve their economic status, to obtain adequate training, to express self-development, and to contribute to sound community life.²⁰

¹⁹ A. G. Black, Governor of the Farm Credit Administration, in his prepared speech before the American Institute of Cooperation, Atlanta, Georgia, January 12, 1942, on the subject "The Responsibility of Agricultural Cooperation in the War" declared: "We may expect to see small self-help cooperatives, such as the Farm Security Administration assists in starting, increase both in numbers and in strength. Some of those already established may broaden to serve whole communities or counties."

²⁰ In this connection, the Chinese Indusco movement deserves close examination by American students of cooperative activity. For example, see Ruth

Attitudes of these low-income farmers are being set now toward the war effort and the post-war economy. Prejudice concerning the intelligence of these low-income rural people ought to be discarded. No longer should we judge peoples' value in a democracy solely on the basis of their economic worth. William Allen White, well known editor of *The Emporia Gazette*, recently wrote: "I wish I could think that those who were well placed in this town and county and who supported the President's foreign policies probably three or four to one, had really better brains than their less thrifty, less diligent and less prosperous brethren. I used to believe that way forty years ago and it was a comforting faith. I confused the acquisitive faculty with brains. I mixed up hard work, prudence and diligence with intelligence. I have had to surrender that prejudice. I know now that survival qualities in a competitive civilization are not the roots of human wisdom."²¹

Weiss, (English Corresponding Secretary of Chengtu Promotion Committee) "Chinese Industrial Cooperatives Chengtu Depot Report—1940." Published by Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Hongkong Promotion Committee. Extensive material on this movement may be obtained from the American Committee in Aid of Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, New York.

²¹ William Allen White, "Emporia in Wartime," *New Republic*, 106 (April 13, 1942), 491. For a clear-cut expression of positive faith in the cooperative way, see Jerry Voorhis, "Cooperation—the Middle Way" *Congressional Record* (April 27, 1942), A1689–A1692.

(Continued from p. 193)

economic status, number of rooms in apartment, etc., in reinforcing the use of the invention of contraception that makes for smaller families.

Connected with the relationship of tall apartment house dwelling and small families is a rather widespread consensus of opinion that the apartment house is no place for children.⁸ If this is true for ordinary apartment houses how much more true is it for the skyscraper apartments. Several persons in the Hyde Park area who were interviewed stated that at one time they had lived in tall apartment buildings and then moved into smaller walk-ups when they started to have children. Other childless married women declared that as soon as they had children they planned to move to less congregated dwellings.

A wife of about 28 years of age who lived with her husband (who has an income of \$75 a week) in a three room apartment on the ninth floor expressed her attitudes in the following manner:

We like living up high because it is so much cooler in hot weather and you don't get the gas fumes of the cars. Most of our friends live in the same type of house in this neighborhood. If we had children we would have to move to a walk-up because we would need more room and it would be cheaper. (Personal interview.)

Another wife, age 34, with a college education lives in five rooms on the tenth floor. She had two daughters,

⁸ Edward Stratton Holloway, "Apartments and How to Live in Them," *The House Beautiful*, 42 (Nov. 1917), 337; Elizabeth McCracken, "The Child in the Apartment," *The House Beautiful*, 40 (July 1916), 100; "Ten-Year-Old," *The New Republic*, 46, (May 12, 1926), 356.

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COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENTS IN RESERVOIR-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES*

R. F. LEONARD

Tennessee Valley Authority

SPRING CITY, Tennessee, is a typically small southern city of some 1500 population in the Great Valley of East Tennessee, about 60 miles north of Chattanooga on the Cincinnati highway. It is a shipping center for strawberries, peaches, and other fruit and vegetable crops from the nearby area in the Valley and on Walden's Ridge; it has a small sawmill and a textile mill, but has not within recent years been affected by any large-scale developments of any kind—there has been little growth or change in the community for many years.

In 1939 the Tennessee Valley Authority began construction of Watts Bar Dam across the Tennessee River about 8 miles from this Valley community. Subsequently the facilities for generation of power at this point were authorized to be increased by the construction of an 18 million dollar steam plant. At the peak of construction about 2600 workers were employed on the dam and the steam plant. It is estimated that about 200 workers will be permanently employed at this site as an operating force, requiring additional facilities in the town of housing, utilities, stores, and recreation facilities. As a measure of the size of this impact upon the community, a single statistic is of interest. The steam plant will use 2700 tons of coal each day, enough to heat an average house for 500 years, arriving through the town by rail and truck, and by water down the Tennessee River system.

This is only one part of the effect of the Authority's program on this small community. Spring City is situated on Piney Creek about 6 miles above its mouth at the Tennessee River. The reservoir created by the Watts Bar Dam extends back toward the town from the main river over a quarter mile inside the city limits. Nearly 20 acres of land within the city limits have been flooded for the first time within the last four weeks. Population readjustment was relatively slight; approximately 20 families within and immediately outside the city limits found new homes above the lake in the

vicinity. Although the lake at this point is relatively shallow, at most stages of the relatively constant reservoir a body of water 7 square miles in extent has been formed and affords superlative views from the outskirts of the town and extremely superior opportunities for water recreation.

THE PLANNING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN SPRING CITY

The citizens of Spring City as early as the summer of 1940 became interested in meeting these new conditions. As a result of conferences with the State Planning Commission, an official Spring City Planning Commission was established, soon extended as the Northern Rhea County Regional Planning Commission, under the very complete planning enabling legislation in Tennessee. The planning commission was recognized as a desirable official group to study the possibilities of readjustment, to focus the community desires for recreation, housing, and other development, and to undertake the zoning and planning actions requiring planning commission recommendation under Tennessee laws.

The development of recreation areas was what the town wanted first. The history of the program in this field over the past 24 months is an interesting example of the governmental and social relationships between citizens, local governments, state governments, and a federal agency. The Spring City Planning Commission discussed with TVA and State Planning Commission technicians the type of boating facilities which would be desirable, the extent to which the town could participate, and the approximate area and location of a boat harbor site which might be desirable. The TVA and the State Conservation Department meanwhile studied schemes for recreational development on the Watts Bar Lake as a whole and arrived at a tentative plan for recreational developments which would meet the recreational needs of the people. Combining the findings of the Watts Bar recreation plan with the desires of the citizens of Spring City resulted in selection of a Spring City boat harbor area on TVA land. A tentative program for its development was prepared. Underwater preparation of the site

* Read before the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 4, 1942.

(which could be accomplished most effectively before the reservoir was filled) was undertaken by the TVA as an incident to a required road relocation across the inlet on which the harbor is situated; trees and an old farmhouse were left on the site and protected for future use as a public shelter; and the TVA and the city, through the planning commission, are now engaged in writing a lease of the boat harbor area and of the town waterfront within the city limits for a period of 19 years, for recreation use.

Another item in the waterfront development is of interest. Although commercial development of the waterfront at Spring City is not in general feasible due to the shallowness of the bay (future commercial sites have been indicated in the reservoir plan several miles toward deep water from the city), a special experimental operation for the quick freezing of fruits and vegetables has been established on a portion of the waterfront park area. City approval of this development had to take into account its effect on future residential development, its effect on eventual park development, and of course its inherent desirability in building up the agricultural productivity of the Spring City trade area. The study given to the proposal by the TVA and State Planning Commission technicians and Spring City planning commission has resulted in satisfactory community understandings and formal lease arrangements to protect the interests of the city and handle this desirable use without impairing any present or future development possibilities.

Zoning protection, that first interest of many larger communities of the Valley, was also desired by Spring City, especially to facilitate an FHA Title VI housing project for the housing of the dam and steam plant operators. In order to locate this housing and to record the necessary map information on existing land use and studies for the zoning regulations, it was first necessary to prepare a complete and adequate base map of the community. The same combination of technical experience and city interest and support resulted in the establishment of an NYA project under technical supervision to extend TVA property maps using deed records for the remainder of the area, and to assemble penciled maps suitable for final drafting by the TVA staff. Since the planning commission does not receive any annual appropriations from the city, first the city directly and then the Kiwanis Club assisted in meeting the small expenses associated with the operation of the

mapping project. A simple zoning ordinance and suggested zoning district plan has recently been completed and is in process of adoption by the community. The planning commission is now engaged in review of the subdivision plan proposed for the new housing project, checking to see that existing city streets are properly improved to provide convenient and attractive access to the new streets of the project, which will be planned to connect with them.

THE PROGRAM IN OTHER COMMUNITIES

The rather lengthy foregoing description of the Spring City activities has been designed to give something of the feel of the cooperation between the TVA, the State Planning Commission, and the community in readjustment problems. To give the complete picture, it will be helpful to point out a few of the additional development problems which have been encountered in other communities of the Tennessee Valley. Three kinds of situations currently evidence the need for community planning. There are the reservoir-affected communities similar to Spring City, though in some cases with different problems. There are the communities which serve as housing centers for the reservoir construction projects. And there are, increasingly, the communities seriously affected by large-scale military encampments and war industries.

One of the most perplexing problems in many reservoir-affected communities is the question of bringing about a proper relationship between changing trade areas and changing community service centers. In many cases much of a community's rural trading area may be flooded by an adjacent reservoir, and the rural business in the town thus decreased. At the same time it often happens that there are alternative solutions in the readjustment of the town itself—a dike may sometimes be built to protect residences and businesses that would otherwise be flooded. If they are protected, will there be business enough for them to remain; if they are not protected, will enough store service remain to serve the continuing needs of the town and the surrounding trade area? There is no single, simple solution to this type of problem. Sometimes, as in the case of Guntersville, Alabama, new recreation and navigation resources more than replace the farm trade lost through reservoir construction. Other problems relate to assisting communities to develop vacant areas within their limits, to receive families

relocating from areas flooded by reservoirs, or moving into the community to work in war industries.

In reservoir-affected and war industry areas alike there is also a continuing need for improved administration of the community development regulations; zoning, subdivision control, building codes, and the like. I need not mention the inadequacies of most community public administration in this necessary but rather new field of adjusting day-to-day development to the needs of the future.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

From the foregoing description of the planning assistance program, the objectives and methods of the program can be seen. The immediate objective is to provide technical assistance to aid the communities in meeting required expansions and readjustments which are often completely outside the community's past experience. A more important long-range objective is to obtain the acceptance of planning principles as an integral part of municipal administration. In detail, the program attempts to establish, through a growing number of laboratory demonstrations, examples of desirable local community organization for planning.

The underlying method of accomplishing these objectives involves first the organization of a technical community planning staff within the Authority, able to call upon other specialized services of the Authority in the various fields of governmental administration, recreation, health, education, and similar aspects of community life. In line with Authority policy, the ensuing contacts with communities in the Valley are carried on through the existing state agencies established for this same purpose: the state planning commissions. In communities directly affected by the activities of the Authority in which an extra measure of state assistance has been desired, contracts have been established providing for reimbursement by the Authority to the state planning commissions for these extra services. Such contracts have been in force in Alabama and Tennessee for over two years. I believe it is fair to say that they have stimulated and strengthened the planning assistance rendered by the Commissions to other communities in the state.

A community planning program starts in most cases with the formation of a local planning commission. Community planning can be done formally or informally, given the basic considera-

tion of citizen and official interest and support; the programs show, however, that existing state legislation makes it definitely desirable to have established an official advisory planning commission. Both laws and good procedure require extensive public hearings in many phases of planning commission activity, and it is virtually impossible to proceed without this beginning of education of community citizens in the planning process.

The solution of immediate readjustment problems may be a dramatic evidence of the value of planning, but the more important second steps require that the planning commission and the community realize the value of continuing community analysis and planning in the less dramatic year-in-year-out community life. In this analysis and long-range planning study, technicians can assist by providing the materials and studies for school and adult instruction. Getting across this conception of the community as a constantly growing and changing organism requires that first the planning commission members themselves and then the citizens study the subject of planning and its application to their community. There must be an awareness of the desirability of establishing some sort of a community plan to govern subsequent development; a plan not rigid but continually changing within the principles under which it was originally adopted, and carried through by community backing independent of changing municipal administrations. The two-year existence of the cooperative planning program is too short a time to have seen much progress in these second steps, and they are being taken only gradually in the cooperating communities, slower perhaps than would ordinarily be the case because of abnormal wartime conditions.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND FINDINGS

As might be expected, progress in the stimulation of community planning is always found to be greatest during the period of immediate community readjustment. Interest in a long-range program is very apt to decline after the first exertion. No general objection to the program has been encountered; inertia is rather the main obstacle. It is difficult to obtain the personal study of planning commission members necessary to understand the basic considerations of the adjustment of urban environment, though the contributions of planning commission members to the program are in many cases extremely significant. Almost all the communities say that they are too poor to finance

any technical staff for planning study or administration, meaning that neither they nor the body politic yet realize the value of planning. Public information on the community program, and maps and printed materials are valuable if they are kept short and simple. The film, "The City," has been used on occasion in demonstrating possibilities for city development, but its content is directed to metropolitan problems and is inappropriate to conditions in the smaller southern cities. As more extensive state and community planning organizations are developed, film materials on this subject showing more typical southern community problems would be useful and should be developed. We have recently prepared our first model of a proposed community relocation, which immediately showed its value in explaining the more technical maps which had been prepared. Since there is still a lack of suitable written materials to explain the possibilities of community planning, the Authority made available to an Advisory Panel on Regional Materials of Instruction materials for preparing a booklet, "Communities for Living," designed to illustrate the planning principles and their application primarily to southern communities and cities. The booklet has been published by the University of Georgia Press, and the Panel is taking steps to bring it to the attention of school authorities and libraries and to make it available for community study groups.

There is, however, little indication that the 30-odd communities in Tennessee and Alabama which have already initiated a planning program are yet ready to adopt local planning as a continuing factor in their development if the state and regional technical assistance were withdrawn. Even if it becomes necessary to reduce this technical assistance to meet the needs of the current war effort, it is believed that the temporary experience in planning and education in planning principles will not be entirely lost and will make it easier to reestablish planning programs in these communities and elsewhere in the future. The real foundation and guarantee of future planning progress is the gradual spreading of a conception of the kind of cities we should have.

THE UNDERLYING CONCEPTS OF THE PROGRAM

The Tennessee Valley Authority's support of the planning assistance program and the support of the state administrations and of the local community

governments are based on a few specific concepts. It is believed, for instance, that community development will be more economical, attractive, and convenient if carried out according to carefully studied procedures and plans for what the community wants and how to get it. It is believed that community development is a concern of the whole community—not the planning commission alone nor the municipal administration alone. The planning program may be one answer to the long-sought method of introducing citizen participation in community administration.

The planning organization, to implement this community concern, requires: (1) a group—the planning commission—to focus community desires, cooperate with city officials, coordinate technical staff studies with public opinion; (2) an advisory group, formal or informal, to extend representation in the planning process to all neighborhoods and interested groups; (3) a technical-administrative employee or staff to gather facts, prepare recommendations, keep records, and administer plans. In smaller communities, this man becomes the all-important keeper of the keys to future development, in contrast to day-by-day administration of city affairs.

The basic assumption is that urban living can be improved—true "communities for living" can be built or reconstructed—if the urban living characteristics developed as goals by urban sociologists and by city dwellers themselves can be joined to and implemented by the science of community planning—the techniques of building the physical structure of the city. As an example, the concept of urban "neighborliness"—the organization of community life around central neighborhood facilities of school, church, playground, and shopping center—can be implemented by the community plan for the gradual relocation or location of those facilities, the street design that will serve them, and the location of major traffic arteries to by-pass them. For too long a time urban sociologists have been endeavoring to build the right kind of structure with the wrong kind of bricks, and both professions can get together with profit.

In conclusion, a short definition of sociology, perhaps unacceptable to the experts, is the science of the origin and evolution of society, or of the forms, institutions, and functions of human groups. If southern sociologists can indicate the kinds of forms, institutions, and functions that best

serve this particular human group of southern city-dwellers, such planning programs as have been described can help in bringing those institutions and functions into being. I can, indeed, quote

Aristotle, in a classic slogan with which the Valley planners are pleased to concur: "A city is not for the purpose of men's merely living together, but for living as men ought."

RECREATION PLANNING IN THE TENNESSEE-CUMBERLAND RIVERS WATERSHEDS*

ALLEN T. EDMUNDS

Central Southeastern Regional Recreation Study

LET us picture in our minds, if we can, a vast chain of lakes covering thousands of acres of land and stretching from the Ohio River in southwest Kentucky, down through Tennessee into a corner of Mississippi, through northern Alabama, just touching a corner of Georgia, and back up through Tennessee on the western side, into the quadra-State mountains territory of Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, back through southeastern Kentucky, northern Tennessee, southwestern Kentucky, and ending in the Ohio River again a few miles north of its starting point. It is not difficult to picture such a series of lakes on the Tennessee River for we have watched them gradually come into being, but few of us have attempted to visualize the importance and implications involved in a duplicate series on the Cumberland River.

A dry, lakeless portion of our nation once known chiefly for its isolated mountainous regions and the low economic levels of its people is gradually becoming a recreational area of considerable magnitude. The establishment of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Tennessee and North Carolina, and the building of the Norris Dam stimulated a tremendous increase in tourist interest in our state. With the development of more dams and reservoirs, scores of state parks and commercial recreational areas, the possibilities of this region were becoming more apparent. Add to this now the proposed development on the Cumberland and we begin to grasp the immensity of the recreational picture.

Although recreation is secondary in the establishment of dams for flood control, power develop-

ment, and navigation, it takes no back seat in public interest. To what extent should recreation be planned for in relation to the reservoirs? To what extent should states develop facilities for recreation for the ever increasing use of their citizens and those who come from without the state? What type of developments should be attempted, and how extensive? Where should these developments be placed to best serve all interests? When do we reach a saturation point in the provision of recreational facilities? These and many other questions become paramount when a section of our country finds itself, all at once, an object of much interest to a recreation-minded public.

Obviously one cannot answer those questions without considerable research and study. For this reason a very definite, earnest, and well planned attempt is being made on the part of Federal and state agencies to solve many of the problems and chart a smooth and practicable course through this rapidly increasing interest and public demand for things recreational. In 1936 Congress passed an Act authorizing the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service, to conduct a Park, Parkway and Recreational Area Study throughout the nation with those states that cared to participate, in order to provide a well planned program of development of the nation's recreational resources. Forty-six of the states participated and well over thirty of these states have prepared, in cooperation with the National Park Service, preliminary reports on a state master plan of development.

In the preparation of state plans, the necessity for ignoring state boundry lines became more and more apparent. One who seeks recreation does not normally turn back when he reaches the state

* Read before the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Southern Sociological Society in Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 4, 1942.

line. In addition, states found themselves developing similar facilities within but a few miles of each other, creating a problem of overlapping and insufficient use. By the end of 1940, states within the Tennessee-Cumberland River Watersheds had completed their preliminary reports and so in cooperation with the representatives of these eight states, and three Federal agencies, (Tennessee Valley Authority, U. S. Forest Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service), the National Park Service launched its first Regional Study, known as the Central Southeastern Regional Recreation Study.

The reason for selecting the Tennessee-Cumberland River Watersheds is an obvious one. But to determine the area that should be included within the Central Southeastern Region for study, because of the recreational influence of these lakes and mountains, is not so easily decided. Our first step was to determine an arbitrary boundary line that would encompass the zone of influence, for all practical purposes, of the watersheds. In determining this boundary line we considered very carefully the calculated zone of influence of other recreational sections of our country. Thus we became encircled with other recreational regions. In the north our boundary line stopped at the Ohio River on the edge of the Great Lakes Region. In the west it stopped at the Mississippi River because of the Ozarks, and in the south it cut through the states of Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, on the border of the Gulf Coast Region. In the southeast it bisected the states of South Carolina and North Carolina because of the Atlantic Seacoast, and in the northeast it stopped in southern Virginia and on the boundary line of West Virginia, because of the Appalachian Mountain Valley Region. We only assume that the zone of influence ends or extends to that boundary line; it is purely arbitrary now but we hope to establish one based on facts as determined from research and study among the people.

For several years now the National Park Service has been collecting considerable data on the recreational habits and interests of people attending national, state, county, and metropolitan parks. There are available, in published form, reports dealing on the distances people travel to visit state parks, the percentage of those that come from within the fifteen mile zone, twenty-five mile zone, and fifty mile zone, the percentage of those who swim, picnic, hike, camp, study nature, or just sit. We think we know a great deal about what the people want who come to the area, but we don't know anything about the people who never have

visited an area, and unfortunately they represent a vast majority of our population. So we are out to learn 'why' and 'what' from that large group.

We have prepared a simple five-minute questionnaire which we plan to present to a few thousand people within the Central Southeastern Region. We are adhering to the principles of Dr. Gallup, which have proved so accurate, and will attempt to sample the population to determine many things concerning the recreational habits and interests of the people we are planning for. To test the feasibility of the questionnaire prepared, we have already taken a sample test in a small section of Mississippi. Although the samples were so few we made no attempt to draw conclusions, many interesting bits of information were brought out. Some, worthy of mention are as follows:

(1) Eighty percent of those contacted earned between \$500 and \$1,000 a year, yet half of them owned automobiles or had them available for their use.

(2) Well over half (60 percent) of those interviewed were not provided with recreational opportunities by any agency, organization or group. The church presented opportunities for about twenty percent, and was the leading agency; fraternal lodges, fifteen percent and W.P.A. two percent.

(3) Over two-thirds (67.5 percent) of those interviewed did not travel out of town for recreation on week days. Seventeen percent went ten miles or less, and the rest between twenty and thirty miles.

(4) 27.5 percent did not go out of town for recreation on week-ends. 32 percent went twenty-five miles or less; 20 percent went sixty miles.

(5) 42.5 percent did not travel out of town for their vacation; however, 35 percent went 300 miles plus; 12 percent, 100 miles or less; and 10 percent, 200 miles.

(6) Over half of those interviewed (57.5 percent) travelled neither to the seashore nor the mountains on their vacation.

(7) 60 percent preferred the seashore for a vacation and 30 percent the mountains.

There are about twenty-seven different sections of this region where we would like to take samples. It is not anticipated that more than a total of 4000 samples will have to be taken to secure an accurate picture of the recreational habits and interests of the people.

There are over 200 non-urban recreational areas within the CSE Region owned and operated by Federal, state, county and municipal agencies. They vary in size from a single area of several thousand acres to a wayside of less than an acre. Federal agencies administer 145 of the areas; state agencies, 73; and county and municipal agencies, 8. One hundred and three of these provide day-

use and overnight facilities. We know very little about the vast number of non-urban recreational facilities owned and operated by commercial agencies, which complement the opportunities offered by public agencies. We want to know a great deal more about them and what part they best play in the development of a sound regional plan.

We have listed all the areas in the Region, placed them in separate classes or types, such as, recreational areas providing day-use and overnight facilities; National and state monuments; National military parks; waysides; memorials; shrines; and scientific sites. We have subdivided the list of recreational areas into primary and secondary and made field appraisals of all primary areas to determine from their natural features the extent of their possible development. This we have learned about existing areas but we know little about the potential areas that lie within this Region. As our recreational needs expand it becomes imperative to give priority of development to the most logical of sites. Thus we come to another phase of the Study which is as yet in the future. We have, however, divided our Region into its physiographic provinces and prepared a procedure for the study of potential sites that has proved satisfactory in a sample test.

Much time has already been devoted to the study of the population of this Region. Although this Region is of national significance it will provide recreation primarily for the people within the Region. Because of this factor it is necessary to know first, population distribution, trends and racial dispersion. In addition we have to know the social, economic, and political habits and trends of these people before a sound Regional plan can be devised.

The establishment of Army Camps and defense industries in this Region has made a pronounced difference in the adequacy of our recreational opportunities. Favorable climatic conditions for training purposes and the abundance of electric power, or the natural resources to provide it, for industry are the motivating forces for the establishment of these camps and areas. Because of these two fundamental factors there may continue to exist a large industrial section within the Region, after the emergency has passed.

Unlike the North and the East where industrial plants and army camps were, in many instances, already established, a large majority of the sites selected in this Region are in virgin territory. Many are centered at small towns and rural areas,

creating social and economic problems of great magnitude. Not least of these is the provision for recreational opportunities.

Within the Central Southeastern Region there are existing and proposed (as of July 1, 1941) 19 forts, army camps, and air bases, and 25 defense industry centers. In nearly every case, the training areas are located where recreational opportunities are least adequate. Fortunately, this is not true of the defense industry centers but seldom are the centers properly equipped to provide for a normal load irrespective of the new demands being made upon them.

The provision of facilities now for an increased two or three millions of people which can serve recreational needs after the emergency has passed, deserves careful planning.

Much has been written about the millions of dollars spent by tourists in our states each year. The tourist trade has become big business and prior to the defense boom was second to no other trade in some states. A number of studies have already been made as to the 'flight of the tourist' through Tennessee, how and where he spends his money, why he stays or doesn't stay, and so personal an item as how much money he earns, even before the income tax collector tries to find out. More studies of the nomad will be made from time to time for he is an important user and advertiser of our commodity, recreation, and it is wise to serve him well.

Why shouldn't the man, who has paid \$3.00 for a fishing license in Tennessee, be able to use that same license in Alabama or Mississippi or Kentucky or some other state in this Region and vice versa? If state boundary lines are ignored by the recreation-minded, then perhaps a regional plan of administration of areas should be developed. The problems of revenue, state's power of jurisdiction, taxation, and a thousand others seem to arise upon a mere mention of the question, but it is not an impossible one. We already have interstate compacts where two or more states agree to maintain jointly and operate an area. We have instances where states have combined to purchase land that later becomes a national park, because that area is of considerable benefit to the states within which it is located. A Regional Plan of development, operation, and maintenance, with all our resources pooled, certainly has possibilities of accomplishment. Thus we set the stage for two more important phases of our Study, a Regional Plan of Administration and a Regional Plan of Legislation.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

Contributions to this Department will include original articles, reports of conferences, special investigations and research, and programs relating to marriage and the family. It is edited by Ernest R. Groves of the University of North Carolina, who would like to receive reports and copies of any material relating to the family and marriage.

EFFECTS OF THE MODIFICATION OF THE SEX MORES UPON SEX SPECIALIZATION OF LABOR

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IN THEIR book *Science of Society*, Sumner and Keller devote a chapter of considerable length to the subject, "Labor: Sex Specialization." There is no room left for doubt in the minds of their readers as to their firm belief in the "inequality" of the sexes. Their conclusions are predicated upon the physiological differences between the sexes. Fundamental importance is placed in the fact that:

The female bears the passive, relatively heavy, inert, impregnable ovum; the male the active, light, impregnating spermatozoon. The female is the sought, the male the aggressive seeker.¹

These differences predestine the sexes to play specialized roles in the continuance of life and thereby society. Such specializations, however, form the bases for cooperation because of their "extremes of unlikeness."² It is mainly through the medium of their greatest physiological differences that the sexes are most effectively complementary. In other words, the reference is to the roles played by each sex in reproduction. Physically, then, it is through the cooperation of the sexes that life continues. It is equally true psychologically and objectively that life continues through the cooperation of man and woman using their peculiar specializations.

The female, therefore, by native endowment is cast for the role of domesticating the offspring and caring for its basic urgent needs. The male provides and protects the environment for these ac-

tivities. Herein is compassed in a brief manner the philosophy of the authors of the *Science of Society* on labor and sex specialization. The recorded history of the development of the sexes has certainly provided voluminous material warranting in the main the conclusions of these scholars but the writer quarrels with the rigidity of their conclusions. They are too dogmatic. The stepped-up movements of dynamic society during even the last decade in which their treatise was published tend to prove this critical reaction. Times change because conditions change, social forces generate varying degrees of intensity thus so altering the exteriors of life as to actually make, for practical purposes, societal differences. There is much evidence to support at least a hypothesis to the effect that current social dynamics are tending to soften the "inequalities" existing between the sexes particularly in the matter of sex modification as it effects labor specialization.

The bare question of whether or not men and women are actually equals belongs in the realm of philosophical vagueness because of the varied possible definitions of the terms equality and inequality. What is important, though, is that men, women, and their offspring continue to live and to live less and less irritating lives. For this reason continuous analyses of the effects of modification of the sex mores upon sex specialization of labor should be a fundamental in any adequate system of sociology. Fundamental because,

To an extent not yet gauged by historians, hunters, wars, states and institutions have been shaped to meet the supreme exigency of continuing life and must be if mankind is to go on living at all. . . . Otherwise human

¹ W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927), 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 116.

life and everything built upon it would perish from the earth.³

Judging from the tone of the books reviewed in the course of research for this thesis there is much opinion of weight to the effect that sex, while basically important, is only a segment of woman's life. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the same is true of man's life. Sex, however, is the prime causal factor in differentiating the maintenance roles of man and woman. For instance, it diverted woman's thinking and activities into the general field of domesticity which even in primitive times, according to numerous cited cases, covered a wide range of activities, the organization of which must have called for considerable ingenuity.

It has been argued that women were the inventors of the domestic arts but whether or not this assumption is correct there is scientifically acceptable evidence that they cradled the domestic arts thus incorporating them into their sex mores. The core then of woman's work has been the intimate care of the life which she bore. Might it not then just as well be said that the core of man's life-work has been maintaining the setting in which the mother-life and child-life operate with varying degrees of safety. Mary Beard would have us believe that women "are launching civilization."⁴

In his time-honored role of protector man has engaged in the more dangerous and unrefined tasks such as hunting, fishing, and fighting. Women have tended to serve as their socially refining agents by keeping "the home fires burning" with comfort and cheer, thus gradually conditioning men to the ways of more peaceful life.

The aggressiveness of men, however, has led them to encroach upon the occupational world of women whenever it seemed to their advantage to do so. Consequently much of the labor specialization cradled by women has been taken over by men when it is out of its swaddling clothes, the result ultimately being large business structures labelled textile mills, dairies, bakeries, agricultural combines and the like—domestic arts in their most matured state. In the main, these are industries of peace and domestic conditioning. A noted woman writer reflects this situation in the following view:

Amusing as it may seem, it is primitive women's interest that is now the prime concern of the civilized

man. . . . Modern societies . . . all agree in declaring that their fundamental end is the manufacture and wide distribution of those commodities which the old Romans of the republican era declared tend to effeminacy—the conveniences and luxuries, that give ease and satisfaction in the continuance and care of life—primitive women's burden and one that will abide while mankind exists.⁵

In the course of time, certain dynamic adjustments in the self-preservation scheme of the sexes have tended to soften the "inequalities" between the sexes. It is not contended that these conditions have even tended to erase the "extremes of unlikeness" between the sexes but that their incorporation into the sex mores has given new advantage to women in the matter of antagonistic sex cooperation in the struggle for existence. A few illustrations will dramatize the meaning as the writer thinks of it. Wars, for instance, never fail to throw the maintenance machinery of society out of gear. Wars take their men from among those of production age, so the maintenance patterns suffer. However, society must be fed, clothed, and provided with fighting materials. Hence, women are forced to assume at least part of man's occupational status.

This has been noticeable as far back as there is recorded history. As wars have become more and more the all-absorbing fields for specialists, women have had to assume increasing important and demanding supporting roles. Today a nation like Great Britain is reported to have over three-quarters of a million women in uniforms doing arduous and dangerous work. After wars there is serious dislocation of population and fewer men of productions value so women by force of circumstances maintain much of what they have gained in offsetting the effect of the sex inequalities.

At least for the sake of argument attention should be directed to the modern inventions which tend to detract from the force of the physical "extremes of unlikeness." There are types of medication very effective in reducing the ill-effects of periodic illnesses natural to women thereby cutting down the time lost monthly from work. Contraceptive devices regulate child birth thus making it possible for women to be more standard competitors of men. Then, too, might be added the fact that modern labor-saving machinery is rapidly opening up erstwhile "men's jobs" to women.

³ Mary R. Beard, *On Understanding Women* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931), 513.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

Because of the almost immeasurable breadth of the subject of this thesis some sacrifice of logical sequence is obviously made in order to center attention briefly upon certain selected significant topics, such as the influence of mothers upon occupations, transfer of wealth to women, limitations of women in politics, some advantages of remaining true to the particular sex mores. An unalterable, basic, and simple fact, apparently forgotten at times is that women are the mothers of men. The theme running through this thesis has stressed the role of women in the scheme of life continuity. This intimate relationship places mothers in the position of laying foundations for the philosophy of life to be formed by her maturing offspring. Modern conditions of motherhood have rendered it more possible and probable than ever for the mother to affect the kind of occupational futures followed by her children. She has probably, at all times, even during their short period under her control in primitive times affected the attitudes of her children toward their occupations and toward their sexes. The psychoanalysts have been exceedingly concerned about the extremes of mother-fixations because of the almost unremediable maladjustments they cause in males as well as females. A woman writer obviously influenced by the psychoanalytic school sums up her reactions to this point in part in this succinct statement:

Her attitude to the problem of occupation will depend, obviously, as much on her whole preparation for life as did her attitude to the other problems; but here the opinion she has formed about her sexual role will clearly have a very considerable effect.

... The kind of training any girl undertakes with a view to her future profession or occupation shows clearly enough what her attitude towards her sexual role is. ... A woman's concept of her role in the matter of occupation may well be a definite reflection of the concept of "a woman's place" held during her mother's maiden days. So one hears unending arguments today between women, between men and women and between men as to the place or lack of place of women in industry for instance. A thorough examination of many of the views expressed would no doubt reflect the maternal cradling influence.⁶

One of the vocational "monstrosities" produced at least, in its major part, by the side of this argument which contends that we live in a "man's world" is the women who believe that to be suc-

cessful in the eyes of the world they must act the man role. They then proceed to change their social type—this is very important because it implies that the personality type is not changed. The battle between these types makes for the maladjusted individual.

Olga Knopf finds this situation serious enough to pay attention to it in her book *The Art of Being A Woman*. In part her reaction is so expressed:

... Many women have believed that they can succeed only by acting as if they were men. They have overestimated the chasm between the two sexes and tried desperately to bridge it. We can see how much tension and wasted energy must accompany such an attitude.⁷

The traditional role of social refiner monopolized by women has encouraged numerous myths and legends about her powers as a super-purifier of the morals of men. The term motherhood has become a great symbol of social control bearing the weight of practical idealism and fantastical fantasy—"the woman's touch." The magic of "the woman's touch" was to purify politics. The entire profession would become genteel. Well, history, both ancient and current, of times when women became direct political factors, tells of how they in most instances acted as if they were men. The activities of women in modern politics have been limited too by the "extremes of unlikeness" and their sex mores. Menstrual periods, childbirth, household duties, moral concepts have kept many of them from being fully effective political forces. Men are vitally interested in protection of these specializations and oftentimes force women to accept preferred treatment when they become problems to be dealt with.

Women are beginning to recognize the occupational as well as social values of remaining true to their sex. By doing so they maintain an importance as a cooperating partner even though at times it may be antagonistic cooperation. They remain complementary to the other sex; necessary to its completion. They gain the advantages that accrue to the mothers of men. Men then can be made to find certain pleasurable ego compensation in modifying their traditional world so that it will be hospitable to women who enter it as partners or competitors. The game of life continuity is subject to one set of rules when it is played between men and another more civilized, humane set when

⁶ Olga Knopf, *The Art of Being a Woman* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1932), 245.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Preface, p. vi.

the competition is between men and women. Inez H. Irwin makes note of the value of the separate sex roles in these words:

But no matter how carefully she listens, no woman of middle years now hears the young girls about her saying, 'Oh, how I wish I had been born a boy!' The girl of today can do almost everything boys do and usually does. She works at everything. She plays at everything. She is on the mountain, in the sea, and above the clouds.⁸

It is a definite fact that modern science and necessity have narrowed considerably the kinds of jobs open exclusively to either sex. Scientists have established the mental equality of the sexes, social welfare has in some countries attempted to make the care of children a matter of state, contraceptive inventions are regulating the spacing of childbirth or preventing its even becoming an occupational obstruction, modern machinery is fast taking the drudgery out of labor.

The fact that intellectual development is becoming the important factor in operating the world likely portends a future when in spite of physical differences the sexes may truly act as if the "inequalities" created by their physiological construction have been erased.

In the work world of relatively peaceful America, women have become so diffused in multitudinous occupations of such wide varieties and thereby such

⁸ Inez H. Irwin, *Angels and Amazons* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1935), 439.

integral parts of the maintenance systems of their regions until . . . "a one-day strike of women would be chaos now."⁹

Their current importance is represented by the fact that changes in certain regional sex codes have been accelerated in order to accommodate the women engaged in once forbidden occupations. The writer recognizes the present state antagonism to women in competition with men and particularly the strength of these antagonisms in the dictator countries. However, if the mass murder of men continues these antagonisms will give away to need for continuing life and society.

Throughout this thesis the male has been used both directly and by implication as the controlling factor for the discussion lest it get out of hand. The frequent mention of the female has not been intended to minimize the effects of sex modification upon the labor specialization of males. The very dynamic force of the female throughout this thesis has, it is hoped, thrown into bas relief these effects upon men.

This is important because the expanding means for accommodating women in erstwhile male jobs has contributed largely to the unemployment of men. Unemployed men can not support families. Consequently sex codes are being altered—eventually, maybe, the core of the sex mores will be changed, thus further softening the differences between the "extremes of unlikeness."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

(Concluded from p. 198)

one six, the other two. Her husband's income is approximately \$20,000 a year. She made the following statements:

I think living in an apartment like this one is loathsome. There are simply no advantages as far as I am concerned. I have always lived in a house of my own and my children were born in a private house. They can't get out of doors except when the nurse takes them and that isn't always convenient. I feel terribly cramped and so do my children.

We thought we would try living in an apartment but shortly after we moved in we realized that we couldn't bear it. We are building a house in Highland Park (a suburb) and we will move as soon as we can. (Personal interview.)

Mrs. B., age 40, has a daughter of eight. She has two college degrees; is very wealthy; lives on the thirteenth floor.

I much prefer living in an elevator apartment because it is so much safer and cuts down the nuisance of having all sorts of people like salesmen and so on, coming up. My husband and I never lock our apartment because the elevator man always knows whether we are in or not.

Karen (the daughter) is very friendly with the three elevator men. They take her out to the drug store; give her birthday and Christmas gifts; and know all about her small affairs. There are quite a few children in the building but she doesn't know any of them at all. When I was a child we lived in a walk-up apartment. I knew all the children in the building and mother was friendly with almost all of the women in the building. In the elevator all of us say hello to each other but we never let it go further than that. I consider the elevator men as part of my domestic household and at Christmas time tip each one one hundred dollars.

Karen plays in the park with her nurse, goes to school and makes dates with other children. She has her own room and many playthings. We don't associate with anyone in the building.⁸

From the findings we can conclude that living in tall elevator apartment dwellings either decreases the birth rate and size of family or it selects for habitation the childless and small family. In either case an association between the high elevator apartment and smaller families exists.

FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AMONG MINNESOTA RURAL YOUTH*

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WHAT do I want to do for a living when I grow up? That is one of the most frequently recurring preoccupations of the adolescent. Perhaps all youth dream at times of themselves occupying positions of power and prestige. With some people such dreams become obsessions leading them on to success or to the depths of despair upon failing to attain their goal. Other youth tend to have more easily attained ambitions which may lead to contentment or to the setting of a new and more lofty goal. In this study Minnesota rural youth were asked the question, "What is your occupational choice or preference, if any?"¹

It is probable that many interpreted the word choice as what one would like to do if he had the time and means to prepare for it, while other youths made a more practical interpretation and stated only a choice within reasonable possibility of attainment. An example of the former would be aviation, which seven listed as their occupational choice. Four of these admitted they would not be able to enter this occupation. Of the remaining three, two obviously would be unable to fulfill their ambitions because of lack of education. Only one who had reached the senior year in high school had stated this was his choice and that he felt he would be able to enter the occupation. Thus, only one out of seven who selected aviation had a chance of fulfilling his ambitions. An example of the latter (attainable choices) would be

teaching which was more nearly within the realm of possibility of fulfillment for those making this selection. In Duluth (St. Louis County) and Alexandria (Douglas County) are normal training schools for teachers. Many of the rural elementary schools in the state use teachers who have had only one year's training in these schools. Thus the high school student in Duluth or Alexandria who says he intends to go into teaching stands a very good chance of being able to do it. However, this is a study of the occupational desires and ambitions of rural youth and should not be interpreted as indicative of the way in which they will be distributed eventually among the various occupational groupings.

THE FACTORS OF AGE, SEX, AND MARITAL STATUS

Single Men. As the youth become older there seems to be a definite tendency for them to express their occupational choice as something more within the possibility of attainment. Table I shows that while only 31.8 percent of the single young men between the ages of 15 and 19 gave farming as their occupational choice, 40.0 percent of those 20-24 gave it as their choice, and 62.8 percent of those 25-29 listed farming as their choice. This seems to demonstrate the statement rather frequently heard among the young people on the farm that they do not want to go into farming but there is nothing else to do.² In the two older age groups many had begun farming operations, which probably accounts somewhat for the high percentage in the older age groups listing farming as their occupational choice.

Choice of professional occupations among men was largest for the age group 15-19 in which case

* Assistance in the preparation of these materials was furnished by the personnel of Work Projects Administration Official Project No. 665-71-3-69.

¹ This question was one included in a survey of Minnesota rural youth living in ten selected townships in Minnesota. These townships are located in Dodge County in the southeastern portion of the state; Douglas, in the central western portion; and St. Louis, in the cut-over area of the northeast. The first is located in Minnesota Social Area No. Ia, the second in No. IIa, and the last in No. III. The schedule was prepared by a former member of the rural sociology staff of the University of Minnesota, who also supervised most of the field work. The writer edited most of the schedules and prepared the manuscript. The survey was conducted during the fall of 1937.

² In New York State 28.2 percent of farm boys aged 15-29 gave farming as their occupational *preference* for life work while 49.2 percent gave farming as their occupational *plans* for a life work according to a study made by Anderson and Kerns. Those who did not know their occupational preference or had no occupational plans were omitted. Calculated from tables in W. A. Anderson and Willis Kerns *Interests, Activities, and Problems of Rural Young Folk: 11 Men 15 to 29 years of Age*, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin #631 (1935), pp. 17-18.

21.8 percent listed occupations of this type. With the age group 20-24 the percentage was 15.7 and for the oldest group 25-29 it was down to 7.8 percent. Smaller proportions wished to enter business and other white collar occupations, but the same trend is seen here as in the professional occupations. For the 15-19 group the percentage is 7.3, for the 20-24 group 6.1 percent, and for the 25-29 group 2.0 percent. It is possible that the percentage for the group 20-24 did not fall farther because many youth who had professional ambitions before 20 chose the business and other white collar jobs between 20 and 25 but after 25 realized they could not attain either of these goals. This explanation may also hold for the skilled and semi-skilled occupations where the middle age group showed the highest percentage (33.9). Rela-

on the other hand, it is probable that the men who marry come in a larger proportion from those who already have some means of earning a living than from those who have not yet gotten jobs. Skilled and semi-skilled occupations were next in importance since this type of job constituted 28.6 percent of the 20-24 group and 22.5 percent of the 25-29 group. Professional choices were true of 14.3 percent of the married group 20-24 and 7.5 percent of the group 25-29. Since some male teachers were included in this study, these percentages were made up of persons already employed in several cases. Business choices were negligible as were unskilled choices.

Single Women. Among the single women, professional ambitions loom large, as seen in Table II. Desire to enter teaching is the professional occupa-

TABLE I
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OF MINNESOTA YOUNG MEN CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO AGE AND MARTIAL STATUS

	PROFESSIONAL		BUSINESS AND OTHER WHITE COLLAR		SKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED		UNSKILLED		FARMING		TOTAL	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Single Men	46	16.7	16	5.8	84	30.4	17	6.2	113	40.9	276	100.0
15-19	24	21.8	8	7.3	33	30.0	10	9.1	35	31.8	110	100.0
20-24	18	15.7	7	6.1	39	33.9	5	4.3	46	40.0	115	100.0
25-29	4	7.8	1	2.0	12	23.5	2	3.9	32	62.8	51	100.0
Married	6	9.8	2	3.3	15	24.6	3	4.9	35	57.4	61	100.0
15-19	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20-24	3	14.3	—	—	6	28.6	1	4.7	11	52.4	21	100.0
25-29	3	7.5	2	5.0	9	22.5	2	5.0	24	60.0	40	100.0

tively few chose unskilled occupations in any age group. Since the numbers are small it is doubtful whether any significant differences are indicated, but the highest percentage was in the younger group. It would seem then that here we have some substantiation of an hypothesis that with increasing age farm youth in Minnesota tend to state their occupational choice as something within their grasp rather than indulging in phantasy to the extent that the younger group appears to do. The only contrary evidence is in the unskilled choices where the number of cases is small.

Married Men. Among the married men the percentages for farming were 52.4 for those 20-24 and 60.0 for those 25-29. There were no married men younger than 20. Reciprocal factors are probably at work among this group. Marriage would force a man to select work and begin it, and

tion most frequently mentioned. Since teacher training departments are found in two of the counties studied it would seem that attainment of this goal would be possible for many. The age of greatest desire to enter this field was between 20 and 24 when 57.1 percent wished to enter this field. Some of these were already teaching. The 15-19 age group gave professional occupational desires in 49.5 percent of the cases and the 25-29 age group in 40.0 percent. Commercial work appealed to about one-fourth of the age group 15-19, one-fifth of the group 25-29, and one-ninth of the group 20-24. This lower middle group about balances the higher middle group in the professional choices. Domestic occupations (housekeeping etc.) increased with age, but the number of cases was small. Other occupational choices such as beauty operator constituted about one choice in six for

each age group. Young women, if they planned to marry, seldom admitted it. Many of them no doubt will, but the fact that the young women are dissatisfied with farm life or at least make a verbal choice of nonfarming occupations may become a major problem in the future, if it leads to disproportionate migration of marriageable women from the rural areas. This is a problem of considerable magnitude and gravity in some of the European countries. G. Stockman has pointed out in regard to central Europe:

As it is, even today in central Europe not only must the peasant toil from early morning until late in the evening, but the peasant's wife must be not only housewife and mother but also the main assistant of the peasant in his work, especially on the smaller farms.

capable and most talented daughters of peasants leave the land to take up professions in the cities, or they marry civil servants, tradesmen, or skilled workers in order to find an easier life. Migration from the land is nowhere so apparent as among those peasant daughters, particularly among the more talented.³

Married Women. Married women chose domestic occupations in nearly all cases. In their case a definite occupational choice had been made sometime previous to the taking of the schedule.

RELATION OF LAND TENURE AND SIZE OF FARM TO OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OF BOYS

Nearly three-fourths of the farms on which the youth lived were owned by someone in the household. However, when we break down our survey

TABLE II
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OF MINNESOTA YOUNG WOMEN CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO AGE AND MARITAL STATUS

	PROFESSIONAL		COMMERCIAL		DOMESTIC		OTHER		TOTAL	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Single Women	74	51.0	31	21.4	15	10.4	25	17.2	145	100.0
15-19	46	49.5	24	25.8	7	7.5	16	17.2	93	100.0
20-24	24	57.1	5	11.9	6	14.3	7	16.7	42	100.0
25-29	4	40.0	2	20.0	2	20.0	2	20.0	10	100.0
Married Women	6	5.0	—	—	115	95.0	—	—	121	100.0
15-19	—	—	—	—	3	100.0	—	—	3	100.0
20-24	2	4.4	—	—	43	95.6	—	—	45	100.0
25-29	4	5.5	—	—	69	94.5	—	—	73	100.0

These conditions have had very harmful consequences, especially in the post-War period, on the hereditary force of our rural population and for the retention of our rural folk in the country-side and in their traditional vocation. The peasant himself has to work harder than the industrial worker although he finds some compensation in the fact that he enjoys the higher social status and the slightly greater degree of independence which goes with the ownership and management of a peasant farm. The peasant wife, however, is usually more burdened with work; she is indeed completely overburdened on many peasant farms, and certainly far more burdened than the wives of artisans or industrial workers. We are, therefore, now confronted with the situation, and it is a very dangerous and serious one, that the best and most capable daughters of peasants usually have no inclination to become peasants' wives. I was told in a peasant village of south Germany that there were about fifteen to twenty young sons of peasants all willing to take over their farms, but who were looking in vain for capable peasant girls whom they might marry. It is especially the case that the most

into counties, marked differences are to be found. Over nine out of ten farms in St. Louis County were owner operated.⁴ In Dodge and Douglas Counties the percentages were much lower, 57.3 and 66.4 respectively. This differential is probably related to the fact that most of the land in the latter two counties is fertile and has been settled for a considerable period, whereas St. Louis County was homesteaded fairly recently, chiefly since the opening of the iron mines in 1884. The land being

³ G. Stockmann, "Farm Labour and Social Standards," *Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Agricultural Economists* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 239-240.

⁴ In order to check the accuracy of our reporting and sampling the percentage of farms operated by owners and part-owners as reported in the 1935 Census of Agriculture was calculated. For all three counties the figures were quite satisfactory—within three percent of each other.

fairly cheap, it is usually bought rather than rented. It should be pointed out that the average owner in this area does not have as high a standard of living as the tenant on many corn belt farms. Often his investment is much smaller, i.e. the investment of the corn belt tenant in livestock, power machinery, and other equipment is greater than the entire investment of many owners in the cut-over area.

Owners' Sons. Table III presents the number and percentage of youth who expressed an occupa-

this choice, 29.8 percent of those living on farms of 60-99 acres, while 47.3 percent on farms of 100-139 acres, 46.0 percent on farms 140 to 179 acres and 65.2 percent of those on farms of 180 acres and more wanted to become farmers.

It seems that relatively few male youth living in owned homes would like to enter business, since only about five percent were considering business and commercial occupations. The number of cases is quite small but the percentage seems to be somewhat greater among those coming from the

TABLE III
RELATION OF TENURE STATUS AND SIZE OF PARENT'S FARM TO OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE OF MALE YOUTH

SIZE OF FARM AND TENURE STATUS	PROFESSIONAL		BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR		SKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED		UNSKILLED		FARMING		TOTAL	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Owner and Part Owner.....	37	17.1	12	5.6	70	32.4	16	7.4	81	37.5	216	100
Farm.....	31	15.6	11	5.5	64	32.2	13	6.5	80	40.2	199	100
Less than 20 acres.....	2	50.0	1	25.0	0	0	1	25.0	0	0	4	100
20-59.....	8	24.2	1	3.0	15	45.5	5	15.2	4	12.1	33	100
60-99.....	7	14.9	5	10.6	17	36.2	4	8.5	14	29.8	47	100
100-139.....	1	5.3	1	5.3	8	42.1	0	0	9	47.3	19	100
140-179.....	7	14.0	2	4.0	15	30.0	3	6.0	23	46.0	50	100
180 and more.....	6	13.0	1	2.2	9	19.6	0	0	30	65.2	46	100
Nonfarm.....	6	35.3	1	5.9	6	35.3	3	17.6	1	5.9	17	100
Tenant.....	11	12.2	6	6.7	20	22.2	3	3.3	50	55.6	90	100
Farm.....	9	11.7	3	3.9	15	19.5	2	2.6	48	62.3	77	100
Less than 20 acres.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20-59.....	1	33.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	66.7	3	100
60-99.....	2	14.3	0	0	3	21.4	0	0	9	64.3	14	100
100-139.....	3	30.0	1	10.0	1	10.0	0	0	5	50.0	10	100
140-179.....	2	6.9	2	6.9	6	20.7	1	3.4	18	62.1	29	100
180 and more.....	1	4.8	0	0	5	23.8	1	4.8	14	66.6	21	100
Nonfarm.....	2	15.4	3	23.0	5	38.5	1	7.7	2	15.4	13	100

31 Schedules were omitted because of incomplete information.

tional choice of one sort or another according to tenure status and the size of the farm. Among the owner group there was a tendency for children on larger farms to consider agriculture as their life job to a higher degree than those on smaller farms, although dissatisfaction with agriculture probably is registered by the relatively small percentages in all size classifications who planned to remain in agriculture. Only 40.2 percent of those on owned and part owned farms planned to become farmers. None of the youth from owned farms of less than 20 acres wished to go into farming. Only 12.1 percent of the farms of 20 to 59 acres expressed

smaller farms. About one in six had professional ambitions. That satisfaction of these desires is impossible with the majority of them is obvious, except as noted above in the case of the rural teachers. Here again, fantasy seems to play a larger role in the case of the youth on the smaller farms. Skilled and semi-skilled occupations account for the desire of somewhat less than one youth in three, and there seemed to be little relation to size of farm. Nonfarm youth made this choice in about the same proportion as farm youth. About one in fourteen planned on going into unskilled labor. This was found more often in the

case of the small farm and nonfarm youth than in the case of youth coming from the larger farms.

Tenants' Sons. The son of the tenant seems to plan on entering agriculture more often than does the owner's son. While 62.3 percent of the sons of tenant farmers chose farming as their future occupation, only 40.2 percent of the sons of farm owners chose this occupation.⁵ There appears to be no definite relationship between size of tenant farm and choice of farming as an occupation. Business and commercial fields were chosen by 3 out of 13 rural nonfarm boys, but by only 3 of the 77 rural farm boys. A somewhat lower percentage of the tenant group chose professional careers than did owner's children. About one-fourth of the sons of tenants chose semi-skilled and skilled fields. This was more marked among the nonfarm tenant group, many of whose fathers fall in this class, no doubt, than among the farm youth. Choice of labor was insignificant. Those who stated this choice were probably youth who were engaged in common labor and saw no alternative but to continue.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. Farming was the occupational choice in larger proportion: (a) of the older than of the younger men; (b) of the married men than of the single men; (c) of the sons of tenants than of the sons of owners; and (d) of owners' sons on the larger farms than of owners' sons on the smaller farms.

2. Professions were the occupational choice in larger proportion; (a) of the younger than of the older men; (b) of the single men than of the married men; (c) of the sons of owners than of the sons

⁵ Miss Dickens found in Mississippi that sons of owners were less likely to enter farming, and that daughters of owners were less likely to marry farmers than sons and daughters of tenants. Dorothy Dickens, *Occupations of Sons and Daughters of Mississippi Cotton Farmers*, State College, Mississippi. Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin #318 (May, 1937), 45-47. Anderson found a slight trend in the opposite direction. 26 percent of the owners' sons living away from home were engaged in farming and 23 percent of the tenants' sons. Among the daughters, 25 percent of the daughters of owners were farmers' wives and 23 percent of the daughters of tenants. W. A. Anderson, *Mobility of Rural Families II: Changes in Residence and in Occupation of Sons and Daughters in Rural Families in Genesee Co., N. Y.*, Ithaca, N. Y.: Cor. Ag. Exp. Sta. Bul. #623 (March 1935), 28.

of tenants; (d) of the sons of owners on the smaller farms than of the sons of owners on the larger farms; (e) of the sons of nonfarm owners than of sons of farm owners in all classes except those of less than 20 acres; and (f) sons of tenants on farms of less than 140 acres than sons of tenants on farms of 140 acres and more.

3. Business and white-collar occupations were the choice in larger proportion: (a) of the younger than of the older men; (b) of the single than of the married men; (c) of the sons of tenants than of the sons of owners; and (d) of the owners' sons on the smaller farms than of the owners' sons on the larger farms.

4. Skilled and semi-skilled occupations were chosen in larger proportion; (a) by the center age group than by the older or younger men; (b) by the single than by the married men; (c) by the sons of owners than by the sons of tenants; and (d) by the tenants' sons on the larger farms than by the tenants' sons on the smaller farms.

5. Unskilled occupations were the choice in larger proportion: (a) of the younger than of the older men; (b) of the single than of the married men; (c) of the sons of owners than of the sons of tenants and (d) of the sons of owners on the smaller farms than of the sons of tenants on the larger farms.

6. Among the women the professions were the choice in greater proportion: (a) of the center age group than those of the older or younger; and (b) by the single than by the married women.

7. Commercial occupations were the choice in larger proportion: (a) of the younger than of the older women and (b) of the single than of the married women.

8. Domestic occupations were the choice in greater proportion: (a) of the older than of the younger single women and (b) of the married than of the single women.

9. No marked differences were found in groups not mentioned in the previous eight points.

CONCLUSIONS

Results of this study would lead one to formulate an hypothesis that larger numbers of rural young people remain on the farm and are engaged in agriculture than express a preference for this type of life. Research in the extent of occupational frustration among rural youth would be highly desirable.

A RECONSIDERATION OF THE SO-CALLED SEX INSTINCT

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IT IS unavoidable that some lag should exist between the discovery of knowledge and its general diffusion to the various fields concerned with its application. But a prolonged lack of realization of new facts is both regrettable and uncalled for, particularly when it occurs in the various fields of human behavior, where basic principles are unearthed so slowly and so painstakingly and where their application is so vital to human problems. It seems appropriate, therefore, to call attention at this time to a fact which has lain unappreciated too long—one which carries significant implications for the understanding of a large segment of individual and social behavior.

The so-called nature-nurture problem undoubtedly is far from settled, and perhaps never will be entirely a closed issue. Yet since many studies have shown so conclusively that hereditary and environmental influences are closely interrelated, the old dichotomy of nature *versus* nurture has tended to be discarded in modern scientific writings. The current "interdependent" point of view undoubtedly has led to a more unbiased and fruitful understanding of human behavior.

However, after the subsistence of the somewhat recent and tempestuous controversy over the respective contributions of nature and nurture to human behavior, one fact has remained largely unappreciated: namely, that sex desire is not basically a biological "instinct," an "internal appetite," an "organic drive," a "visceral drive," a "physiological drive," a "physiological need"—or whatever other term may be employed to denote this type of humanly universal, unlearned, and recurrently compulsive behavior. That sex desire is basically a reflexive response should be obvious by now, but apparently this point is still being ignored—judging at least from what is being written in current and widely employed texts in sociology, psychology, and social psychology¹ (let alone medical texts and popular literature).

¹ According to W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (N. Y.: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), 139-40: "These drives [certain internal stimuli] are related largely to the organic needs of the individual, such as those for sleep, exercise, food, water, elimination and sex activity. . . . When an organic need is unsatisfied, an organic tension is set up which leaves the individual restless and impels him to bestir himself in the effort

A large part of the confusion displayed in discussions of the nature-nurture problem has been occasioned simply by differences of definition. The terms instinct, drive, organic need, appetite, etc., have been employed in innumerable ways. Therefore, it is first necessary to offer a rather precise definition for this type of behavior, one which will provide an agreeable base of reference for the following discussion.

The term "instinct"—abused and maligned as it has been—will be resurrected for present purposes. By "instinct" is meant: any type of behavior which is both universal (i.e., common to all peoples at all times), and recurrently and organically compulsive. That is, it periodically affects all individuals due to factors inherent in the physiological and neurological nature of the human organism. The essential features of this definition are: first, that it eliminates learned or conditioned behavior; second, that it refers only to compulsive behavior (thus excluding reflexes); and third, that it narrows the problem down to human behavior alone (thus eliminating inferential hypotheses deducted from animal behavior). This definition does not, however, necessarily imply that instinctive behavior cannot be modified by experience or training; but it does imply that such behavior leads periodically to a painful state of organic tension which demands relief.

That sex desire is not an instinct is contended simply on the basis of the definition advanced: namely, that there is no evidence (and much con-

to satisfy the need. In the case of hunger, for example, . . ."

According to R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology* (N. Y.: Holt, 1940), 377: "In man, the organic factors are much the same as in animals, so that there is undoubtedly an unlearned trend in sex behavior."

According to E. Freeman, *Social Psychology* (N. Y.: Holt, 1936), 313: "For the sake of logical clarity it is necessary to keep in mind that whatever is fundamental and instinctive will assert itself in the human race as a whole, regardless of the forms imposed by particular patterns of social organization and culture, . . . Thus hunger for food, air, and sex satisfaction are found universally."

According to G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology* (N. Y.: Harper and Bros., 1937), 99: The list of "visceral drives" includes "hunger, thirst, air-getting, temperature regulation, sexual, etc."

trary evidence) that *all* individuals recurrently experience a desire for the relief of sex tension in the same sense that they experience a desire for the relief of the tension created, for example, by the hunger instinct. The argument that those who do not experience a sexual desire are somehow physiologically or neurologically (or perhaps even endocrinologically) deficient or maladjusted, ignores both common observation and clinical experience. One cannot deny the existence of the hunger instinct, even though he may purposely starve himself to death; but many writers and clinicians assume that a person who says that he or she does not feel any sex desire is somehow pathologically maladjusted.

Yet the evidence from reliable investigations of sexual practices is irrefutable: namely, that not only are some persons happily married without indulging in sexual relations,² but that some couples even live happily in marriage in complete ignorance of the sexual response.³ Granting that the percentage of sexually ignorant (as contrasted to the sexually apathetic) couples in marriage is small, nevertheless the fact that *even one* normal person could go through life without ever feeling sexual desire refutes the instinctiveness of sexuality.

There is an increasing tendency among scientific writers to qualify the instinctive nature of sex desire by contending that it differs from the other instincts (whichever may be posited) in that it does not come into evidence until the time of puberty.⁴

² See L. M. Terman, *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1938); R. L. Dickinson and L. Beam, *A Thousand Marriages* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1931); and K. B. Davis, *Factors in the Sex Life of 2,200 Women* (N. Y.: Harper, 1929).

³ According to Dickinson and Beam, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-6: "The characteristic story [of a group of eighteen married (women) virgins] is an amiable one, of two people who did not know how to do differently. The husband also was a married virgin . . . This state went on for a relatively long time, for none less than one year . . . There is nothing to indicate that entry might not have been effected, with instructions. The patient usually came for something else and did not even know the situation. Neither was there indication that all were promptly going to change it. They had become used to what they had." Undoubtedly other cases of this type occur in physicians' offices, however infrequently.

⁴ E.g., R. L. Sutherland and J. L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology* (N. Y.: Lippincott, 1940), 178: "Sex as a physiological drive does not appear until the gonadal glands begin to function at puberty."

Also Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 85: "... the individual is functionally ready for, and experiences a strong drive

The assumption among this group is that sex desire is a result of the endocrinological function of the sex glands, that the sex hormones provide the assumed compulsive basis of sex tension.⁵ That such is the case with the lower animals has been well established for years, but there is as yet no reliable evidence that the same process occurs in man. Even writers who warn that to argue analogically from animals to man is "dangerous" invariably include sex desire with the more common instincts.⁶

The argument that sex differs from the other instincts in that it does not come into effectiveness until puberty is open to further serious question. First is the fact that—granting the significant influence which the sex hormones exert upon many phases of human development and behavior—it has not been demonstrated that the sex hormones account for specific sex feeling in man, whether that feeling be anticipatory (i.e., desire) or responsive (i.e., the orgasm). Second is the fact that definite sexual feeling is found among those groups

toward sexual activity shortly after the onset of puberty, . . ." and K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment* (N. Y.: Crofts, 1940), 62: Under "physiological needs—drives from within," is listed "Sex impulses (which mature after puberty)."

⁵ E.g., C. Bird, *Social Psychology* (N. Y.: Appleton-Century, 1940), 38: (Following a discussion of C. P. Stone's work on rats) "Undoubtedly the physiological drive owes its origin in part to secretions from the cells of Leydig and also to other glands of internal secretions."

⁶ E.g., R. T. LaPiere and P. R. Farnsworth, *Social Psychology* (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1936), 41.

In the two pages following his statement quoted in the preceding footnote, Bird (*op. cit.*, pp. 39-40) warns: "As yet, the relative strength of these drives [hunger and sex] has been determined for only a few animals; . . . Perhaps extended research will teach us that the physiological drive [of sex] itself has been given exaggerated importance . . ."

Woodworth (*op. cit.*) apparently is attempting to straddle the fence on this issue, for in contrast to his later statement (quoted in footnote 1), he says on p. 177: "In the human species the same hormones are demonstrably at work but the picture is complicated and diversified by mental and social factors. The sex hormones, though present in childhood, increase during adolescence and are *certainly* necessary for the development of sex interest. As to personality traits, some individuals appear to be oversexed and others undersexed. Such differences may be due to the hormones, *though real evidence on this point is scanty.*" (Italics not in the original.) One might ask if there is *any* "real" evidence for such statements.

which have not yet developed sexually (i.e., children before puberty) or which have passed beyond the period of sexual development (i.e., after the climacteric). Evidence for these two facts is found in the standard psychiatric literature and in the data accumulated on sexuality.

Sex desire, then, is a reflexive response, not an instinct in the way the term has been herein defined (and as it originally was meant to be used). The fact that sex desire can be stimulated mentally as well as physically does not negate its reflexive nature; for like all functional responses, conditioning is a dominant factor. Nor does the fact that sex is a pleasurable response, whereas other reflexes are most often of a purely withdrawal or adaptive nature, deny its essentially reflexive basis.

The argument that sex is an instinct because it is universal is belied by the facts, if by universal is meant that sex desire is necessarily experienced by all individuals at all times. Cultural universality, of course, is something else. A specific type of behavior may be culturally universal without being instinctive (e.g., language systems, religion, some type of family, a division of labor). But it is only naively assumptive that sex desire is universal. This Darwinian type of argument—that sex must be instinctive, otherwise how would the human race have survived?—is both logically and experientially indefensible. On logical grounds, one cannot argue that the effect explains the cause. On experiential grounds, one must grant that there always have existed some individuals who were not in the least interested whether the human race survives or not; so to reconcile this argument with reality, one would have to argue that some persons possess a sex instinct whereas others do not—an argument incompatible with the definition offered here and usually implied in discussions of instincts.

At this point one might reasonably ask: "What difference does it make whether sex desire is instinctive or reflexive, that is, organically compulsive or conditioned? The fact remains that most persons regard sex as instinctive, and will often go to any lengths to experience the sex response. The answer to this is, from both a theoretical and practical point of view, quite simple yet significant. If sex desire is essentially a conditioned response rather than a periodically compulsive organic drive, then sex must be viewed as essentially a mental rather than a physiological mechanism. This infers that sex desire can be modified greatly both in intensity and in direction, in fact even

eliminated if desired. But it also infers that the cure for nymphomania would not be castration, nor would the cure for frigidity be the prescription of hormones. This "reflexive" point of view should be both diagnostically and therapeutically invaluable. No one would contend that a man obsessed with a desire to accumulate a million dollars is motivated by uncontrollable instinctive forces, yet it would be just as serious an error to argue that a man kills, is insanely jealous, or commits adultery because of instinctive forces beyond his control. Particularly to the scientist who is primarily interested with why rather than with how man behaves as he does, the difference between the instinctive and the reflexive nature of sex desire opens new vistas in the many mysteries of human behavior.

The statement was made at the beginning that this fact had not yet been generally recognized by scientists. This implies that the noninstinctive nature of sex desire had been realized earlier. That it should have been realized seems obvious from the data suggested here; that it had been realized is implied, rather than specifically stated, in a few sources, some of which have been referred to. Mead,⁷ for example, and Groves⁸ have stressed the thesis that sex desire cannot be regarded as simply an instinctive mechanism, and the works of Terman, Dickinson and Beam, and Davis should by now have provided irrefutable proof that sex desire is not the simple phenomenon it was once thought to be. This paper is merely a reminder that this case of scientific lag should no longer be tolerated.

⁷ According to M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament* (N. Y.: Morrow, 1935), 140: Among the Arapesh "spontaneous sexuality is denied to both sexes. Both men and women are conceived as merely capable of response to a situation that their society has already defined for them as sexual, . . . sex-responses take a slow course, follow on the heels of affectionate deep interest, do not precede it and stimulate it."

Ogburn and Nimkoff seem to qualify their statement quoted earlier (footnote 1) by saying later (*op. cit.*, p. 723) that: "... sex among human beings is not a simple physiological reaction . . . but instead is conditioned by experience and a large variety of social and cultural factors." Note also the doubt expressed in Bird's statement quoted in footnote 6.

⁸ E. R. Groves, *Marriage*, rev. ed. (N. Y.: Holt, 1941), warns many times against the common practice of regarding the sex impulse as simply a physiological mechanism. See especially his chap. III, pp. 34-49, for the presentation of the reserved point of view advocated in this paper.

RACE, CULTURAL GROUPS, SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

THE MODERN CASTE SCHOOL OF RACE RELATIONS

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DURING the last decade a prolific school of writers on race relations in the United States, led mainly by social anthropologists, have relied religiously upon an ingenious, if not original, caste hypothesis. Professor W. Lloyd Warner is the admitted leader of the movement, and his followers include scholars of considerable distinction.¹ We propose here to examine critically the position of this school.

¹ See the leading hypothesis: W. Lloyd Warner, "American Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII (September, 1936), 234-37. See also, by the same author, "Social Anthropology and the Modern Community," *ibid.*, XLVI (May, 1941), 785-96; W. Lloyd Warner and W. Allison Davis, "A Comparative Study of American Caste," in Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), *Race Relations and the Race Problem* (Durham, N. C., 1939), 219-40; W. Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage* (Washington, D. C., 1940); W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, and Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, D. C., 1941); W. Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, Mary R. Gardner, and W. Lloyd Warner, *Deep South* (Chicago, 1941); John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937); Buell G. Gallagher, *American Caste and the Negro College* (New York, 1938); Donald Young, *Research Memoranda on Minority Peoples in the Depression* (New York, 1937); Robert Austin Warren, *New Haven Negroes* (New Haven, 1940); Kingsley Davis, "Intermarriage in Caste Societies," *American Anthropologist*, 43 (September, 1941), 376-95; Robert L. Sutherland, *Color, Class and Personality* (Washington, D. C., 1942); Edward A. Ross, *New-Age Sociology* (New York and London, 1940); William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Boston, 1940); Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, *Introductory Sociology* (J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940); Stuart A. Queen and Jennette R. Gruener, *Social Pathology* (New York, 1940); Alain Locke and Bernhard J. Stern, *When Peoples Meet* (New York, 1942); and others.

THE HYPOTHESIS

Strictly speaking, the school has no hypothesis, but we shall quote liberally so that the authors might have an opportunity to speak for themselves about the things which they believe. The school is particularly interested in race relations in the southern states of the United States; and its members believe that they have struck upon an unusually revealing explanation of the situation. In the South, they maintain, Negroes form one caste and whites another, with an imaginary rotating caste line between them. "The white caste is in a superordinate position and the Negro caste in a subordinate social position." The following definition of caste has been most widely accepted.

Caste . . . describes a theoretical arrangement of the people of a given group in an order in which the privileges, duties, obligations, opportunities, etc., are unequally distributed between the groups which are considered to be higher and lower. . . . Such a definition also describes class. A caste organization . . . can be further defined as one where marriage between two or more groups is not sanctioned and where there is no opportunity for members of the lower groups to rise into the upper groups or of members of the upper to fall into the lower ones.²

A class system and a caste system "are antithetical to each other. . . . Nevertheless they have accommodated themselves in the southern community. . . ." The caste line is represented as running asymmetrically diagonally between the two class systems of Negroes and whites as in figure I.

² W. Lloyd Warner, *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII, 234.

It is assumed that during slavery the caste line, AB in figure I was practically horizontal, but that since then with the cultural progress of Negroes it has rotated upward. It may become perpendicular so that it coincides with the line, DE; indeed, though unlikely, it may swing over toward the whites. The point here is that it would be possible for the line to take a vertical position while the caste system remains intact. It is thought further that the social disparity between Negro classes and white classes is particularly disconcerting to upper-class Negroes. The "emotional instability of many of the individuals in this group" may be readily explained since:

In his own personality he feels the conflict of the two opposing structures, and in the thinking and feeling of the members of both groups there is to be found this same conflict about his position . . . although he is at the top of the Negro class hierarchy, he is constantly butting his head against the caste line.³

It is believed that in many countries of the world besides India there are developed caste systems, but the school has never found it convenient to demonstrate this proposition. "Caste," Warner and Davis assert without proof, "is found in most of the major areas of the world; this is particularly true of Africa, Asia, and America. The Indians of the southeastern United States and those of British Columbia have well-developed, if not castes, then castelike structures. We cannot take time to examine those American systems, but we shall briefly summarize the material on East Indian caste. . . ." Thus the caste system in India has been taken as the criterion; nowhere has the school relied upon any other system.

On the crucial question of marriage among castes Warner and Davis give Émile Senart credit for the belief that castes "isolate themselves to prevent intermarriage"; while they regard hypergamy as an example of "variations from the caste ideal."⁵ Kingsley Davis, however, thinks that hypergamy distinguishes two major types of caste systems. In India hypergamy is possible because the Indian caste system is a "non-racial caste system"; in the United States and South Africa, on the other hand, hypergamy is impossible because there are in these situations "racial caste

systems."⁶ Warner and Davis depend further upon Senart and Bouglé for their significant conclusion that "no one occupation has but one caste assigned to it."⁷

Considerable emphasis is put upon the fact that a Negro or white person, who was born Negro or white, could never hope to be anything but Negro or white: "Children and grandchildren of Negroes will continue to be born into, live in, and only die out of the Negro 'caste.'"⁸ Further, this biological fact of inheriting racial marks strikes Kingsley Davis as providing an ideal foundation for a caste system:

The reason that race serves as an excellent basis of caste is that one gets one's racial traits by birth from parents having those traits, and one cannot change these traits during the rest of one's life.⁹




FIG. I*

* After the chart by W. Lloyd Warner, "American Caste and Class," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII (September, 1936), 235. Used by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

These, then, are some of the leading postulates of the caste school of race relations. Without continuing to introduce fragmentary statements at this point we shall attempt an evaluation.

ESTIMATE OF BASIC PRINCIPLES

Although the school has relied completely upon references to the caste system in India for its authority, it has nowhere made anything approaching a careful study of the caste system. Yet, even so,

⁵ "Intermarriage in Caste Societies," *American Anthropologist*, 43 (July-September, 1941), 376-395.

⁷ In *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), p. 231.

⁸ W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, Walter A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature* (Washington, D. C., 1940), 11-12.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, note, p. 387. See also *Deep South*, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 236. See also *Deep South* by Davis, Gardner, Gardner, and Warner, p. 13.

⁴ "A Comparative Study of American Caste," in *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, Edgar T. Thompson (ed.).

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 230 and 229.

it has been difficult to determine which of their selected "essences" of the caste system will be controlling in given situations. For example, after one tentative discussion of caste in India, the conclusion was reached that:

There has been no attempt in these last few paragraphs to demonstrate that our caste structure and Indian caste structure are exactly the same, but rather we have attempted to show that they are the same kind of social phenomena . . .¹⁰

At this point the question may easily devolve upon the meaning of the expression *same kind*. We have had considerable difficulty also in finding clear-cut statements of principle. Usually some such phrase as "for our purpose," "as here used," or "generally" limits statements that are forthwith given universal applicability. Of course one could hardly question such a contrivance; it may be likened to the researcher who says: "This animal before us is not a horse, but *for our purpose* it is convenient to call it a horse; if you examine it closely you will discover that it is a water-buffalo. That does not matter, for we are not going to use it in the water-buffalo sense. Of course, you cannot say this animal is not a horse; after all, it has four legs; and what does it matter in any event whether we say horse or water-buffalo?"

At points where clarity is most needed the school invariably becomes impressionistic and circuitous. It has been accepted that the form of social organization in Brahmanic India constitutes a caste system. This system has certain distinguishing characteristics; hence we shall consider these the norm.

Definitions of a society are difficult to formulate; they are usually insufficient. For example A. L. Kroeber wrote an article on caste¹¹ and came to the conclusion that a caste system is not possible in western society; notwithstanding, Warner adopted his definition of "a caste" and reached the opposite position that: "The social system of Old City (in the South) fits this definition of Kroeber's and of most of the ethnologists and social anthropologists."¹² The play with definitions usually results in debate rather than constructive interest in the social problem. At any rate, Warner's own definition of caste considers two fac-

tors as determining: (a) that intermarriage between groups is not sanctioned, and (b) that there is no opportunity for members of lower groups to rise into upper groups nor for those of the upper groups to fall into the lower groups.

It should be emphasized that a definition of "a caste" does not describe "the caste-system." We have shown elsewhere that upper caste men in India have always been able to marry women of lower castes without disturbing the caste system, a procedure which could not be sanctioned in the South. Endogamy may be an isolator of social classes, castes, tribes, sects, or any other social groups which think they have something to protect; hence, the final test of caste is not endogamy but the social values which endogamy secures. Indeed, A. C. Mace sees marrying out of one's class as an offense second only to the commission of crime; while Bouglé speaks of the horror of misalliances and the belief in impurity of contact between upper and lower classes in Europe.¹³

Probably the most insidious analogy between race and caste relations rests in the idea of life membership in each group. The identity of the phenomena, however, is only apparent. It must be obvious that a man born in a certain race cannot have the choice of leaving it and going into another race. This biological affiliation has not been the position of one caste man with respect to another in India. In fact, this very distinction should raise the suspicion that different social forces are operating in the caste system from those in situations of racial adjustment. But what really do we mean by saying that a white man cannot fall into the Negro group? To the extent that he can have sex relations with Negro women he can "fall" biologically. The mixed blood children that are born are, in the long run, the most potent equilibrators of the races; and the law makers of the South are by no means unmindful of this fact. The Negro may "rise" biologically if he is able to pass.

From too much preoccupation with the unchangeableness of physical inheritance, the conclusion is reached that the social status of Negroes and whites in the South may become identical, yet they will continue to constitute two castes. In explaining his diagram, Professor Warner holds

¹⁰ Edgar T. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

¹¹ *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, III, "Caste" by A. L. Kroeber, pp. 254-256.

¹² *Deep South*, p. 9.

¹³ C. A. Mace, "Beliefs and Attitudes in Class Relations," in *Class Conflict and Social Stratification*, T. H. Marshall (ed.) (London, 1938), 159; C. Bouglé, *Essais sur Le Régime Des Castes*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1935), 6.

that there is a theoretical possibility of Negroes' advancing to the point where they may become the dominant caste. And this makes his theory particularly illogical and sterile. So far as its logic is concerned, it asserts that Negroes may become equal to whites, evidently in wealth, in learning, in opportunity to control the government of the state—in short, culturally equal. Yet Negroes and whites will still be unequal; unequal, obviously, in color. For a person born white could never have the privilege of becoming black. Clearly it must be on the grounds of this latter disability that his caste system will still be maintained. And since, so far as we know, time will not alter the possibility of a man's changing his racial marks, we must expect the white caste and the black caste to remain indefinitely intact—an ideal leopard-and-spots theory of race relations.

The theory goes happily past the meaning of the racial dichotomy in the South. It makes it appear that the white man is protecting his color and that the Negro is equally interested in protecting his; so that with the ballot in the hands of Negroes and with the opportunity for cultural participation open to him as a normal citizen, the black code which keeps the races segregated will still be the law of the South. Elsewhere, we have attempted to show, however, that the greater the relative cultural advancement of Negroes, the less will be the need of the white man's protecting his color. The theory sees a caste system set up in the South in the interest of the white man's color and, for that matter, the Negro's also. None the less it may be shown that the white man has no such obsession about his color. He will protect it only so long as it helps him to reserve a calculable cultural advantage.

The caste interpretation of race relations in the South does not see that the intermarriage restriction laws are a social affront to Negroes; it cannot perceive that Negroes are smarting under the Jim Crow laws; it may not recognize the overwhelming aspiration among Negroes for equality of social opportunity; it could never realize that the superiority of the white race is due principally to the fact that it has developed the necessary devices for maintaining incontestable control over the shooting iron; and it will not know that "race hatred" may be reckoned in terms of the white man's interest. Hence it is possible for the school to imagine the anomaly of Negroes fully assimilated culturally and yet living symbiotically apart

from whites on the basis of some unexplained understanding that their colors should never be mixed. In other words, the races will, as Warner and Davis believe: "isolate themselves to prevent intermarriage!"

In order that the authors might come to terms with the disturbing question of the relationship of occupation and caste, it is concluded that even in India there is no identification of every occupation with a caste. It is argued, in other words, that since many castes have the same occupation, occupation is no significant factor in the system. The point to remember here, however, is that every caste has a traditional occupation, and not that every occupation has a caste.

Considerable importance is given to interracial etiquette in the South as a factor supporting the caste hypothesis. Thus, according to Davis, Gardner, and Gardner:

The most striking form of what may be called caste behavior is deference, the respectful yielding exhibited by the Negroes in their contacts with whites . . . The behavior of both Negroes and white people must be such that the two are socially distinct and that the Negro is subordinate. Thus the Negro when addressing a white person, is expected to use a title such as 'Sah,' 'Mistah,' or 'Boss,' etc., while the white must never use such titles of respect to the Negro, but should address him by his first name or as 'Boy.'¹⁴

However, in the South, there is also an etiquette intended to keep poor whites at a proper distance from upper class whites, and it is probably more severely non-reciprocating there than in other parts of the country. To upper class Negroes, also, lower class Negroes are unusually respectful. Indeed, a system of social etiquette which distinguishes superior persons or classes is no exclusive trait of the caste system. It is found in armies, churches, among social classes, as well as among peoples and races who live in relationship of subordination and superordination.

PERSONALITY OF UPPER CLASS NEGROES

It is a common belief, not peculiar to the caste school, that upper class Negroes are especially maladjusted. The bi-racial system in the United States, it must be admitted, is a pathological situation, and insofar as this is so, it affects adversely the personalities of both whites and blacks. But sensitivity to social wrongs need not imply de-

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

rangement or an "off balance" personality. We may mention at this point that although this assertion calls for explanation, the caste theorists evidently do not realize that it is most damaging to their hypothesis. A person belonging to a lower caste is not "constantly butting his head against the caste line." In fact, the absence of such a phenomenon is so vital to the persistence of a caste order that it would hardly be inaccurate to maintain that it is definitely incompatible with a caste system. Caste barriers in the caste system are never challenged; they are sacred to caste and caste alike. The personalities developed in the caste system are normal for that society.

Negroes are moving away from a condition of extreme white domination and subjection to one of normal citizenship. The determinant of unrest or social dysphoria among a people is not so much their *state* of subjugation or seeming oppression; it is rather the process of changing from some accommodated stage of well-being to one of subservience. Since the Civil War the situation among Negroes in the South has been opposite to this. Hortense Powdermaker makes the significant observation that it is not difference in class so much as difference in age which determines the attitude of Negroes toward whites. "Among the younger [Negro] generation, those in their teens, twenties, and thirties, resentment is keen and outspoken."¹⁵ Older Negroes were reared in an earlier school of racial beliefs; and, indeed, the younger are not infrequently very impatient with their compromising attitudes toward whites. Among Negroes in the South the "Uncle Toms" are distributed through all the social classes.

Of course militance in the interest of racial progress should not be mistaken for personality imbalance. In fact, dissatisfaction with the *status quo* is the common preoccupation of all Negro leaders. There is, furthermore, some compensation to upper class Negroes. Frequently they meet whites under flattering conditions, mostly in business relations. They have considerable prestige among their own people, sometimes even more than that which whites of similar attainments can hope for within their own group. This windfall may not only compensate for loss of respect from low class whites, but it may even result in a sort of grandiose importance inconsistent with reality. The "big Negro," a recognized per-

sonality type, is usually indelicate and grossly lacking in humility; yet, he is not pathological.

Upper class Negroes do not envy poor whites in the South because the latter are beyond the purview of the black code. One might as well argue that some human beings suffer severe personality traumas because the dogs and cats of the rich have certain advantages that they do not have. The resentment of upper class Negroes is rather against the ruling class, the guardians of the *status quo*. Enlightened Negroes recognize clearly the cultural inferiority of the poor whites. As a youth, W. E. B. DuBois says of himself: "I cordially despised the poor Irish and South Germans, who slaved in the mills, and annexed the rich and well-to-do as my natural companions."¹⁶ Thus, bitter as it is, the real conflict is usually between Negroes and their cultural equals or superiors. Sometimes it may seem to end in despair, as when Countee Cullen exclaimed:

Yet do I marvel at this curious thing:
To make a poet black, and bid him sing!

Ordinarily, however, it is a persistent challenge to Negroes, an integrating force in a cause which must be served. Claude McKay in his *America* symbolizes the situation.

Although she feeds me bread of bitterness,
And sinks into my throat her tiger's tooth,
Stealing my breath of life, I will confess
I love this cultured hell that tests my youth!
Her vigor flows like tides into my blood,
Giving me strength erect against her hate.
Her bigness sweeps my being like a flood.
Yet as a rebel fronts a king in state,
I stand within her walls with not a shred
Of terror, malice, not a word of jeer.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF NEGROES

Symptomatic of the possibilities of the caste hypothesis of race relations is the classification of societies of the world by Warner and Davis.¹⁷ From simple "theoretical" classless societies to "our own society (which) possesses ranked internal structures, class and caste orders, groups with diverse cultural (ethnic) traditions, as well as sex and age evaluations," all the types of societies in the world are included. Thus the dichotomized racial system in the South becomes a natural type

¹⁵ *Darkwater* (New York, 1921), p. 10.

¹⁷ In *Race Relations and the Race Problem*, Edgar T. Thompson (ed.), pp. 225-27.

¹⁶ *After Freedom* (New York, 1939), 331 and 325.

of social ranking: "The ranking changes from a status situation in which there is little or no ranking to one in which almost all behavior is given an evaluation of rank."¹⁸ Unless clearly limited, the term society is very ambiguous. It is properly used with reference to western society or to a consumers' cooperative society; however, the authors did not limit the concept. It becomes necessary, then, to settle upon some meaning of the term before discussing it. According to John Dewey:

Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from others. . . . Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end. . . . What they must have in common in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding.¹⁹

Assimilation and consensus seem to be necessary. John S. Mackenzie emphasizes this:

When a people is conquered and subject to another, it ceases to be a society, except in so far as it retains a spiritual life of its own apart from that of its conquerors. . . . So long as the citizens of the conquered state are merely in the condition of atoms externally fitted into a system to which they do not naturally belong, they cannot be regarded as parts of the society at all.²⁰

Another way of looking at a society is in terms of its capacity to perpetuate itself. Hinduism or the caste society of India is a powerful form of social organization which may go on self-satisfiedly, so to speak, forever. It carries within itself no basic antagonisms. But the social aims and purposes of whites and Negroes in the South are irreconcilably opposed. If such a situation could be termed a society at all, it must be a society

divided against itself. Sapir has used this idea in his analysis of culture. Thus he writes:

The genuine culture is not of necessity either *high or low*; it is merely inherently harmonious, balanced, self-satisfactory. . . . If the culture necessitates slavery, it frankly admits it; if it abhors slavery, it feels its way to an economic adjustment that obviates the necessity of its employment.²¹

In like manner we may think of the larger American society as fundamentally antipathetic to the non-Christian, non-democratic, bi-racial system in the South; hence it is continuously "feeling its way" to something else. To put such a situation easily into a typology of societies which includes the caste system in India, indeed, to identify it with the caste system, must be misleading to say the least. The caste system of India is a minutely segmented, assimilated social structure; it is highly stable and capable of perpetuating itself indefinitely.

When two racial or nationality groups become more or less isolated from each other because of some continuing conflict situation or basic repugnance, we do not refer to them as forming a social status hierarchy even though their relationship is one of superordination and subordination or of conqueror and conquered. As an illustration, Adolf Hitler in his *My Battle* says: "It must be held in greater honour to be a citizen of this Reich, even if only a crossing-sweeper, than to be a king in a foreign state."²² Suppose now that this philosophy be made a reality in future German-Polish relationships; all Poles will then be considered inferior to the least of Germans; and an etiquette will be developed to implement the attitude. But there will be here no social status hierarchy; neither would Hitler there and then have enacted a caste system. The Poles will seek a *modus vivendi* in some sort of society of their own; and the intergroup relationship will most likely be one of antagonism, a latent power group relationship.

So, too, Negroes and whites in the Deep South do not constitute an assimilated society. There are rather two societies. Thus we may conceive of Negroes as constituting a quasi or tentative society developed to meet certain needs resulting

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 227. See also Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Sarah A. Solovaj and John H. Mueller, trans. (University of Chicago Press, 1938), 81-83, for a discussion of the misleading possibilities of such a typology of societies.

¹⁹ *Democracy and Education*, p. 5.

²⁰ Quoted by F. A. McKenzie, "The Assimilation of the American Indian," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, VIII, 45; see also Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Sarah A. Solovaj and John H. Mueller, trans. (Chicago, 1938), pp. 85-86; "By a society is here meant a recognizable system of human relations characterizing a group, the members of which are aware of this unity and of their difference from others." Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941), 80.

²¹ "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX (January, 1924), 410. See also Albert Bushnell Hart, *Slavery and Abolition, 1831-1841* (New York-London, 1906), p. 321.

²² E. T. S. Dugdale, trans. (Cambridge, 1933), 182.

from their retarded assimilation. Unlike the permanence of a caste, it is a temporary society intended to continue only so long as whites are able to maintain the barriers against their assimilation.²³ It provides the matrix for a universe of discourse in which members of the group give expression to their common sympathies, opinions, and sentiments; and in which their primary social institutions function. The political and economic structure is controlled by another and larger society to which the whites are assimilated and toward which all Negroes are oriented.

The "public" of the white society includes Negroes only in the broadest sense; and when Negroes in their institutional functions declare that "everybody is invited," white people who turn up must assume the role of strangers. The "we feeling" of the white and of the Negro society tends to be mutually exclusive. Says Robert E. Park: "Gradually, imperceptibly, within the larger world of the white man, a smaller world, the world of the black man, is silently taking form and shape."²⁴ Ray Stannard Baker reports an interview with a Negro store owner in Atlanta:

"What do you mean by protection?" I asked.

"Well, justice between the races. That doesn't mean social equality. We have a society of our own..."²⁵

²³ Professor Robert Redfield describes the evolution of a racial dichotomy into a class system. It is significant to note that no such process could be suggested as a means of liquidating the caste system: "It requires little special knowledge to assert that the contact of the Spanish with the Maya, as is generally the case with long-continuing interaction between diverse ethnic groups, began with the existence of two separate societies, each with its own racial and cultural characteristics, and moved toward the formation of a single society in which the original racial and cultural differences disappear. At the time of the Conquest there were two groups that looked across at each other both aware of the marked ethnic differences that attended their sense of distinctness one from the other. As the two groups came to participate in a common life and to interbreed, the ethnic differences became blurred, so that other criteria of difference, such as occupation, costume, or place of residence, came to be relatively more significant signs of social distinctness than was race or general culture.... At first there were two societies, ethnically distinct. At last there is a single society with classes, ethnically indistinct." *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago, 1941), 58.

²⁴ "Racial Assimilation of Secondary Groups," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, VIII, 77.

²⁵ *Following the Color Line*, p. 40. Compare Carle C.

One device for retarding Negro assimilation, which does not have to be resorted to in the caste system, is the policy of guarding against any development of an overt expression of indispensability of Negroes within the social organization. Whatever their *de facto* importance, they must never appear as an integral part of the society. Instead, they pay little taxes; hence little or none of certain public expenditures should be diverted to their benefit. The theory of taxation according to ability to pay and expenditure according to need does not include them. Crime, sickness, death, and poverty almost characterize Negroes; hence they are a drag on "society" and may be ostensibly sloughed off to advantage. Whites are generally protected from contact with cultured Negroes. The successful practice of this contrivance tends to give the Negro a sense of worthlessness and unwantedness, which contributes finally to the retardation of his assimilation. In Brahmanic India, however, where the population is assimilated to the caste culture, it is openly admitted that low-caste men are indispensable to the system, and this admission does not conduce to any advancement in the latter's social status.

By using the caste hypothesis, then, the school seeks to explain a "normal society" in the South. In short, it has made peace for the hybrid society that has not made peace with itself; and insofar as this is true its work is fictitious.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE SCHOOL

A remarkable characteristic of this caste school of race relations is its tendency to conceive of itself as being original.²⁶ It believes that it has made a

Zimmerman, "The Evolution of the American Community," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVI (May, 1941), 812; Hortense Powdermaker, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²⁶ "The view that the relationships of whites and Negroes in the South are systematically ordered and maintained by a caste structure, and that the status of individuals within each of these groups is further determined by a system of social classes existing within each color-caste, was the creation of Warner" Davis and Dollard, *Children of Bondage*, p. xvi. "The presence of caste and class structures in the society of the deep South was reported upon first by a member of our research group..." Davis, Gardner and Gardner, *Deep South*, p. 5. "An original interpretation of a class and caste distinctions in the United States, providing a useful frame of reference for an appreciation of caste phenomena in this country."—Ogburn and Nimkoff, *Sociology*, p. 343.

discovery. It is difficult, however, to determine wherein rests the originality. We do not know who made the first analogy between race relations and the caste system of India, but it is certain that the idea was quite popular during the middle of the last century. One of the most detailed and extended discussions of this hypothesis is that of the Hon. Charles Sumner published in 1869.²⁷ Since then, many textbooks have accepted the idea.²⁸ Some students, like Sir Herbert Risley have used the hypothesis as the basis of extensive research.²⁹ Many writers such as E. B. Reuter and Charles S. Johnson have applied the term casually to the racial situation in the United States.³⁰ Among these we take somewhat at random from the writings of a journalist who in 1908 published in book form the findings of his study of race relations in the South.

In explaining the class strata among Negroes, Ray Stannard Baker says:

I have now described two of the three great classes of Negroes: First, the worthless and idle Negro, often a criminal, comparatively small in numbers but perniciously evident. Second, the great middle class of Negroes who do the manual work of the South. Above these, a third class, few in number, but most influential in their race, are the progressive, property-owning Negroes, who have wholly severed their old intimate ties with the white people—and who have been getting further and further away from them.³¹

With respect to the color line, called a caste line by the modern school, Baker states:

When the line began to be drawn, it was drawn not alone against the unworthy Negro, but against the Negro. It was not so much drawn by the highly-intelligent white man as by the white man. And the white

man alone has not drawn it, but the Negroes themselves are drawing it—and more and more every day. So we draw the line in this country against the Chinese, the Japanese, and in some measure against the Jews; and they help to draw it.³²

Baker then proceeds to clinch the full idea of the caste hypothesis:

More and more they [Negroes] are becoming a people wholly apart—separate in their churches, separate in their schools, separate in cars, conveyances, hotels, restaurants, with separate professional men. In short, we discover tendencies in this country toward the development of a caste system.³³

It is difficult to see what the modern caste school has added to this, other than perhaps publicity. Certainly anyone who has a taste for art might use the information given above to draw a caste line between the white and the black class structures. But Baker, like most other former advocates of the caste hypothesis of race relations in the United States, thought almost fancifully of the idea and did not stipulate that his work must stand or fall with the belief. He realized that the factor of primary significance was not "the caste line" but the way in which that line held. Thus he concludes:

This very absence of a clear demarcation is significant of many relationships in the South. The color line is drawn, but neither race knows just where it is. Indeed, it can hardly be definitely drawn in many relationships, because it is constantly changing. This uncertainty is a fertile source of friction and bitterness.³⁴

With respect to the scientific precision of the word "caste" the school argues that: "by all the physical tests the anthropologists might apply, some social Negroes are *biologically* white," hence the word race cannot have meaning when applied to Negroes.³⁵ We should remember here, however, that the racial situation in the South never depended upon "physical tests of anthropologists." It developed long before anthropometry became of age. The sociologist is interested, not in what the anthropometrists set up as their criteria of race, but in what peoples in interaction come to accept as a race. It is this latter belief which controls their behavior and not what the anthropometrist

²⁷ *The Question of Caste*, Wright and Potter (Boston, 1869).

²⁸ Among the best of them are C. H. Cooley, *Social Process* (New York, 1922), 279; and *Social Organization* (New York, 1919), 209-28; Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), 722 and 205-6.

²⁹ See, for example, *The Peoples of India* (Calcutta, 1908), 263; and *Census of India*, 1901.

³⁰ Reuter, *The Mulatto in the United States* (Boston, 1918), 360; Johnson, "Caste and Class in an American Industry," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII (July, 1936), 55-65. See also R. E. Park, "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, VIII (1913), 73.

³¹ *Following the Color Line*, p. 65.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁵ Davis, Gardner and Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

thinks. But in reality the term caste does not economize thinking on this subject. It is always necessary first to say what kind of people belong to the Negro caste before we can know what the Negro caste means. Therefore in the process of defining Negro caste we have defined Negro race, and the final accomplishment is a substitution of words only. One may test this fact by substituting in the writings of this school the words *Negroes* or *white people* wherever the words *Negro caste* or *white caste* are used; and observe that the sense of the statement does not change.

For this reason the burden of the productions of this school tends to be old wine in new bottles. In other words, much that has come to us by earlier studies has taken on the glamour of caste; and the school seldom refers to the contributions of out-group students.³⁶ One could hardly help recalling

³⁶ As a typical example of this, see Davis and others, *Deep South*, pp. 15-136 and 228-539. Consider the weighty significance with which the following commonplace is introduced. "The critical fact is that a much larger proportion of all *Negroes* are lower class than is the case with *whites*. *This is where caste comes to bear*. It puts the overwhelming majority of *Negroes* in the lowest class group, and keeps them there." (Italics

as an analogous situation the popularity which William McDougall gave to the instinct hypothesis. Without making any reference to William James, Lloyd Morgan, and others who had handled the concept with great care, McDougall set out with pioneering zeal to bend all social behavior to his instinct theory. It was not long, however, before reaction came. And so too, until comparatively recently, the race-caste idea had a desultory career. It has now been made fashionable; yet, already, students who had once used the term caste begin to shrink from it.³⁷ But we should hasten to add that this school has none of the anti-color complexes of the instinct school. Its leadership merely lacks, as Robert E. Park might say, a sociological tradition.

mine.) Davis and Dollard, *Children of Bondage*, p. 65. This quotation also illustrates the mystical way in which real problems have been explained away.

³⁷ See R. E. Park in the introduction to Bertram W. Doyle. *The Etiquette of Race Relations* (Chicago, 1937); and Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt* (Washington, D. C.), 1941. However, this is not to say that either Park or Johnson fully appreciates the worthlessness of the caste belief, for they are still toying with it.

ADJUSTMENT IN JEWISH-GENTILE INTERMARRIAGES

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THIS paper deals with the adjustment of intermarried couples, as studied in 183 cases of Jewish-Gentile intermarriage between white people in Chicago.

THE INTERMARRIED COUPLE AND THEIR ADJUSTMENT TO SOCIETY

In Jewish intermarriages the couple must make an adjustment to society, inasmuch as they represent two different and relatively antagonistic groups. The couple may be accepted by both groups from which they come, by one only, or by neither. In the cases studied, as far as the relatives and close friends of intermarried people are concerned, open conflict usually ceases after marriage, and they become more or less reconciled. This is particularly true if the intermarriage is considered to be a "good match," i.e., if the member of the out-group has some characteristic which has particular social value to the in-group.

Gentile man. I think that she [his Jewish mother-in-law] finally became a little proud of my work in school—in other words, she had the typical attitude towards scholarship that so many Jews have. She once said to my wife, "Ach! If he were only circumcized!"

As a result of further acquaintance with the spouse from the out-group, the family may lose its prejudice against that person, and reconciliation may be effected.

Gentile woman. That trouble only lasted a year. They [her parents] met my husband a few times and saw that after all he was a pretty nice guy. I think my father's death brought us closer than anything; he was killed in an accident and my husband was very attentive to my mother. She seemed to lose her prejudice.

The sentimental ties between grandparents and grandchildren may produce reconciliation after the birth of offspring to the intermarried couple.

Gentile woman. We ran away and went to the justice of the peace. I wrote to my father regularly, but he never answered a word until the baby was born; it was his first grandchild. My husband's parents wouldn't even meet me—I never saw them until our baby was four months old, and we had been married two years before I had my baby. It was the baby that reconciled them, too.

But in relatively well integrated communities the couple's parents may never become reconciled to the intermarriage.

Jew. When I married my wife, to my mother I was more or less dead. They sat *shivah* [rites for the dead].

In the cases investigated, 57 percent of the intermarried people were either partially or entirely accepted by both families; 20 percent of the Jews were not accepted by their own families, and 23 percent were not accepted by that of the spouse; 16 percent of the Gentiles were not accepted by their own families, and 27 percent were not accepted by that of the spouse. The higher percentage of non-acceptance by the Jewish families leads one to presume that endogamy is stronger in the Jewish group than the Gentile.

Dropping of more casual acquaintances takes place after Jewish intermarriage for two reasons: first, the acquaintances may no longer accept the member of their own group, or will not accept the spouse from the out-group; secondly, the cultural differences between the spouse of the out-group and the acquaintances from the in-group may be so great as to produce friction.

Gentile woman. Christian people who weren't close friends and by some slight indication showed that they didn't like the idea of my marrying a Jew, I dropped.

Jew. My wife is a good deal different from some of these Jewish women I know. I think they feel a little strange with her—they don't know what to do with her; she isn't typical of the women in the group. We've dropped contact with the typical Jewish people who do the typically Jewish thing. When I was a bachelor those people were all right for me, but now that I'm married the people sense the difference.

No matter how they try to identify themselves with the group in which they live, in Jewish intermarriages the member of the out-group is rarely entirely accepted in well integrated communities.

Gentile woman. Most of my intimate friends are Jewish. They talk about things they don't like about Jews when I'm around. But sometimes even my best

friends say to me, "You really can't accept our religion. You like us, and work with us, but really in your heart you can't accept our religion." Some of the Jews I know make it very apparent that I'm a Gentile—some of them have snubbed me.

Two types of adjustment may take place to prevent non-acceptance of the intermarried couple by the group in which they live. The member of the in-group may hide the fact of his intermarriage, or the group identity of the spouse from the out-group may be hidden.

Gentile man. The place where I work is anti-Semitic, and I haven't told them of my marriage or my change of religion [i.e., his conversion to Judaism before his marriage].

Jewess. When my husband taught in Arkansas I didn't tell anyone that I was a Jew. We were thought of as a Gentile family.

ACCULTURATION BETWEEN THE INTERMARRIED COUPLE

Since the people who intermarry come from groups with different cultures, intermarriage brings about accommodation between the customs of the intermarried couple. Therefore, amalgamation may lead to changes in language, religion, cuisine, friendships, personal habits, etc.

Gentile woman. We were married by a Jewish rabbi after I went through the conversion. I dropped my given name and use my converted name.

I prepare a number of Jewish dishes.

I understand a great deal of Yiddish; I've picked up quite a lot.

I think I'm certainly much more talkative and colorful and emotional than I was before my marriage. I have all the expressions and talk with my hands. I've got that sing-songy Jewish inflection and intonation, and the shrugging of the shoulders—I've acquired them all.

I take attacks against Jews very personally. I live among Jews and I work among Jews, and their problems are my problems.

While it is usually only the more overt traits necessary for accommodation, which are adopted, sometimes even such things as attitudes and values are taken over.

Gentile woman. I belong to the sisterhood of a synagogue and all sorts of Jewish organizations. I was never formally converted—it came to me gradually over a period of years. I go to temple now, and it fills my needs—it fills my heart. I have a *seder* [Pass-over service] at home, because I like ceremonies. We

don't have any Christmas tree; it's pretty, but it's against our religion. I don't believe in the stories about Jesus. He's no deity; he was a fine man, but he had to have a father.

I'm a Jew. I've built my life around it. The Jews are my people. I'm a Jew because I want to be—I've read and studied those old laws. The other Jewish women are Jewish because they can't help themselves; I feel that I'm more Jewish than they are, sometimes.

I've learned quite a lot of Jewish; I cook only in the Jewish style.

I don't like to hear remarks against the Jews. Once in a P. T. ... there was some discussion against the Jews, and I got up and said my little piece; at the end I told them that they were discriminating against me. They laughed and thought I was crazy, but then I told them that I was Jewish.¹

But no matter to what extent the individual thinks that he has assimilated himself to the new group—Jewish or Gentile—the behavior patterns established in childhood cannot be completely effaced.

Jew. I believe I have an ideal marriage. But you can't change the spots on a leopard, and for a Jew to intermarry—it just doesn't seem as if it fits. The Jew can never be assimilated—they're set apart like a Chinaman or a nigger. A year ago I had the sad misfortune of losing my father, blessed be his memory, and I reverted back—a gypsy always remains a gypsy. I joined a conservative *shul* [synagogue].

If both the husband and wife are each strongly attached to those customs which have high social value in their respective groups, no compromise may be possible and each will then carry on the customs of his own group. In the cases investigated, this is particularly true of religion.

Jew. I used to go to temple every now and then before I was married, and I still do. My wife attends her church every holiday, too. We both go alone.

If the intermarried couple has been affected by the increasing secularization of American life, they may ignore their religious differences and not participate in any religious activities. Otherwise those Jews who are not sufficiently Americanized to become converted to one of the usual Christian denominations, sometimes join the Ethical Culture movement or become Christian Scientists.

So far the traits which are adopted through acculturation have been examined; let us now con-

¹ Of Scandinavian descent, she is Nordic-Alpine in physical type, with the former predominating.

sider the question of the trend of the acculturation process. To a large extent this depends upon the community in which the intermarried couple lives. If they reside in a Jewish community, the Gentile may become converted to Judaism, learn Yiddish, drop most of his old Gentile friends, and in general adopt the more overt customs of the Jewish culture. On the other hand, if the intermarried couple settles in a non-Jewish area, the trend of acculturation is usually toward the Gentile group. This is a result of the social controls operating in each community.

But it is significant that even if the Gentile does adopt certain Jewish customs, it is usually a formality, a matter of accommodation in order to reduce friction with the Jewish parents-in-law and community, and does not result in any extensive change in behavior patterns.

Gentile woman. I was converted out of respect to his father. I consider myself a Christian—you never feel a Jew. I don't enjoy the services—I don't understand much about it, and I have to read the book from back to the front. I go because it gives my father-in-law more satisfaction than anything else in the world.

On the other hand, when the couple lives in a Gentile area, the Jew tends to drop many of his Jewish customs. Even if he still identifies himself with the Jewish group, he tends no longer to participate in its activities.

Jewess. I consider myself a Jew. I used to go to the temple before I was married, but never since. But half of my friends are still Jewish.

One of her Jewish friends. They tend to the non-Jewish more than the Jewish—she doesn't consider herself part of the Jewish community in any way. If you ask her she'll say, "Of course I'm Jewish," but she never does anything about it. I never send her Christmas cards, but she always sends me a Christmas card. They keep all of the *goyisheh* [Gentile] holidays and none of the Jewish ones. And though she says she's going to let the children decide their own religion, since they don't have any Jewishness around how will her kids know about it?

Therefore, on the whole, the trend in the Jewish intermarriages studied is toward the dominant Gentile American culture on two counts. First, even if the couple lives in a Jewish community, because the latter is a minority group the Gentile tends to take over Jewish traits only superficially in order to accommodate himself to the group. Second, when the couple lives in a Gentile area,

the Jew is rapidly forced to give up his group customs, not only on account of the necessity for accommodation, but also because of the lack of opportunity to participate in the customs of his own minority group even if he wants to. For example, the Gentile only infrequently takes part in the activities of the Jewish institutions—religious, charitable, social, etc.—which are among the strongest forces in maintaining the integration of minority groups. On the other hand, if the Jew does not join equivalent Gentile organizations, he at least tends to stop participating in Jewish institutions, and thus the minority Jewish group is forced to relinquish some of the most effective means it has to prevent assimilation of its members into the dominant majority group. As a result, in the cases investigated, even according to the most generous interpretation, only about one-quarter of the couples could be considered to tend toward the Jewish culture, while in three-quarters of the cases the trend was toward the Gentile group.

ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE INTERMARRIED COUPLE

Since people with different ways of acting find it difficult to adjust to each other, it may be expected that intermarriages between people from different cultures will result in more marital conflicts than marriages within the same group. Consequently, the stability of intermarriage can be taken as an index of the cultural and social accommodation between the husband and wife.

Statistics on divorce among intermarried Jews in Berlin show that the divorce rate in such marriages was approximately double that of like marriages.² Also, marital conflicts tend to disrupt intermarriages quicker than like marriages. For instance, in the figures available for Chicago, almost three-quarters of the cases of desertion, "the poor man's divorce," took place in the first four years of marriage among intermarried couples, while less than half occurred in the same period for like marriages.³

The greater the difference between the cultures of the people who intermarry, the greater the possibilities for marital conflict; and conversely, the less difference, the less conflict. When the

husband and wife are from very different cultural backgrounds, there may be a great deal of domestic discord because of such differences.

Jew. My wife's attitude was that she should be protected, but I always had the feeling that if a man's done a day's work he's discharged his duties; among the Gentiles the women are pampered—there are the men to do the dirty work. I was used to having the woman keep up her part of the family, and even, especially in the case when the husband is a scholar, to have the woman hold the fort for the family.

When both husband and wife are highly Americanized, there is little discord because of cultural differences, and if any conflict does occur it is usually between the couple and the wider group, rather than between husband and wife.

Gentile woman. It never occurs to me that we are intermarried. To me it isn't an intermarriage because there's no difference—to me it's not any different than if I had married anyone else. There's no racial difference, and we both don't have any religion, and he was born in a small town, too, so that our background's almost the same.

In most instances of marital discord in the cases investigated, cultural conflict was not so much a cause as an effect of domestic difficulties. In only 4 cases were cultural differences the major reason for divorce or desertion; in 18 cases such differences did not seem to enter at all as a factor. It appears that what often happens is what was found in 7 other cases, namely, that friction arises on some other account—economic hardship, personal incompatibility, etc.—and then latent prejudices are expressed in these situations and so aggravate marital conflict.

Jewess. My husband is good to me, but if I ever had to do it over again I never would do it. Whenever we argue he always throws it up to me. He calls me a dirty Jew, says it's my Jewish blood, and so on.

The conflicts resulting from intermarriage may make one more conscious of the difference between the two groups, increase the individual's feeling of identity with his own group, and thus augment the conflicts already existing.

Jewess. It was brought up all the time that William was Gentile and I was Jewish. For instance, when I'd be introduced to people they'd ask me how come I was called Mac—[a Scotch name, since she speaks English with a Yiddish accent]. Among Jews or Gentiles I was always conscious of the fact that I was a Jew

² *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin*, XXXI (1906-07), 58.

³ E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization* (Chicago, 1927), 105-06.

and he was a Gentile—you can't escape that. You become more conscious of your Jewishness when you marry a Gentile—it brings out conflicts that you hadn't thought of before.

It was found that the arrival of offspring intensifies marital conflict based on cultural differences. The customs associated with birth and religion usually have high social value in a culture, and the parents must decide whether the child is to be circumcized or baptized, whether it will be reared as a Jew or Christian. When the couple is not very emancipated, and particularly if one or both of the spouses are close to their families, so that the group social pressures are strong, such decisions are usually reached after much conflict, because the high social value accorded to these customs by the groups from which the husband and wife come, persists in the attitude of the couple.

Gentile man. Most of the problems that came up before the child came, we forgot. When the child came, however, things were different. I told my wife before we were married that we could be married by a rabbi, but that any children would not be brought up in any religion; when they grew up they could join any religious body they liked. But when she was pregnant she came to me and told me that she wanted the child circumcized if it were a boy, because her father said he wouldn't take the baby in his arms if it wasn't circumcized. This riled me. But the child was a girl.

His Jewish wife. I married him because I thought it didn't make any difference to him whether Jew or Gentile—I thought he was a liberal, broad-minded person. But we had trouble. I had a longing in my heart to please my parents, and when I was pregnant I knew it would be pleasant for them to have the child circumcized. But he resisted it terribly, in spite of all his broad-mindedness. He thought that that would make the child Jewish from the beginning.

The child may be initiated secretly, in order to satisfy the rites of the group with a minimum of conflict with the spouse.

Gentile woman. My husband would not let our boy be baptized, so one day I had him baptized secretly; my conscience was easier after that. I never dared tell my husband about what I had done, and as long as he lived he never knew.

Sometimes no compromise can be effected, and then it may be decided not to have any children.

Jew. We have no children. I had an antagonism against non-Jewish religions. My wife wanted to give any children we might have the same religious training she had. I talked it over with her and I decided, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it, let's not have any children."

THE INTERMARRIED COUPLE AS CARRIERS IN DIFFUSION

Not only does acculturation take place between the intermarried couple, but through social contact with the couple diffusion of customs may extend to their families and friends.

Gentile woman. I learned a great deal about cooking from my mother-in-law, and I passed my recipes on to my friends. A funny thing once happened. Nobody in my family used garlic—they wouldn't think of it—it was only for foreigners. Well, one day I fixed a roast flavored with a garlic according to my mother-in-law's recipe, and they said, "Grace, this is simply delicious!" Then they found out it was the garlic that made it taste so good. Now my whole family uses garlic.

Also, as a result of personal contacts with members of the out-group, loss of prejudice may occur among the relatives and friends of the intermarried couple.

Jew. I believe some of my wife's friends were astonished when they met me. They'd never known a Jew before, and were quite astonished that my interests were the same as theirs; that I liked games, hunting, and swimming; that I could hold my liquor without getting noisy. They'd been taught that Jews were extremely different.

NEGRO HISTORY WEEK

The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History announces that the eighteenth annual celebration of Negro History Week will take place between February 7 and 14, 1943. At this time the schools will have an opportunity to demonstrate what they have learned from the study of the race during the year.

SOCIAL-INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSHIPS

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

TIME-TABLE OF MINIMUM WAGE PROCEDURE UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

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AS OF January 1, 1942, forty industry committees had been appointed and thirty-five minimum wage orders issued in accordance with the terms of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Wage and Hour Law).¹ Students of administration may well raise a number of pertinent questions about minimum wage procedure under the statute. This procedure, it will be recalled, falls into two phases: the first or "industry committee phase" which includes the appointment by the Administrator of the industry committee, its meetings and hearings, wage recommendation and report; the second or "Administrator phase" consisting of review of the industry committee records and recommendation, public hearing, oral argument, and issuance of the minimum wage order. How long has it taken to proceed from the appointment of an industry committee to the issuance of the wage rate? How much of this total time has been devoted to the industry committee phase of the procedure? To the Ad-

ministrator phase? What factors have delayed early deliberation and prompt action by the committees and the Administrator? Have any reforms been adopted which have accelerated the enactment of minimum wage orders?

Table 1 indicates the interval intervening between (a) the appointment of the industry committee and the issuance of the wage order; (b) the appointment of the committee and the filing of its report with the Administrator; and (c) the committee report and the issuance of the wage order.

In some classifications the total period intervening between the appointment of the committee and the issuance of the wage order by the Administrator was relatively extended. 512 days were required to reach the apparel wage order, 487 days for the first woolen, 467 days for the railroad, and 432 days for the hat wage orders. On the other hand the second woolen minimum wage rate was issued only 68 days after the committee was appointed, the second textile 95 days, the shoe manufacturing and allied industries 102 days, and the enameled utensil 125 days. The average total time from committee appointment to issuance of wage order required by each of the first ten categories was 360.4 days while the figure for the last ten was 135.3 days each. How much of the total time was spent in the industry committee phase? The average of the thirty-four categories was 98.4 days; the average time utilized by each of the first ten industry committees was 207.4 days while the last ten committees required only 40.8 days each. The average time needed for the Administrator phase was 126.5 days; the first ten classifications required an average of 153.0 days each for this stage of procedure while the last ten needed but

¹ Data for this study are from the files of the Wage and Hour Division of the Labor Department. The literature on the administrative and procedural aspects of the Wage and Hour Act is growing rapidly. Among other studies see Calvert Magruder, "Administrative Procedures under the Fair Labor Standards Act," *American Bar Association Journal*, 25 (1939), 688-95; Harold November, "Industry Committees under the Fair Labor Standards Act," *American Federationist*, 47(1940) 144-50; Z. S. Dickinson, "The Organization and Functioning of the Industry Committees under the Fair Labor Standards Act," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 6(1939), 353-67. See also the authors' "Labor and Public Representation on Industry Committees," *American Labor Legislation Review*, 31(1941), 175-77.

TABLE 1
TIME-TABLE OF INDUSTRY COMMITTEES*

INDUSTRY COMMITTEE	INTERVAL INTERVENING BETWEEN		
	Ap- point- ment of Com- mittee and issuance of wage order	Ap- point- ment of Com- mittee and filing of report with admin- istra- tor	Com- mittee report and issuance of wage order
	days	days	days
Textile (No. 1).....	381	252	129
Apparel.....	512	282	230
Woolen (No. 1).....	487	351	136
Hosiery.....	198	112	86
Hat.....	432	263	169
Millinery.....	283	190	93
Shoe.....	372	254	118
Outerwear.....	267	39	228
Underwear.....	205	45	160
Railroad.....	467	286	181
Leather.....	173	83	90
Pulp and Paper.....	152	54	98
Carpet and Rug.....	291	86	205
Luggage and Leather Goods.....	218	71	147
Converted Paper Products.....	325	180	145
Embroideries.....	164	54	110
Portable Lamp and Shade.....	189	26	163
Enameled Utensil.....	125	20	105
Drug, Medicine, Toilet Prepara- tions.....	179	45	134
Single Pants, Shirts, Allied Gar- ments.....	216	68	148
Seamless Hosiery.....	143	51	92
Rubber.....	130	38	92
Gray Iron Jobbing and Foundry.....	223	30	193
Clay Products.....	161	58	103
Textile (No. 2).....	95	37	58
Jewelry Manufacturing (No. 2).....	174	27	147
Women's Apparel.....	129	37	92
Knitted and Men's Woven Un- derwear and Commercial Knit- ting.....	180	41	139
Wood Furniture Manufacturing.....	154	37	117
Lumber and Timber Products.....	154	41	113
Miscellaneous Apparel.....	144	52	92
Passenger Motor Carrier.....	154	58	96
Shoe Manufacturing and Allied Industries.....	102	49	53
Woolen (No. 2).....	68	29	39
Average.....	224.8	98.4	126.5

* This table includes only those committees for which

94.6 days each. Two important observations are suggested by these figures: first, that a number of perplexing delays were encountered during the early history of the act; and secondly, that marked progress has been made in speeding the preparation and issuance of minimum wage rates.

Considerable variation has appeared in the time necessary for the initial phase of minimum wage procedure. The first woolen committee used 351 days between its appointment and the filing of its report, the railroad committee 286 days, the apparel committee 282 days, and the hat committee 263 days. On the other hand the enameled utensil committee required only 20 days, the second jewelry manufacturing committee 27 days, and the second woolen committee 29 days. As pointed out above, the average time of the first ten committees was 207.4 days each while that of the last ten was only 40.8 days each.

This marked acceleration of the industry committee phase stems from a number of important reforms. Committees were formerly appointed without proper regard to the availability of the basic economic data without which they could not function. Many committees were compelled to remain relatively inactive for varying periods—the railroad committee 102 days (from appointment to first meeting), the converted paper products committee 92 days, the millinery committee 85 days—until the requisite investigations had been prepared by the research agencies of the Labor Department. At present the appointment of the committee occurs more or less simultaneously with the completion of the economic studies. This data, of course, can be used to great advantage by reconvened committees or new committees within the same industry; for example, whereas it took the first textile committee 252 days to proceed from appointment to the filing of its report, the second textile committee needed only 37 days; similarly the first woolen committee used 351 days, the second woolen committee only 29 days. It is only fair, however, to observe in this connection that a great deal of time was spent by the first woolen and textile committees in reaching a satisfactory definition of the industries. It probably

wage orders had been issued prior to January 1, 1942. It does not include the first jewelry manufacturing, knitted outerwear, property motor carrier, cigar, and tobacco industry committees; nor does it include the Special Puerto Rico industry committee appointed August 1, 1940. Data appearing in this paper refer only to those committees listed above.

will not be possible to shorten appreciably the time necessary to prepare the economic data in new fields nor would it appear to be wise economy to skimp on this vitally important preparatory stage.

The time spent in actual committee sessions has been reduced considerably. The first textile committee, for example, needed 161 days from its first meeting to reach a wage recommendation, the apparel committee 136 days, and the shoe committee 121 days; the last twenty-four committees, on the other hand, have together required only 53 days (an average of 2.2 days each) while the last ten committees have needed an average of 1.7 days each. This has been made possible by the following reforms: the basic data have been made available to committee members several weeks prior to the initial session so that when the representatives convene they are prepared to take immediate action; there has been increasing use of experienced chairmen who have been able quickly to guide the deliberations of the committees; diminishing use has been made by the committees of the formal hearing device. Important, too, has been the increasing acceptance by the employer representatives of the forty cents hourly rate.

A serious bottleneck developed around the statutory provision requiring each committee to file with the Administrator a report containing its recommendations. The committees formerly spent much time in preparing these documents: the first woolen committee 220 days, the apparel committee 104 days, and the shoe committee 109 days; the reports were extended and detailed, frequently running to a hundred pages in length. Later the Office of the Solicitor of the Labor Department ruled that the reports need contain but the wage recommendation and a summary statement. The wholesome effect of this ruling is shown in the fact that the last seventeen industry committees together have required only 25 days (an average of 1.5 days each) for the writing and filing of their reports.

The second or Administrator phase has followed a similar pattern of variation and acceleration. The total time intervening between the receipt of the industry committee report and the issuance of the wage order has ranged from highs of 230 days for the apparel, 228 days for the outerwear, and 205 days for the carpet and rug classifications to lows of 39 days for the second woolen, 53 days for the shoe manufacturing, and 58 days for the second textile categories. The average time required by each of the first ten classifications was 153.0 days

while that of each of the last ten was 94.6 days; this suggests that some economies have been achieved. Perhaps the greatest saving has come from the diminishing use of the oral argument stage. The privilege of oral argument, granted at the discretion of the Administrator, has been used in fourteen of the thirty-four classifications; however it has appeared only twice in the last fourteen categories.

The public hearing required by law cannot perhaps be accelerated very much. Adequate notice and publicity must be given; interested parties need and demand sufficient time for the preparation of their briefs; the Administrator and his staff wish carefully to examine and digest the economic data, industry committee records, and reports. Indeed, in the case of the property motor carrier and single pants-shirts-allied garments proceedings, the Administrator held up the public hearings until additional data had been secured. Many delays are, of course, unavoidable; inevitable changes in top administrative personnel, injury and illness of interested parties, often necessitate postponement of the hearings. And after the completion of the public hearing, the Administrator wants plenty of time for reviewing the entire record, calling for renewed investigations if necessary, or making a personal study of an industry (as did one Administrator of the New England jewelry industry) before rendering his decision. For example, 183 days intervened between the first session of the public hearing and the issuance of the wage order for the apparel industry, 156 days for the hat, 149 days for the carpet and rug industries; on the other hand wage orders were issued 19 days after the opening public hearing in the case of the second woolen classification, 22 days for the knitted and men's underwear, and 29 days for the second textile.

A final delay, also largely inescapable, occurs between the issuance of a wage order and the date when it becomes effective. This interval has ranged from 60 days or more in the case of the seamless hosiery, portable lamp and shade, first woolen, and pulp and paper categories to only 16 days for the shoe manufacturing, lumber and timber products, and wood furniture manufacturing; 30 days appear to be the normal period. Sufficient time must be granted to the industries to prepare for a wage change; if possible the wage order will be made effective at the end of a normal period of activity to avoid compelling employers to fill out old contracts on the basis of increased labor

costs. Notification of the affected industries is in itself a formidable job; 30,000 notices were sent under the property motor carrier wage order while 17,000 were mailed under the lumber and timber products wage order.

The success of the Fair Labor Standards Act is dependent in large measure upon the effective

functioning of its minimum wage procedure. It is, therefore, reassuring to observe the impressive speeding of both industry committee and Administrator phases in the enactment of minimum wage rates. Yet the essential democratic character of the process has not been sacrificed on the altar of speed and efficiency.

THE PROFIT MOTIVE TODAY

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OCCASIONAL official remarks, as well as practically universal popular belief, would have it appear that economic activity is almost solely dependent on the profit motive. Although the limitations of explanations of economic activity in terms of profit-seeking have sometimes been pointed out, the standard discussion of economic motives operates through the conventional classical concepts of wants, utilities, and cost.¹ Thorstein Veblen, on the other hand, has had considerable influence in effectively undermining the exclusively hedonistic psychology. In his *Instinct of Workmanship*,² as elsewhere, he drew the distinction between business and industry, with implications that while the vast majority are driven by a desire for workmanlike accomplishment, a comparatively few are engaged almost exclusively in pecuniary pursuits having no necessary relationship to production. Taussig's explanation of the difference between inventors and money makers is of some interest in this connection.³ Less known, perhaps, is Paul H. Douglas's study of the incentives of scientists, business men, and wage earners.⁴

Jerome Davis maintains that the profit motive is important in capitalist society largely because it is superimposed upon many other motives and reinforces them. "One of the most potent means of adventure is the quest for money; and money means power as well as prestige. Consequently

there is a cumulative piling up of urges when the individual thinks of profits."⁵ Similarly, John Dewey pointed out that acquisition is an incident of love of power, of desire to impress others, to obtain prestige and influence, to manifest ability, or "... to 'succeed' in short under the conditions of the given regime."⁶ In opposition to instinct psychology, the influence of which was already waning when he wrote, Dewey asserted that "if we are to shove a mythological psychology of instincts behind modern economics, we should do better to invent instincts for security, a good time, power and success than to rely upon an acquisitive instinct. We should have also to give much weight to a peculiar sporting instinct. Not acquiring dollars, but chasing them, hunting them is the important thing."⁷

Among the first to turn to a realistic examination of economic behavior was Carleton H. Parker, who pointed out, for example, that the hedonistic psychology did not explain that "the worried father of a sick child seated at his office desk is not an economic man."⁸ Moreover, he directed attention to the developing problem of individual loss of morale under the regime of big business.⁹ Parker's stress on instincts, however, led Wesley C. Mitchell to call attention to the importance of the "institutional factor" which includes the socially prevalent habits standardizing the behavior of individuals in a given group.¹⁰

¹ Z. C. Dickinson, *Economic Motives* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922).

² New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914.

³ F. W. Taussig, *Inventors and Money Makers* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915).

⁴ "The Reality of Non-commercial Incentives in Economic Life," *The Trend of Economics*, R. G. Tugwell, ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1924), 153-188.

⁵ Jerome Davis, *Capitalism and its Culture* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1935), 234.

⁶ *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1922), 145.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ "Motives in Economic Life," *American Economic Review*, 8 (1918), Supplement, p. 226.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

The growing dominance of the large corporation in American economic life, together with the concomitant separation of ownership from control, led finally to the detailed study by Berle and Means of *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*.¹¹ The authors confessed their inability to conclude what the motives of those in control are, but added that "... more could be learned regarding them by studying the motives of an Alexander the Great, seeking new worlds to conquer, than by considering the motives of a petty tradesman of the days of Adam Smith."¹² They suggested that those in control might derive large personal incomes at the expense of a company, without necessarily helping to make profits for it.¹³ However, whether or not large personal returns are thus derived by those in control, it is nevertheless clear, as Harry W. Laidler indicates, that generally speaking industry is run for profit which goes to absentee owners, not the administrators.¹⁴ Salaries and other forms of income derived from the corporation by the administrative hierarchy are corporate expenses, not residual profits similar to those acquired by owner-managers of an earlier period. "As one descends from the highest order of executives to the second and third ranks, profit becomes negligible as an energizing force in industry."¹⁵ Any dividends received from securities owned by lower executives are ordinarily small in amount, as compared with income from salaries, but such dividends may admittedly have the effect of making the recipients "capitalist-minded."¹⁶

As Tugwell pointed out in discussing the profit motive, "profits, in the sense in which we use the term, belong to a speculative age, one in which huge gambles are taken, and in which the rewards for success may be outstanding. When we speak of them as motives, we do not mean the hope of making 4 percent induces us to undertake an operation, we mean that we hope for some fabulous story-book success."¹⁷ Railway men, steel workers, and office employees,—from workman to

superintendent—have no stake in company earnings and it is therefore absurd to treat motives as though our knowledge were derived from eighteenth century literature rather than from an understanding of the contemporary world.¹⁸ "The truth is that if industry could not run without this incentive it would have, stopped running long ago."¹⁹

There are three groups directly concerned with the large corporation, which is of course increasingly characteristic and significant in the modern economy,²⁰ whose attitude towards profits is of interest. These are (1) stockholders, (2) the relatively small group of insiders in control of the corporation, and (3) the many thousands of administrative employees. Stockholders are obviously not engaged in actively seeking profits. The incomes of the few in control are scarcely profits in the traditional sense. Whatever funds they receive, including bonuses and similar prerogatives, are preferably regarded as essential for the proper indication of status.²¹ Finally, it is evident that the money incomes of most individuals participating in daily corporate activities must be distinguished from the corporation's income, since changes in the two often have little relationship. So long as the incomes of individuals continue to be what they regard for a variety of reasons as more or less satisfactory, this aspect of their daily lives is in an entirely different category from the activities carried on for the corporation in terms of profit and loss.

However, there appears to be no discernible awareness of the increasing difference between habitual methods of thought and the actual facts of current conditions. Perhaps the vast majority of those who apply themselves daily, not in making profits for themselves, but in assisting a corporation to do so, have faith that "the profit motive" is basic to the present economic order, if not a prerequisite to the maintenance of what is referred to as civilization. The fact is they identify their welfare with what is called the profit system. Since habits of thought are changed only slowly, the profit system as an institution appears to be

¹¹ New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 350.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁴ *Incentives under Capitalism and Socialism* (New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1933), 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez Faire," *American Economic Review*, 22 (1932), Supplement, p. 80.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Cf. National Resources Committee, *The Structure of the American Economy*, Part I, pp. 106 f.

²¹ Cf. Talcott Parsons, "The Motivation of Economic Activities," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 6 (1940), 199.

entrenched for the foreseeable future as symbolic of what is considered a desirable economic order. Those who urge that some form of collectivism could be relatively easily instituted because the profit motive is not essential even to present economic arrangements²² overlook the significance

²² Cf. e. g., Jerome Davis, *op. cit.*, and Harry W. Laidler, *op. cit.*

of deep-rooted faith. This is of course not to say that an accelerated trend toward more extensive use of the government corporation would be considered an unacceptable form of collectivism, for without unduly disturbing existing institutions the device of the government corporation preserves the profit system to the apparent satisfaction of the majority.

CHRISTMAS MEETINGS CANCELED

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.—President Dwight Sanderson has sent out the following announcement:

In view of the urgent pleas of the Office of Defense Transportation that civilian travel be curtailed between December 15 and January 10, the Administration Committee has voted to cancel the meeting of the American Sociological Society which was to have been held in Cleveland, December 29-31, 1942. Similar action has been taken by most of the other Social Science Societies which were planning to meet with us.

* * *

THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE.—The December 4, 1942 issue of *Science* carries the following announcement from Secretary F. R. Moulton:

In compliance with a direct request of the Office of Defense Transportation, the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of 44 of its affiliated and associated societies that was scheduled to be held in New York City beginning next December 28 has been postponed, by vote of the Executive Committee. . . . Naturally the postponement of a meeting implies that it will be held at a later date. In the present case, however, no definite plans for the future have been made or can be made until the acute transportation problems have been at least partially solved. It is not possible to predict how soon the transportation conditions will improve; as soon as they are improved the ODT will not discourage the holding of scientific meetings.

SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

The prompt response of the membership to the questionnaire which was sent out in November is indeed gratifying. Although complete returns are not yet available, results show unreserved endorsement of the judgment of the Executive Committee which voted 12 to 2 for cancellation. Of the 147 questionnaires returned at this writing, 135 members have voted to call off the meeting and only 12 have voted in favor of holding it. Of the 137 members who answered the question concerning their attendance at the meeting, should one be held, 93 said they would not attend under present conditions, while only 44 signified that they would.

Accordingly, the annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society scheduled to be held in Atlanta on April 2 and 3, 1943, has been cancelled.

At this time, the responses to the question concerning the election of officers show a small majority in favor of continuing the present officers until an annual meeting can be held, with a substantial minority voting for election by mail ballot or by the Executive Committee. In addition, some excellent suggestions have been received from members pointing toward ways of not only keeping the membership intact, but continuing the Society as an active social force. Action and developments regarding these matters will be reported to the membership shortly, either through *Social Forces* or by means of personal letter, after sufficient time has been allowed to give every member an opportunity for expression of opinion.

KATHARINE JOCHER
President

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TWO MEASURES OF REGIONAL EFFORT

W. RUSSELL TYLOR

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THE BOULDER CANYON PROJECT. By Paul L. Kleinsorge. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1941. 330 pp. \$3.50.

An important study in the field of regionalism, and a notable contribution as to the significance

of river valley and water power development which has highlighted the past decade in America, is contained in this volume appropriately off the Stanford University Press last year, entitled *The Boulder Canyon Project* by Paul L. Kleinsorge,

assistant professor of economics and business administration, Oregon State College.

This is a thoroughly scholarly, fully documented (there are 13 pages of bibliography in turn referred to by footnotes), and able presentation of the socio-economic aspects of this multipurpose project in its historic setting, with the emphasis upon its appraisal from an economic point of view.

The Colorado River Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act are historically reviewed and analyzed, with detailed discussion as to the various legal controversies and court decisions involved. The Boulder Canyon Project Act specifies the following purposes of the Boulder Canyon Project: (1) the control of floods; (2) the improvement of navigation; (3) the regulation of flow of the Colorado River; (4) the storage of water for the reclamation of public lands and other beneficial uses exclusively within the United States; and (5) the generation of electric energy.

Although the construction of Boulder (Hoover) Dam in the Black Canyon was the largest and most spectacular feature of the project, its importance was supplemented by the Act's provision for the construction of the All-American Canal and the Imperial Dam for the irrigation of the Imperial and Coachella valleys in southern California.

Likewise discussed is the significance of the closely related project, not included in the Act, of the Colorado River Aqueduct, with the Parker diversion Dam, which supplies water to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.

The geological and engineering aspects of these projects also receive attention without, however, any attempt at a strictly technical analysis. The author's primary purpose of the study is, as stated in the Preface, to permit

a fuller understanding of the economic justification of the project—and, for that matter, of any of the multi-purpose projects now under construction or contemplated.

Whereas the whole study throughout exhibits an admirable balance in its appraisals and in its evaluation of gains, actually and potentially realizable, in the light of possible alternative means of securing similar results, there are nevertheless a few conclusions stressed which this reviewer would challenge.

In the first place it would appear that the author's rightly placed enthusiasm in his subject has at the same time caused him to lose sight of its relevant role in a larger perspective. When for example he states on page 282 that:

There is little doubt that the Boulder Canyon Project has set a precedent for direct federal action in the development of hydro-electric sites, and for this reason the economic success or failure of the Boulder power plant will have great influence in determining the extent of federal activity in future projects,

he is ignoring, seemingly, the greater role of the Tennessee Valley Authority, not only in its prior consideration of dam sites but in the extension of its whole power program as part and parcel of a larger regional integration.

It is significant that the generation of electrical energy was given the last place in the list of purposes and the last place in the priority of uses of the Boulder Canyon Project Act which became effective by President Hoover's proclamation in 1929, albeit it was through the sale of electric power that the project was to be made financially solvent and a self-supporting undertaking, the government being unwilling to donate public moneys from the federal treasury without reimbursement.

Ten years before President Roosevelt's dedication of Boulder Dam in 1935, Wilson Dam at Muscle Shoals, begun during the last World War, was completed. It was transferred from the War Department to the TVA by the Act of 1933 setting up the Tennessee Valley Authority. Section 23 of the Tennessee Valley Act places the maximum generation of electric power as a general purpose second only to those of flood control and navigation, and moreover further deliberately specifies as a purpose, "the economic and social well-being of the people living in said river basin."

Although the federal government has built some 15 power plants in connection with other projects before Wilson Dam was completed, these were not comparable to the power output and multiple purposes scope of the TVA. Pursuant to this program Norris Dam and Wheeler Dam were finished in 1936, so that to date the TVA comprises eight dams in all, with four more under construction. Hence it is rather the TVA, that has set a precedent, and especially "for direct federal action," as it represents the only existing Federal Authority controlling an entire river

development and its power potentialities, whereas the Colorado River project is essentially an interstate compact.

Quantitatively and qualitatively, the two river undertakings are in marked contrast. The Congressional program calling for the eight TVA dams totaled over \$321,000,000, comprising a construction job bigger than the pyramids. The Boulder Canyon Project Act limited the construction costs of the entire project, including interest based upon a construction period of seven years, to \$165,000,000, although when to this amount were added interest, maintenance, and depreciation expenses for the amortization period of fifty years, as required by the Act, the total which the Secretary of the Interior was required to cover through revenue contracts amounted to nearly \$207,000,000. Even though, as Professor Kleinsorge points out on page 154, the contracts for power as actually secured will account for more than \$327,000,000 in revenue during the fifty year period, and represent, therefore, "one of the largest power transactions in the history of the world," no social service in any "yardstick measure" is encompassed hereby.

On the other hand, the recognized objective of the distribution of TVA power by municipal, cooperative, and wholesale customers of TVA is electric service at low rates rather than at profit, albeit at rates adequate to cover costs of service including interest, adequate depreciation reserves, a reasonable return on investments, and tax equivalents.

No less an authority than Leland Olds, executive secretary of the New York Power Authority, believes that the TVA fixed charges are on a par with those of private utility concerns, and hence provide an actual incentive and stimulus to private utilities for rate improvements rather than serve as a menace to their very existence. He even predicts that the time will come when the TVA yardstick may be considered too high rather than a daring experiment. As an operating yardstick, it has been claimed that the contracts for the disposal of TVA power have resulted in a reduction of rates in electricity throughout the nation amounting to a savings of \$50,000,000 annually on electric power bills.

In view of these considerations it is doubtful that even the conceivable economic failure of the Boulder Dam power plant would have any influence in determining the extent of the federal

government's interest and participation in the TVA or the Columbia River development. A failure might, however, render it more cautious in analyzing more thoroughly future or potential power requirements in certain other regions.

An even more fundamental criticism is one addressed to one of the basic assumptions upon which the economic evaluations of the services of the Boulder Canyon project rests. This has to do with the estimated future population of southern California's Metropolitan Water District, with its consequent needs for water for domestic uses and of the relationship of the Colorado River Aqueduct to the project. Especially is this true, since it was the construction of the aqueduct which virtually insured the financial integrity of Boulder Dam, since the Metropolitan Water District contracted to take 36 percent of the electrical energy generated at the dam in order to pump the Colorado River water across the mountains to the reservoirs near Los Angeles.

The author maintains, at the top of page 279, that:

Although the point is still in dispute, most authorities have agreed that the Colorado is the only dependable source available for a quantity of water large enough to meet the growing needs of the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and on that basis there is little doubt that the construction of the Colorado River Aqueduct would be the most economic method of securing the needed supply.

Whereas alternate sources of water supply were in the picture, although their likelihood is in turn involved, the issue may be focused upon what would seem to constitute "the growing needs of the Los Angeles metropolitan area."

These needs have been flagrantly overestimated in other connections, with far reaching economic losses entailed. In the mid-twenties, the subdivisions in Los Angeles County had enough laid out business frontage in vacant lots to provide for more than the entire population of the United States on the basis of a norm of 50 feet of business frontage for every 100 expected population as recommended by the Chicago Regional Planning Association.

In his justification analysis the author accepts a forecast¹ that the metropolitan district would reach 7½ million population by 1980 from a 1938 population of some 2½ million. Moreover, he

¹ The International Engineer for May 1938, p. 149.

concludes, at the bottom of page 274, after analyzing the district's past growth, admittedly phenomenal, that in the light of its past growth "there was no reason to assume that the rapid growth would not continue as long as the requisites for healthful living were available." On the contrary there is every reason to assume just the reverse of this, and particularly in conjunction with his further statement on page 274 that this present 2½ million population might rise to the level of 12,279,000 people as far as the ultimate supply service of the Colorado River Aqueduct is concerned.

That such population growths are highly fantastic should be apparent to all students of demographic trends. Neither the intrinsic trends in the total population nor those in urban populations will justify such wide amplitudes of expansion. As brought out in the late study by Frank Lorimer, Ellen Winston, and Louise K. Kiser on *Foundations of American Population Policy*,

The real alternatives in the long range prospects for the total population in the United States are not population increase or stabilization, but rather stabilization or decrease. In fact, a period of population decrease beginning a few decades hence seems almost inevitable. By that time, if present trends continue, the intrinsic reproductivity may be only three fourths or two thirds of that required for permanent population replacement. Associated with such long range trends is the possibility of the approximate equalization of fertility rates between rural and urban areas with the consequent improvement of economic conditions in the areas where population presses heavily on natural resources.

In the meantime it may be noted that the 1940 census indicates a decline since 1930 of 14 percent in the urban reproduction rate and of 14 percent in the rural. So much for the total population.

Moreover the chairman of the National Resources Committee's Urbanism Committee, Mr. L. Segoe, has estimated that in the light of trends operative up to 1930 the urban population of the nation by 1980 will be about one million less than it was in 1930. Whereas the urban population increased 108.5 percent during the first thirty years of this century, an increase of only 8.4 percent is expected for the thirty-year period following 1930, with a greater decline indicated for the twenty years following 1960 than the

expected increase during the preceding thirty years.

Seemingly the only way for the Los Angeles region to grow is by net migration, and whereas this may continue appreciably for some years, it would hardly seem possible that it would double, treble, or quadruple at the expense of other population limited areas of the nation. As a matter of fact Los Angeles, the largest city in the United States in area, had an excess of births over deaths this past census decade of only some 22,800, whereas over 90 percent of its growth was obtained from net migration.² While acknowledging the importance of the suburban trend whereby for the nation as a whole suburban areas grew at a rate nearly three times that of their parent cities, it is not plausible, as stated, that this particular area would succeed as a magnet in drawing numbers of people all out of proportion to past and present growth potentialities of populations elsewhere, and especially in view of other notable river developmental projects, actual and proposed, such as those of the Columbia and Arkansas basins.

Furthermore, it is certainly significant in this whole connection that the past census decade, for the first time in nearly 100 years, revealed that the rate of population increase in California's rural areas exceeded that of its cities.

Closely related to this latter fact a third fundamental criticism of this work arises in conjunction with the author's balancing of claims between the prospects for the development of a large urban population in southern California with its primary domestic needs for water versus a large rural population in Arizona with its essential irrigation and reclamation requisites. On page 280 he disclaims any knowledge as to definite grounds upon which to base the choice for a future policy favoring one of these prospects as paramount. However his analysis leads him to justify the former.

As one conversant with these conflicting claims from the viewpoints of rural, urban, and regional sociologists, this reviewer would maintain that there are definite grounds favoring the Arizona rural development. Particularly is this interpretation presented in Lewis Mumford's epochal

² Cf. Warren S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, "Changes in Regional and Urban Patterns of Population Growth," *American Sociological Review*, 5, No. 5, (December 1940), 923.

work, *The Culture of Cities*, and especially in his Chapter V dealing with "The Regional Framework of Civilization" and Chapter VI on "The Politics of Regional Development."

One final criticism is allied with the first. It involves disagreement with the interpretative emphasis embodied in the concluding sentence of the study which reads:

The present development may be surpassed by other projects in size and in the value of services rendered; but it is doubtful if any other development will find greater justification from the economic and social points of view than the construction of the Boulder Canyon Project.

The economic and social program of the TVA certainly outstrips Boulder Canyon ten-to-one. For a justification of this statement see the leading article in the April, 1937, *American Sociological Review* by the former chairman of the TVA board, Arthur E. Morgan, entitled "Sociology and the TVA"; also Jay Franklin's challenging study and account of the TVA entitled *The Future is Ours*, one of the Modern Age Books, 1939; likewise Dr. Clarence Louis Hodge's study of *The TVA, A National Experiment in Regionalism*, published by the American University Press, 1938. The reviewer also had occasion to deal with this in an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* for November, 1938, entitled "Regionalism in Practice."

The above criticisms are in no way meant to detract from the careful and thorough scholarship of this work throughout, nor from the lucid and engaging style which permeates it as a whole. They are offered as variant measures of appraisal of certain fundamental socio-economic implications which inevitably arise in conjunction with a major regional effort of the scope of the Boulder Canyon project.

PARITY PARITY PARITY. By John D. Black. Cambridge: Harvard Committee on Research in the Social Sciences, 1942. 367 pp.

The title to this book has a double meaning. First, it calls attention to the emphatic insistence of farm pressure groups on Parity for Agriculture which has been the battle cry of commercial farmers since the idea was first advanced in the early twenties. Second, it serves to show, from a broader point of view that Parity for Labor and Parity for Capital must be considered along with

Parity for Agriculture. A major objective of the book, the author states, is to help the three major groups come to "a good understanding—of the conditions within the other groups." In other words, the author is no narrow partisan pleading for more governmental aid to agriculture. Rather he is approaching the problem in an objective manner from the standpoint of the wellbeing of all groups in the nation. This point of view cannot be questioned on a theoretical basis but practical politicians and leaders of agricultural pressure groups will not likely agree with the conclusions of this book. Yet such individuals, on the theory that "you cannot fool all the people all the time," will do well to give careful consideration to the facts presented which have been so carefully analyzed and interpreted. A policy for agriculture built on shaky facts and narrow reasoning will likely hurt agriculture in the long run.

In the development of his subject, the author first gives the reader a brief orientation in farm politics, in the economic organization and status of agriculture, and in farm price control. These chapters are well written, easy to read, and set the stage for what is to follow. Next the evolution of parity is traced, and in this brief chapter, the reader will see the interesting things that happen when politics and statistics are mixed in dealing with a major economic problem. Politics is in a dominant position with statistics playing an essential but still minor role. For instance: (1) The Department of Agriculture has failed to release parity ratios which include interest and tax payments, possibly because such procedure would have reduced parity prices around 4 percent; (2) Barley and flue-cured tobacco growers put pressure on Congress in November 1940 and shifted the base period for tobacco parity prices from 1919-29 to the more favorable 1934-39. As the book was being written, pressure was being brought by farm representatives for raising farm prices to 110 percent of parity and for including farm wages, which were rising, in the index of prices paid by farmers. All of this, and similar political maneuvers, suggest that the agricultural parity problem is very much in the realm of sociology and political science. Statistics seem to serve at best as a means of justifying or rationalizing whatever the pressure groups can get away with.

Several chapters of this book are given to a discussion of the relative real incomes of farmers

and city people. The results of the analysis of this controversial question are not conclusive; but the author feels that even though the farmer's economic plight has been greatly exaggerated by the use of inadequate data, there are still good grounds for concluding that "in the long run, agricultural incomes have remained at too low a relative level." The author observes also that migration from farms since 1933 has been slower than the relative economic advantages in the city would warrant.

After showing up the more glaring weaknesses of the parity system as applied to agriculture, the author sets forth some alternative parity standards and suggests practical measures for regulating prices in war time, prevention of inflation, and for post-war adjustments. He doesn't believe that farm people can improve their conditions by holding up consumers, and suggests as alternatives: heavier migration from farms, large farm units in low income areas, increased consumption of the more nutritive farm products by all low income groups, a greatly strengthened surplus commodity and school lunch program for low income families, government loans without recourse, and more effort on the part of farm families to improve their living by direct methods rather than through strictly commercial farming.

The author's treatment of the question of the farmer's interest in wages does not make sense and seems to be inconsistent with some of his major conclusions. Perhaps the difficulty lies in his failure (because of inadequate data) to differentiate properly between wages and other forms of nonagricultural income, much of which go to high income groups. Perhaps he would agree that an increase in the wages of the low income groups would be just as effective in increasing farm prices and farm income as would an increase in nonagricultural employment. It seems that it is a mal-distribution of nonagricultural income that is most detrimental to agricultural markets. The policy of cutting prices of industrial goods instead of raising wages would certainly be welcome, but it would be ineffective unless the bigger problem of wealth distribution was also attacked. Huge salaries and other forms of unearned income are in any case incompatible with a policy of full employment, low prices and reasonable wages. The author, to say the least, has left the reader just a little confused on this point.

In conclusion it must be said that this is one of

the most valuable books that has come from the pen of John D. Black. It represents the practical fruit of years of study and careful deliberation of a competent scholar. It takes economics off the pedestal and places it at the service of the Nation at a time when it is most needed. It should be read far and wide by the partisans of both industry and agriculture, so that there will indeed be a better understanding on the part of each of the other's point of view.

C. HORACE HAMILTON

North Carolina State College

PLANNING FOR AMERICA. By George B. Galloway and Associates. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941. 713 pp. \$3.00.

Written with the expressed purpose of presenting an over-all picture of the status of social and economic planning in America, the book does just that. But in very adequately doing so, it clears none of the confusion as to actual planning methods, aims, practices, and philosophies clouding the American scene today.

The author and his associates for the most part do an admirable job of reporting. In the seven sections of the thirty-three chapter book, the planning of resources, together with economic, area, and defense planning receive expert analysis by specialists closely connected with the respective fields. Particularly stimulating are the chapters by Theodore J. Kreps, "Planning Industrial Policies," and by William F. Ogburn, "Technology and Planning."

It seems to be the consensus of the twenty-eight contributors that it is no longer a question as to whether or not we as a nation shall plan; today it is a full grown dilemma as to how planning shall be implemented.

It is on this point that the book might have made a real step forward in the field of planning literature. Even though Mr. Galloway hinted at the point, no effort was made to develop any type of synthesis of the many diverse themes of planning. Instead, the book followed the now overworked pattern of presenting unrelated essays on separate topics.

In this connection, the section on "area planning" failed glaringly to develop adequately the potentialities of functional integration of national, state, and regional planning. Much of this section degenerated into a standardized and very unrevealing group of essays.

These comments should not be ascribed as much to the book as to the present stage of development in planning. The author set out to show the status of planning; this he does and in so doing makes his contribution. It is admittedly not fair, then, to criticize the reporter and his work if one does not feel satisfied with the state of affairs revealed.

Planning for America allows one to take stock of some of the glaring weaknesses in the field of planning. By such observation planners will perhaps be better able to find new impetus and direction for the development of planning as a social technique.

JOHN E. IVEY, JR.

University of North Carolina

POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES. By George B. Galloway. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942. 158 pp. \$0.60.

This work is a convenient handbook for all students of problems of postwar reconstruction. The body of the report describes the research on postwar problems now under way in 35 governmental agencies, 33 private agencies, 11 industrial and financial organizations, 16 trade associations, and 7 transportation agencies, arranged in alphabetical order. This is followed by a functional classification of fields and problems of planning, and a list of agencies operating in each field. There is also an interpretative introduction, and an excellent selected bibliography of recent literature on economic and social planning.

In summarizing general tendencies in the field, the report states,

Certain more or less common assumptions and objectives for the United States after the war are now taking shape. With few exceptions, a democratic victory is generally assumed and confidently expected. The possibility of an Axis victory enters hardly at all into the calculations of American postwar research.

The desirability of preserving the private enterprise system as the chief component in the American postwar economy is widely taken for granted by both public and private agencies, although there is some question whether private enterprise, alone and unaided, can create full employment and produce security and abundance for the masses.

The author points out that the list of organizations now actively engaged in research on postwar problems, especially in the private and commercial field, is far from complete, and promises revised

editions of *Postwar Planning in the United States* as additional information becomes available.

HOWARD E. JENSEN

Duke University

GEOPOLITICS. THE STRUGGLE FOR SPACE AND POWER. By Robert Strausz-Hupé. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942. 264 pp. \$2.75.

Herr Goebbels will be highly pleased when this book reaches his desk in the Wilhelmstrasse. It will prove to him that, due to our true and unlimited liberal attitude toward the individual right of expression, even during the present war, the treasures of Nazi ideology could be preserved, neatly organized, analyzed, and printed for widest distribution.

Geopolitics is a rather minute and exhaustingly monotonous account of the doings and writings of Karl Haushofer and his fellow-Nazis. Abundant quotations from old and new Nazi propaganda sources, often carefully put in italics, apparently are designed to perpetuate the maze of bombastic nonsense for and, perhaps, beyond the duration.

The saddest thing about the book is the author's obvious sincerity and good intention to present a report "on the state of the [German] Nation." He has done a stupendous amount of reading in order to compile this volume and, unfortunately enough, he has not been very successful in his various interpretations and translations.

One of the more outstanding mistakes in this direction is his apparent inability to submit a correct picture of the multitude of meanings contained in the German term "Raum" and its hundreds of combinations. Strausz-Hupé translates it by "space," giving it a predominantly territorial meaning, while "Raum" is used in Germany alternately for "region," "national sphere," "ideological empire," "living space," or "greater area."

Reviewing this book as a study in the newest discipline of the social sciences would imply a lowering of the standard of scientific writing that could hardly be justified. *Geopolitics* is pictured as it appears on the pages and maps of the National Socialistic "Cooperative for Geopolitics" and the "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik." Not one word is devoted to an attempt to discover the genuine value of the new movement as it undoubtedly is represented in the studies of the era between the turn of this century and the advent of the Nazis.

If there is one find in the book, it is the rescue

of a few forerunners of the German pre-Hitler group. Men like Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow ("the mad baron"), who wrote around the year 1800, Karl Ritter (born 1779), Friedrich Naumann or Paul Rohrbach are seldom known or read on this side of the ocean. Their contribution to the development of the expansionist ideology of Hitler and his henchmen deserves a note in the records—not more, though.

This reviewer admits the unusual fact that he was forced to stop reading *Geopolitics* on page 125: the remainder of the book cannot be good enough to excuse even the Introduction to the volume. May gentle oblivion cover this tragic mistake of an otherwise immaculate publisher.

HANS HAAS

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION: THE HISTORIAN'S PERSPECTIVE. Edited for the American Historical Association by J. D. Clarkson and T. C. Cochran. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 333 pp. \$3.50.

This collection of twenty-six essays was selected from papers read before the 1940 meeting of the American Historical Association. To those who are familiar with professional meetings let it quickly be said that despite this unpromising origin a number of the papers attain a high level of distinction. The date is of significance, however, for the full import of war had not by then been brought to the American mind. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage: the papers did not suffer from a self-imposed censorship as they probably would if written now, but neither did they gain that hard brilliance of outline and that directness of thrust that would characterize similar papers written since war ceased to be an "academic question."

In the volume the papers are divided into sections entitled "The Roots of War," "The Strategy and Conduct of War," "The Neutral and War," "War and Society," and "America and the Present War." Although excellent papers appear in each of these sections that entitled "The Roots of War" is overly ambitious and that called "The Neutral and War" is lacking in significance. In one case a large and complicated field is scarcely touched; in the other the experiences of the Scandinavian countries as neutrals has little application beyond themselves owing to their peculiar and unique circumstances.

In "War and Society" the key paper is by George E. Mowry who recounts the influences of the first World War upon democracy. This paper includes a critical response by Max Lerner. Taken together they constitute good statements of opposed yet typical attitudes toward the problem of war and its reactions upon democratic institutions.

The final section "America and the Present War" reaches and sustains the highest level of interest—perhaps in part through what has happened since 1940. The four authors strike a unity of outlook that is lacking elsewhere. Events have proved each to be realistic and prophetic. This circumstance gives these final essays a striking virility.

Though unequal in parts the volume as a whole is well edited, carefully planned, and competently written. It deserves, and will undoubtedly have, a wide reading within the profession. All of the papers—and this is to their credit—may be profitably studied by any one of curiosity. This is a good beginning in a necessary direction for there seems little doubt that in the future war must become an increasing consideration of those engaged in the social sciences.

JAMES L. GODFREY

University of North Carolina

THE RICE ECONOMY OF MONSOON ASIA. By V. D. Wickizer and M. K. Bennett. California: Food Research Institute, Stanford University. Published in cooperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941. 358 pp. \$3.50. Illustrated.

Technically, sociologists agree that the ecology and the economy of a people must be taken into consideration to understand the social aspects of their behavior. As yet, however, there are some regions of the earth and their populations about which some sociologists and other social scientists have generalized in recent years, without taking into account the basic conditions and implications of their economy. Recall, for instance, the almost ominous suggestions of imminent culture changes on a vast scale in the case of populations of east and southeast Asia—which have not materialized. In weighing such suggestions, it steadies one's perspective to say the least, to ground one's view in the historical facts and current trends of these peoples' economy and ecology.

Certainly this is true of the hundreds of millions of people whose livelihood is chiefly concerned with rice. Their numbers are indicated by the fact

that "roughly four out of five of the earth's inhabitants prefer and consume predominantly rice and wheat." The importance of rice to those growing and eating it, is indicated by the sober contention of the authors that it "probably looms larger in the daily lives of more people than does wheat." The chief area concerned is Monsoon Asia "where 95 per cent of all rice is produced and consumed"—from India to Japan. Fortunately, the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations who cooperated with the Food Research Institute of Stanford University in publishing this book is aware of the significance of such facts for current world relations.

The book is devoted to such subjects as consumption of rice, diet of the population concerned, agricultural methods, marketing, government control, and the problem of expansion of production to keep pace with population. In lieu of adequate statistical data on Monsoon Asia and the rice economy, the book explores such problems and presents a general orientation. While utilizing this introduction to the economics of the problem, sociologists can only hope that subsequent inquiries will explore intensively the cultural as well as the ecological patterns and trends represented by the huge population affected by this basic economy.

MAURICE T. PRICE

University of Illinois

CREATIVE FACTORS IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH. By Austin L. Porterfield. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1941. 282 pp. \$3.50.

This is the completest statement so far of Dr. Ellwood's theories of subjective factors in social research. It is characterized in the subtitle as "a Social Psychology of Scientific Knowledge Studying the Interplay of Psychological and Cultural Factors in Science with Emphasis upon the Imagination." I should say in addition that it is probably the best statement in existence of the research viewpoint of the Social-Interactionist school of social psychology, represented especially by the University of Chicago social psychologists, although there are many details in the argument with which they probably would not agree. As far as it goes, I can find little to criticize in it. It states ably one important aspect of the researcher's attack upon the application of science to the analysis and study of social situations, especially where intention and purpose—or even unconscious trends—in the minds of the adjusting

personalities have to be taken into account. In other words, it is a detailed and persistent appeal for the employment of insight and imaginative understanding of motives and other psychological determinants in the analysis of social phenomena. Who could possibly quarrel with such a purpose? The methods employed by the author in seeking to achieve this emphasis may sometimes be criticized at points easily discernible. It would be a waste of good space to enumerate such minor items here, especially since they are not especially numerous.

The real criticism of this book is the same as that to be made of the less tolerant critics of this work—its blindness to certain facts. For example, in Chapter II the author lists the "factors in the emergence and development of science in the social process" under seventeen headings (pp. 30-38). I agree with all of these and more. Number 11 reads: "Creative insight in interacting individual personalities who have had a part in the development of scientific principles has been dependent upon (1) wholeness of vision, (2) intimate participation as a part of a total situation, (3) dramatic imagination, especially in the realm of social relations, and (4) the possession of objectivity."

That is almost the total extent of the book's contribution to the methodology of objectivity in sociological analysis. Without denying in any sense the importance of the subjective factors, it must be recognized that the history of science in the sociological field as well as in all other fields has emphasized struggle for methods of obtaining and enforcing objectivity in analysis and constructive planning for social revision. To neglect an account of the development and nature of these methodological procedures of measurement and generalization is to ignore the soul of the science. Possibly the author is willing to admit all this and to rest his case on the declaration of intention to examine only the subjective factors and the non-quantitative approaches to objectivity. If so, his subtitle should not pretend to a complete "Social Psychology of Scientific Knowledge."

Because I believe that this book has made an important analysis of those more subjective and nonquantitative objective aspects of sociological investigation which Dr. Ellwood has long emphasized, I wish to say that I think those who would ignore these aspects of sociological methodology (as many now do) are as much to be criticized as

Professor Porterfield for his omissions. Worthwhile criticisms of artificial methods of quantitative measurement have recently been made by Nursell (*Harper's Magazine*), Herbert Blumer (*American Journal of Sociology*), and the present writer in his presidential address (1932), in an article some years back in the *Journal of Educational Sociology* and in the *American Journal of Sociology* (July, 1942). The constructive value of Porterfield's book is the great mass of material brought to bear from the lives of distinguished scientists and present studies to show the value of creative insight and imagination. We need to add to these presentations a strong insistence upon the fact that they are preliminary stages in research and must be checked and tested and corrected by quantitative measurement. But of course it is true that there must always be a mind back of the calculating machine to set its task and estimate the significance of its results.

The first part of the book is given over to a painstaking statement, with needless wealth of citations, of basic facts about the development of personality under cultural controls which every competent social psychologist now accepts. This part of the book, while sound, is somewhat trite and platitudinous, but possibly of use for the development of the last part in which Dr. Ellwood's theories are developed and illustrated with a wealth of detail which Dr. Ellwood himself never gave to them. Some may object to the needless controversial character of the book. Although I am perhaps the chief butt of the author's criticism, I am grateful to him for reproducing some of my sentences (with intent to condemn) which I think worthy of as wide an audience as he can give them. I should have valued his book more if he had exposed the cant of some of the small caliber defenders of obsolete platitudes which they utter so sententiously as to attract a modicum of attention to themselves and thus secure good positions from timid college presidents and approval from the amen corner of tradition miscalled science.

L. L. BERNARD

Washington University

SOCIAL CAUSATION. By R. M. MacIver. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1942. 414 pp. \$3.50.

Here is another volume devoted to fundamental problems of methodology to take its place in the growing series which has marked American Sociology during the past few years. Here, too, is the answer of a mature mind to the rampant

mathematics of Dodd and Lundberg, on the one hand, and to the cloisteral mysticism of Sorokin on the other.

MacIver does not deny the utility of mathematics as a tool of social science; he does object strenuously to the confusion of mathematical symbolism with the reality of social phenomena. Although he concludes that the investigation of social causes leads to realization of an intrinsic dynamic, which is constantly changing directions and intensity and which, therefore, is not susceptible to exact measurement, he does not seek refuge in extra-sensory perception, inspiration, revelation, or any other method based on faith alone. Rather, he says, "The problem (of causal investigation) is that of applying to the particular subject matter of the social sciences the universal formula of enquiry into causes" (p. 374), which he identifies as the comparative method. He insists that "... the phenomena with which the social sciences deal exhibit a special type of causal process differentiated in significant respects from the causality of external nature.... The primary contrast between social causation and the causation revealed in physical and in biological phenomena is that the former involves the socio-psychological nexus. This mode of causation is not an alternative to or substitute for the physical nexus but it introduces a new or additional process that supervenes within but does not abrogate the universal reign of physical law" (p. 371). This new or additional factor, of course, is the subjective evaluation of the situation by the actors. "In so far as we are able to discover the changes of the evaluative schemes of social groups we attain, and thus only, a unified explanation of social change. For then we can assign to the various factors of change their respective roles and functional relationships, as they cohere into specific patterns of the interdependent systems and orders that combine, in endlessly variant conjunctures, into the inclusive causal complex" (p. 374). This, he admits, is a task which can never be fulfilled with exactitude, or even with absolute certainty; but one which we must attempt if we would understand the world in which we must live; and one in which we are successful to the extent that we can, if we use common sense, both understand and predict with sufficient accuracy for most purposes.

Indeed, in the thinking of MacIver, exactitude may not be the primary consideration, since what we want to know more than *how much*, is *how*; and those who would reject the partial truths at which

we can now arrive are compared to those who would prefer total darkness to a dim candle.

It is here that he finds himself impatient with the sociological mathematicians and one school of operationalism:

The complete operationalist, according to Professor George Lundberg . . . defines his subject by his measurements or 'operations.' We are informed that this is the way physical science proceeds, but even here Professor Lundberg reduces a useful principle to an absurdity. . . . Professor Lundberg applauds the definition of intelligence as that which the intelligence tests test. Is it unreasonable, then, to ask, 'Very well, but what is that?' Presumably the testers have some notion of what they are testing when they construct their tests. Presumably some tests are better than others for the purpose they have in mind, though all tests are equally good for testing 'that which they test.' Of course, if the testers were to come out and say, 'We are not measuring intelligence, but only that which we measure,' nobody would object and nobody would care. Every different test would measure a different *that which*, and there would be as many objects of research as there were variant researchers, and the more they differed the less they could possibly disagree and everything would be perfectly 'objective' and perfectly meaningless.

If we find our available methods inexact, we should not give up the problem, but use the best approximations we can devise and revise them as we see opportunity.

In so doing we proceed on the common-sense assumption expressly and dogmatically rejected in the metaphysics of Professor Lundberg, that a phenomenon can be recognized and approximately identified before we set about to investigate its nature or in any sense to 'measure' it (pp. 157-158).

MacIver would probably be the first to deny that here is *the* final answer to the problem of methodology in the social sciences. Certainly it is to be hoped that better statements will be presented in the future. And this seems the more likely because of the preoccupation of some of the best minds in the field with this problem. But here is a temperate, well reasoned, logical statement of the problem and some clear indications of the paths along which we must search if we are to discover any final solution.

HARRY ESTILL MOORE

The University of Texas

PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY. By Eliot Dismore Chapple and Carleton Stevens Coon. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1942. 718 pp. \$3.75. Maps and Charts.

The title of this book is clearly misleading in that it gives the impression that the authors have covered the entire field of anthropology. This they have not done, unless we are to accept their definition of anthropology as "a natural science concerned with the study of human relations" (p. 695) as adequately covering the totality of anthropological research and teaching.

Human relations, or the way in which human beings affect each other, and the adaptation of individuals to their environment are considered by the authors to be responsible for building up man's institutions and providing the details of his culture. In Part I of the book they deal with man's physiological make-up and how these characteristics condition his interactions both with the human and the nonhuman environment. Part II deals with terrestrial environments and the technologies of peoples; the latter being described particularly in terms of the necessary interactions they may bring about between individuals. The development of institutions—defined as aggregates of individuals interacting with each other at a higher frequency than with anyone else outside the system and organized in accordance with their behavior in group events—is discussed in Part III. And in Parts IV and V may be found a discussion of symbols and the part they play in human relations.

"Throughout the work there is an emphasis on the dynamic aspects of human relations."¹ Change in culture is described in terms of disturbances in the equilibria of societies and their constituent institutions which are severe enough to require the reestablishment of an equilibrium at a different level. The point of view employed, according to the authors themselves, represents a modification of that of the so-called functionalists—Radcliffe Brown, Malinowski, and Warner—in the direction of an insistence "on operational procedures and the use of time as the measure of human relations" (page v).

The book will undoubtedly serve as a useful text in courses designed to introduce students to the study of human society, particularly when the emphasis is laid on the development of general principles of human behavior. Courses more general than this, requiring training in the problems of culture history as well, will not find the

book as useful. There is, for example, no discussion of such topics as invention, diffusion, the culture and age areas, and other aspects of culture history.

The limits of this review prevent any exhaustive criticism of the basic approach employed by the authors. It should be mentioned, however, that much of the analysis of cultural data appears, to this reviewer at least, somewhat oversimplified. To take only one example, political institutions are defined as aggregates of individuals, not institutionally linked in any other way, who habitually respond to a leader in group or set events directed against other similarly constituted aggregates. A leader is one "who has formed the habit of originating action in set events and to whom others have formed the habit of responding" (p. 331). The leader must condition his followers to respond to him by originating action as often and as continuously as he can; otherwise his leadership will fail and another, more capable of sustained activity of this sort, will take over. All of this may be quite true but it may be pointed out as well that factors in the leader's history will play as important a role as his ability to originate action. In many Plains Indian societies, for example, it is evident that a person who has little or no status in terms of war honors and wealth (which are not necessarily a result of an ability to lead) will receive no attention from others regardless of his ability to originate in set events.

On the positive side, however, it may be said that the authors have taken great pains to make their theoretical bias clear and to make a sharp distinction between the actual facts and their interpretations of the facts. This quality, rare enough in elementary texts, makes the book useful even to those who do not accept the authors' theoretical position in its entirety.

HARRY HOIJER

University of California

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY: A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF MAN'S ADJUSTMENT TO HIS WORLD. By L. L. Bernard. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942. 1041 pp. \$3.75.

The subtitle of this substantial volume is more descriptive of its content than the title. Bernard's chief emphasis is on man's adjustment to both his natural and social environments. Sociology is regarded as "the science which provides the members of human society with the knowledge most

essential to an effective adjustment" (p. 7). Three aspects of this adjustment are stressed: (1) the development of social processes and institutions, (2) the factors—physical, biological, psychological, and cultural—which have produced and are still modifying human society, and (3) a cross-section view of present-day society. The first of these aspects is discussed in part one; the second in parts two to five; the third in part six, "Social Organization and Control." Entire chapters are almost purely physical anthropology, geography, biology, psychology, political science, economics, or philosophy. Since it is a liberal education to read a well-worked-out book of such broad scope, this treatise is suitable for use as a textbook in a small college orientation course. Its frequent and enlightening use of Biblical material—the interpretation of Solomon's riches in terms of the trade route through his kingdom (p. 253), or the story of how the twelve tribes of Israel became a national state (pp. 136–139), for example—will appeal to many progressive Christians. Bernard's frank interest in social reform together with the conclusion on his final page that "ideals are as important as knowledge in social control" will also have a wide appeal.

Part one includes eight of the forty-one chapters: the physical history of mankind, early cultural history of man, the evolution of the human economies, the evolution of the family and of marriage, the development of religion, the growth of social organization, the development of political and social policies, man's thought about himself and his society. Both the wide reach of the book and the emphasis on the evolutionary approach may be seen in these topics. The family and marriage chapter was of special interest to the reviewer and will be taken as an example. As in many other chapters, not only in this section but throughout the book, the discussion begins with "prehuman origins." "Many of the family habits of the simians and anthropoids are strikingly similar to those of human beings" (p. 83), writes Bernard. By way of illustration, he describes a monkey-cage scene observed by him. A young monkey twisted his papa's tail and was "slapped resoundingly." The mama monkey jumped about angrily, her naughty darling clasped to her breast, but was afraid to retaliate. The papa monkey held his peace. Although this behavior seems very human, one can hardly agree with the statement: "Even among the simians and the anthropoids, the

family is primarily a social institution superimposed upon necessary biological functions and relationships" (p. 84). Bernard's own definition of an institution as "a relatively stable form of social organization with its roots in the past and its chief present emphasis upon securing behavior conformity (control) to the culture patterns which it embodies or represents" (p. 877) refutes this idea.

Later in the same chapter Bernard describes very clearly the three major forms which the family has taken in its evolution—maternal, paternal, and equalitarian. Since he emphasizes the adjustment of institutions to changing situations it would have been logical to have given some attention to Frazier's outstanding analysis in *The Negro Family in the United States*. Frazier shows how "the house of the mother," which was characteristic of the reconstruction period, shifts to "the house of the father," and finally, in the brown urban middle classes, to the equalitarian family, in response to changed conditions. Frazier's scholarly contribution is not mentioned anywhere in Bernard's text.

In the second aspect of the book—factors in social change—it seems to the reviewer that the discussion of physical factors and processes is the best part. In general the analysis of biological, psychological and cultural factors seems to lack the flowing, readable, convincing style of the first two parts. The discussion of the Malthusian principle (pp. 402–19), of the unfavorable natural and cultural selection occasioned by war (pp. 463–67), and of cultural areas in the Americas and Africa (pp. 772–795) are exceptions to this general reaction. Chapter eleven, "The Geographic Factors in Social Change" interested the reviewer especially. Here the influence of the chief physiographic factors on the form and functioning of society are discussed. After centuries of isolation, Japan's quicker readjustment to outside culture, as compared with China, is accounted for by the fact that she has more than twenty times the number of seaports in proportion to population. The concept, "off-the-main-road" peoples, is effectively applied to parts of Mexico. The frequent mention of Latin America in the first two parts of the book is, in fact, a wholesome antidote to North American provincialism.

One looks in vain through this chapter on geographic factors and indeed through the book as a whole for any significant discussion of ecological concepts or processes. The location and growth of towns and cities is discussed in terms of breaks in transportation, junctions of rivers, marked bends

in rivers, bends in land transportation, centralness of location, mountain passes and mountain barriers. Granting the importance of these factors for the explanation of the location of towns, for analysis of city growth, some attention should have been given to such helpful ecological terms as invasion and succession. Not only are these ideas not used but such outstanding students of human ecology as Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and the late R. D. McKenzie are not anywhere mentioned.

Part six includes excellent chapters on "The Group Structure of Society," "Institutions and Institutionalization," "Transitory Forms of Social Organization," "Methods of Directing Social Change," and "Social Control Through Political Organization." In his discussion of fashion as a transitory form of social organization (pp. 904–915) he seems to thoroughly enjoy himself. "The feminine hat has lost practically all its utility except that of advertising the wearer," he writes. "In order to better perform its function of calling attention to the face and head of the owner, it is sometimes hung over one eye or ear, is set on the back of the head, or made into a canopy in front or an umbrella resting on the head, or is stuck in a fold of hair," (p. 913).

One hundred and six pictures add much to the book. Unfortunately they are not very well integrated with the text and are often placed at some distance from the pages where they are discussed. The picture of the Mexican palm leaf raincoat is located opposite page 819 and is discussed on page 250. The exchange of titles for figures 75 and 76 is a minor point. The omission of any index to the pictures suggests that they were a last minute addition.

Using Reuter's 1941 list of "the principal terms used in present-day sociological literature" (*Handbook of Sociology*, pp. 76–170) 105 terms were clearly included in Bernard's subject index or significantly discussed in his book and 135 terms were not. Since this subject index is not too complete there were a number of additional terms about which the reviewer was uncertain. Some of the more important terms either omitted or not discussed significantly are: social attitudes, collective behavior, case study, compensation (Freud's name is on Bernard's taboo list), consensus, social contagion, cultural lag, definition of the situation, universe of discourse, personal and social disorganization, social distance, feral men, folk, the gang, identification, in-group, social interaction,

looking-glass self, social mobility (Sorokin is not mentioned), natural area, neighborhood, human nature, social organism, out-group, segregation, stereotypes, sublimation, wish.

With so many omissions of important sociological ideas, this text, interesting as it is, cannot be recommended as an adequate introduction to sociology.

NORMAN S. HAYNER

University of Washington

NATION AND FAMILY. By Alva Myrdal. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941. 441 pp. \$4.00.

The discussion of policy has long been one of the weak spots of population analysis. This weakness has now been remedied by this splendid case study of the work of the Swedish Population Commission. Whether or not the statutes of Sweden's famous *Mother's and Children's Riksdag* are ever put into effect, Alva Myrdal's book bids fair to become the classic treatment of population policy in English. It represents the liberal-democratic approach to the threat of depopulation, a threat which had somehow been made the special province of reactionary politicians and puritanical moralists. In a remarkable study of tactics the volume shows how liberal forces in Sweden turned this threat into an argument for an integrated New Deal in the social services.

Nation and Family will surprise most sociologists by the way in which it integrates the diverse fields of family sociology, child and public welfare, the sex problem, and population analysis with economics and government. The Swedish example shows the extent to which the determination of national policy around population serves to integrate conflicting social values and interests. Thus agricultural and housing subsidies along with public health were to be integrated in the national budget under population policy. This is the significance of the title, *Nation and Family*—itself a masterpiece. To the author this integration begins with the unity of social values and social research; that is, research is done under the assumption of certain value premises basic to social policy rather than for the sake of disinterested fact-finding as in America. Thus the work is also political in the grand sense of tactics and strategy as well as in its sense of public administration of a public policy.

Comparisons between Sweden and the United States are kept to the foreground throughout. A

unified population policy is hardly possible unless a nation is convinced that it is facing depopulation—a fact not yet true of America. In contrast to the United States where marriage is widespread, Sweden has the task of increasing the popularity of marriage and reducing the incidence of illegitimacy at the same time it raises fertility. Relaxation of restrictions on contraception are to accompany planned rises in the birthrate and living standards of large families are to be increased by payments in kind rather than in cash as in our social security program. By implication, several pertinent criticisms of the New Deal program are evident.

In spite of the fact that the Swedish program represents the liberal-democratic approach to depopulation that we would all like to envisage, it is possible to point out that this approach represents a desperate attempt on the part of our Western Culture to have our cake and eat it too. Nothing is to be given up—neither contraception, urbanization, industrialization, individualistic striving for higher standards of living, employment of married women, not even higher taxes—and yet we are to reverse the trends toward depopulation that these culture complexes have brought. Contraception is to be disseminated, illegitimacy is to be reduced and yet the birth rate is to be raised some thirty to forty percent. Such reversal of declining fertility has not yet been accomplished anywhere outside of Germany; and many feel that the German increases were due to reemployment and thus transitory.

The older motivations to population replacement were religious and nationalistic—not in terms of social security. The Myrdals do not care to make use of either of these emotional sanctions of social values. In times of stress it may be that Mrs. Myrdal, for all her emphasis on value premises, has failed to utilize the strong emotional motivation toward national survival. The first duty of a nation is to survive; failing that, nothing else matters. Once families thought as much of perpetuating their name and stock as they did of attaining a given standard of living. Patriotism may come in time to rank with social security as one of the values of a beleaguered society. To the interests that prompt the collective state to look after the welfare of its citizens may be joined the desire of the population to maintain its stock, its culture, and its national identity strong enough to ensure replacements. So far as we know that

has not yet come to pass in Sweden—nor in most of Western culture.

RUPERT B. VANCE

Louisiana State University

AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE CHANGING WORLD. By C. H. Pegg and others. New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1942. 601 pp. \$3.50.

SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION: A Textbook in Educational Sociology. By Joseph S. Roucek and Associates. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942. 771 pp. \$3.75.

American Society and the Changing World.—This symposium registers the passing of "isolationism" from American social science. "It is clear that the problems of American Society are so powerfully conditioned by the facts and forces of world life that they cannot be realistically treated except in terms of what is happening in Europe, the Far East, and Latin America." The ever-tightening bonds of world interdependence are outlined in the first chapter, exemplified in subsequent discussion, and their implications for an American society in a changing world summarized in the closing chapter. With the Changing World as the framework of Part I, the eleven chapters by the various authors review the economic, social, and political trends from the First to the Second World War in Russia, Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Far East, and Latin America. Part II, which in itself is practically a textbook on current American history and social problems, includes topics which would ordinarily fall under political science, economic, and sociological headings. Specific problems reviewed include American government, foreign policy, propaganda, conservation, agriculture, business, the consumer, the labor movement, unemployment, social security, the family, crime, the ethnic problem, and population. Missing from the list are such problems as recreation, education, and religion.

Despite the title of the book, the authors have not fully realized their purpose of treating American society in terms of or as a part of "a dynamic interdependent world." One does not get a very strong impression of the reciprocal economic, cultural, and ideological impact of America and the rest of world society. Although the purpose is to describe rather than prescribe, a review of recent trends in social and international planning would have appealed to the current "run of attention" in college social science courses. The book

is well written. The tone is liberal. Suggested readings are listed at the end of each chapter.

Sociological Foundations of Education.—"Educational sociology is a subject that seeks to determine the sociological relationships of all types of human activities and institutions to organized educational efforts." It is to be distinguished from the sociology of education which studies education "in the light of a social situation" but does not attempt to do anything for education.

Its scope, premises, present problems, and objectives are outlined in the opening essay entitled "The Essence of Educational Sociology." Both sociology and education are interested in the same social order. The former examines its structure and functionings, the latter "attempts to enlighten and improve this same order." Sociology shows "what is" and within the bounds of "what is" education promotes "what ought to be." Education with a sociological approach, then, is an active social control process which transmits selected portions of culture and seeks to direct change in desirable directions. As a special field, educational sociology includes not only formal education but all "non-school educative agencies that can be analyzed sociologically."

Part I on "Basic Elements in Social and Educational Processes" contains ten chapters dealing with the family, the school, informal groups, the community, culture, the socialization process, and the social role and function of the teacher. Part II, called "Education and Social Control," contains twenty chapters covering the educational aspects of as many social agencies and processes: recreation, civic, adult, religious, marriage education, motion pictures, radio, propaganda, vocational guidance, race conflict, and campus society. The book closes with two chapters on some theoretical implications of educational sociology.

The chief weakness of the textbook is the lack of a unifying framework. To be established as a subject in its own right, educational sociology needs greater systematization than is achieved here (or than is possible in the symposium method of textbook writing). Almost every chapter of Part I devotes considerable space to establishing its own sociological framework with the result that discussions of elementary terms and concepts—culture, human nature, community, family, etc.—become very repetitious. Most of the chapters, as individual contributions, are effectively done. And one cannot miss the underlying argument for

an educational program in which social knowledge shall play a major role.

FREDERICK B. PARKER

Bucknell University

SEX FULFILLMENT IN MARRIAGE. By Ernest R. Groves, Gladys Hoagland Groves, and Catherine Groves. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1942. 319 pp. \$3.00.

No more propitious time could have been chosen by the Groves to write and offer the reading public their fine work on *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage*. In these days when the marriage rate is increasing by leaps and bounds as our young people face separation for indefinite periods, when the problem of prostitution is the headache of every military and civilian administrator, when the birthrate has gone higher than at any time in a decade, these three persons, out of their own personal family adjustments and their scientific knowledge and human understanding, have offered an answer to each of these pressing social, no less than individual, problems. Whether or not the Groves planned *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage* as a guide book to war marriage, war sex problems, and war paternity—as their contribution to the war effort—it is certainly that.

If the Groves, husband, wife, and daughter, have made one outstanding contribution to literature on sex, marriage, and the family it has been through their insistence that these vital elements of our lives should be treated as normal. Their case material, their philosophy, their use of scientific data, all stress and lend weight to the capacity of human beings to live normally in the family relationship, no matter whether it is in sex fellowship, in paternity, in everyday work and play.

In these days of emotional tension, of insecurity, of urge to not miss the experience of marriage, every young person considering such a step should have his or her three or four unbroken hours of quiet with *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage*. If this were possible to attain, many marriages contemplated would be delayed a little longer to be sure there was more in the demand for marriage than physical passion aroused out of unusual tension, excitement and circumstance. These young folk would have a guide for judgment as to whether their contemplated relationship had in it elements which will make possible "Marriage in the best sense of the word . . . the living together of a man and woman who have consolidated affection with sex in all its aspects. It is this enriching of the

relationship with love that makes the difference between a home that actually constitutes merely a place where sex intercourse can be carried on with privacy and a home where intimacy ranges over the entire field of human living," p. 304.

And if the young men in army and navy concentrations throughout the country, shutoff in the main from normal living within the family and community, would read and take heed of the scientific fact of the little in satisfaction prostitution offers plus the very real dangers to *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage* in bad sex habits thus established, there would be less need for preaching and prohibition.

The Groves, may it be said to their eternal credit, never preach. They offer scientific information and good common sense analysis of every phase of sex relationship from the effect of childhood inhibitions and fears arising out of unhappy experiences with other children and adults to an excellent discussion of pregnancy and childbirth, birth control, and the larger meaning of sex.

Their simple statement of questions each person contemplating marriage should ask himself and attempt to answer honestly are of inestimable value and will save many a heartache after marriage, no less for the woman than for the man. So, too, is the information clearly and simply given, with all the restraint of good taste and scientific objectivity, on courtship, on starting marriage, on the sex roles of husband and wife, and on the common problems of marriage.

Mention must be made likewise of the treatment of sex hygiene, birth control, pregnancy and childbirth. This material makes *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage* a book of equal importance for the married as well as the to-be-married. Nor are these the only facts that recommend the volume to the married. Through the unemotional treatment of all the aspects of sex relationship, there are definite leads out of marriage problems that may have already developed.

Dr. Robert A. Ross, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the School of Medicine, Duke University, has given a clever blessing by a medical man to the efforts of the sociologists in his field of specialization.

Dr. Robert L. Dickinson, past president of the American Gynecological Society, has added much to the effectiveness of the book by his excellent illustrations of sexual organs of both men and women. These will go far in answering physio-

logical questions of the uninformed or the misinformed.

The Groves have written their book "to give as clearly and in as practical a form as possible information about the sex side of marriage." They have written for everybody—those married or those contemplating marriage and for those who will never marry. Out of a careful reading of *Sex Fulfillment in Marriage*, written in its simple, unacademic style for unacademic or academic people, ought to come a better understanding of a still too-often misunderstood part of everyday living.

BERNICE MILBURN MOORE

Austin, Texas

✓ *FAMILY BEHAVIOR. A STUDY OF HUMAN RELATIONS.* Second edition, revised. By Bess V. Cunningham. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1941. 527 pp. \$3.00.

This edition of *Family Behavior* continues the distinctive presentation of family problems which characterized the first edition published in 1936, but its present content has been influenced by recent social and international changes, and a new chapter has been added dealing with the historical background of the family. The book presents four points of view: orientation, the social setting, old problems and new settings, and the nurture of personality. It features the social environment as it affects family life, a point of view the following chapter titles disclose: "Neighbors," "More Neighbors," "Common Community Forces," "Working and Sharing Income," "Using Leisure," and "Adjusting to Community Life." This aspect of family relationship is frequently neglected in college texts. The part of the book dealing with the nurture of personality discusses the common human wants that find expression in family life, parenthood as a career, the comradeship of children and their parents, and the problem of growing up, including the adolescent's looking for a mate. The final chapter considers the family life of the future. The discussions of each chapter are reinforced by an excellent choice of references and material for class discussion. The book is adapted to students of college age. It is an interesting, practical, insight-giving interpretation of the social problems of American family life.

ERNEST R. GROVES

University of North Carolina

MILLHANDS AND PREACHERS. A STUDY OF GASTONIA. By Liston Pope. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. 369 pp. \$4.00.

The old South perished for lack of machines. Slavery shut out steam, public schools, and hardy immigrants from Europe. As a result, though steam was applied to textile mills in England in 1785, the South was a century late in building cotton mills. They were welcomed with religious fervor. The smoke stack was the symbol of social progress in Greensboro or Charlotte.

The pity is that the South repeated all of the mistakes of England as regards child labor, long hours, low wages, night work for women, and in general paternalism, that had marked the course of the cotton mills for a century. As we started late, we should have profited by the social gains through the experience of England during a hundred years. We blundered as beginners.

This is the thesis of the able book, *Millhands and Preachers*, by Liston Pope. He is a native of North Carolina and at present a teacher of social ethics in the Yale Divinity School. For his researches into the relation of churches and cotton mills, he was fortunate in singling out Gastonia, the most typical textile community in the South. In 1880 Gaston County contained 5 mills, in 1930, it had 102 mills. The churches grew in membership and wealth as the mills developed.

Industrialization brought new opportunities and new problems. Cheap labor was the magnet that drew the mills to the cotton fields. Both social progress and evils resulted. The excellence of Mr. Pope's treatment of this conflict of forces lies in the balance of his judgment and the thoroughness of his researches. The volume is a model of investigation at firsthand on the field as well as into the literature on the subject of the industrial South. Pope's temper throughout these exciting human issues is judicial and his style is clear, straightforward, and forceful.

"Part of the unwillingness of Gaston County ministers to criticize or attempt regulation of the textile industry roots in their lack of knowledge of economic and social affairs." In this conclusion Mr. Pope points to the necessity of a change in the training of men destined to lead in our churches. Divinity schools have had their theological period, and their missionary period. Has not the time come for them to become social in outlook? Highly emotional sects are capturing the millhands from whom the regular churches are divorced

through lack of knowledge of the hard facts of the workers' lives. Pope quotes to this effect: "The Methodists and Baptists used to care for the ignorant; the Holy Rollers do now, and the Methodists and Baptists are left floundering, wondering what to do."

Pope's treatment of the factors, economic, social, and especially religious, heads up in his brilliant account of the Loray strike, which drew national attention. "Gastonia was a stronghold, relatively isolated and undisturbed, of paternalistic capitalism" is the author's summary of the background of the strike.

The secretary of the Gastonia Chamber of Commerce wrote in December 1928 in answer to an inquiry: "Wages in Gastonia range from 18 cents to 20 cents and 30 cents [an hour] for skilled workers. Children from 14 to 18 years of age commonly work 11 hours a day. Females under 16 are not allowed to work at night." Such the plight!

The Loray strike began in April 1929, as if to ring up the curtain for capitalism's greatest tragedy in the Wall Street crash of the following October. The cause of the strike was the general condition in the mill village—low wages, long hours, company houses, etc. The occasion was the "stretchout" system enforced by an efficient superintendent sent down by the absentee owners in New England. The pretext put forward by the mill management was that the strike was political and aimed at the overthrow of government.

The Loray strike proved disastrous to all parties concerned—workers, mills, churches, community and State. Pope quotes the summary of a North Carolina newspaperman: "In every case where strikers were put on trial strikers were convicted; in not one case where anti-unionists or officers were accused has there been a conviction." The author adds: "The trial of the Gastonia defendants turned into a heresy trial," though a reporter remarked that "God and Karl Marx are not to be tried."

The Wall Street crash eclipsed the courts. Relief finally came to the aggrieved situation in Southern cotton mills by the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Cooperation between government and business won the day.

Liston Pope has recorded a sad but instructive phase of the progress of industry in the South.

SAMUEL CHILES MITCHELL
University of Richmond

SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW. By Roscoe Pound. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. 138 pp. \$2.00.

Dean Pound is here engaged in a statement of the ideal foundations of law in such a fashion as to justify them from a practical viewpoint by showing their relation to the actualities of social control. Social control operates in a current institutional framework and reflects the dominant traditions, forces and interests of the times. Modern history has been an era in which law has been the paramount agency of social control as distinguished from family, kin-group and relation. More recent history has emphasized the characteristic of force as being the primary quality of law—some going so far as to identify political force and law.

Dean Pound sees the issue as the universal problem of individual freedom versus collective action. This problem is insoluble in the sense that a solution resolves all conflicts. The nearest possible approach to solution is one of compromise in which a relatively stable balance between individual interests and collective interests is achieved. The stability of such a balance depends on its relation to current tradition and dominating needs. In many ways, modern law, as Dean Pound illustrates at many points, has successfully achieved a compromise of individual-group relations. On a broad front, however, a stable balance has not been reached.

The book is composed of four lectures: "Civilization and Social Control, What is Law, The Task of Law, and The Problem of Values, given as the Powell Lectures on Philosophy at Indiana University. The lectures are stimulating idealistically—perhaps even a little too optimistic. The ideas advanced, especially the discussion of what law is, would have been strengthened by a deeper exploration of the relation of civil law to that type of natural law studied in the biological sciences and to some extent in sociology. A synthesis of cause-effect and means-end analyses relative to civil law might be productive of useful and even novel results. Hints appear in Dean Pound's exposition but are not developed.

HARVEY PINNEY

New York University

CRIMINOLOGY. By Donald Taft. New York, 1942. The Macmillan Co. 708 pp. \$4.50.

Twenty-odd years of experience in the field of criminology are represented in the background of

this work. This is apparent in the maturity of the grasp with which Professor Taft handles his material. His approach to the problem is logically calm and broad, and yet dynamic.

Against a backdrop of the highly competitive culture of the United States, Taft employs a deterministic thesis regarding the appearance of crime and criminals. The indictment made against our culture is severe, but quite sound. The criminal is shown as a definite product of this culture. In fact, every person is shown to be a product of this culture—whether he be morally good or bad. It follows that, given the antecedent factors, abnormal behavior is the only possible kind of behavior for certain personalities. The responsibility for such behavior is not personal, but is social. Taft sees little hope for combining the various factors of crime into a single successful theory of crime. He says: "Strictly speaking every criminal's history is unique. Yet for practical purposes we may distinguish approximately similar combinations of experiences which account for much of crime" (p. 290).

The book itself is divided into five sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Explanation of Crime; (3) Treatment of Adult Criminals; (4) Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency and Crime Prevention, and (5) Wider Implications of Crime. Some of the chapters deserve special praise. The discussion of the various types of racketeering in the chapter on Organized Crime is especially good. Contemporary racketeering in the field of labor is extremely well handled. Mention should also be made of the excellent chapters on Alcohol and Drug Addiction, Sex Delinquency, and Religion. The material on crime prevention also deserves note.

The mechanics of the book are fine. Good style is supplemented by a small number of illustrations. Boldface subject headings within the chapters prevent monotony of the printed page and at the same time categorize the material efficiently and simply.

This reviewer cannot agree with some of the predictive items in the chapter on Experimental New Penology. This, however, is of little importance in the final reaction to the purpose and content of this book. This is a fine piece of work and a definite contribution to the understanding of the problem of crime. Its one disadvantage

may be its cost, which may curtail the wide distribution that the text deserves.

GEORGE K. BROWN

St. Lawrence University

ORDER AND POSSIBILITY IN SOCIAL LIFE. By Douglas G. Haring and Mary E. Johnson. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1940. 772 pp.

This volume is rooted in a study of anthropology. The first of the six books consists of a description of the social life of nine different peoples as illustrative of the diversity of human customs and standards. The conclusion is reached that men are alike as living organisms but differ greatly in behavior and conduct. This is a fundamental distinction, one with most far-reaching implications. It implies that there is no one normal, essential, inevitable social form and structure toward which evolution or rational thinking are leading us. There is no necessary, or inevitable or preferable way of life the attainment of which is to be visualized as the great social objective.

Men should be free to create forms of social organization as they create works of art; and the mass of men who are not creative but imitative should be free to approve or appreciate the institutions of their choice just as people will have personal preferences for the works of particular poets, novelists, dramatists, painters, or sculptors.

Another implication of the work is the necessity of social tolerance. People must not attempt to magnify their way of life by rationalization, propaganda, or by economic or military pressures. We must recognize the fact of change and variety in the field of social organization as well as in the field of individual artistic creation. The opposite of this analysis, the typical or conventional attitude of most thinkers, scholars, and political leaders, is in the reviewer's opinion, both erroneous and tragic. The attempt to think social life through to one true or essential order, leads not only to overemphasize order in social life at the expense of possibility, but to religious strife, nationalism, and the horror and brutality of total world war. The achievement of analysis by Haring and Johnson deserves much more, in the reviewer's opinion, than a mild, remote and academic approval.

Since no generalizations as to trends or comparative values in the field of social form and structure emerge from the anthropological studies, the authors turn to more inclusive inquiries: what is the nature of social phenomena, and what is

human nature? They attempt to reorient the problem by taking into account "the whole range of data pertinent to human existence; man as a living organism, man in relation to other living things, man in relation to geographic environment, man as a person who thinks and plans—all phenomena involving human beings and their activities, concerning which research can afford knowledge." In other words, the authors attempt to establish a broad basis for scientific induction by summarizing the contribution of basic sciences such as biology, physiology, neurology, and biochemistry. The method is impersonal and objective, and the outlook is purely monistic.

The final studies of social life which are reached through this reorientation through the more exact sciences deal with material from psychology, sociology, economics, and political science. Here is the field for opinions and valuations. The authors, however, are cautious and impersonal in describing trends and in formulating generalizations about human objectives, limitations, and possibilities. While the first part of the work is purely descriptive, the latter part abounds in generalizations, many of which illuminate vital current social problems, and are consistent with the basic studies of anthropology and the other sciences.

If sociology is conceived as a synthesis of the social sciences, it is evident that this book is something more than sociology.

As a textbook the work has limitations. It would require on the part of the instructor a wide range of training, broad intellectual interests, extensive reading, and the mastery of a number of technical vocabularies, all of which would make it difficult for one who had specialized in research in a narrow field. Also, because of the nature of the material of the book, the style is abstract and technical; yet there are many passages of great literary charm and distinction. For the curious and ambitious student, who is impatient with fictions, rationalization, and propaganda, and who wants to learn with the least waste of effort as much as he can about himself and the world, the reviewer would recommend this book as a valuable text.

Because of its broad basis for induction, its scientific attitude, its monistic approach, its counsels of tolerance, its explanation of the bases and conditions of human freedom, and its illumi-

nating judgments, the reviewer is inclined to rate this book as one of the outstanding contributions to social science of the past decade.

HARVEY W. PECK

Syracuse University

SOCIAL LEARNING AND IMITATION. By Neal E. Miller and John Dollard. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. 341 pp. \$3.50.

Where Tarde emphasized the importance of imitation in social life and indicated the role of culture in determining human behavior, this work presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the socio-psychological mechanism of the imitative process. Joint attack is made by psychology and sociology on a specific research problem. It is written for both psychologists and sociologists, and the attempt has been made to avoid use of difficult technical terms in so far as possible.

Briefly summarized, the book develops a reinforcement theory of learning which gives due weight to the significance of social conditioning and on the basis of this develops a systematic theory of imitative behavior. Recent controlled experiments with rats and children are reported for the first time. The last several chapters on crowd behavior and diffusion of culture, while helpful summaries, fail to present anything new to sociologists.

Appendices include a helpful, critical summary of theories of learning developed by more than 40 social scientists from Aristotle and Bagehot to Thorndike and the Murpheys. Theories are roughly classified as being of the instinctivist, associationist, or reinforcement types. This is followed by a chronological review of experimental work on imitative behavior with both animals and children.

Parts of the book are of interest to educators. The emphasis placed upon the importance of rewards in the learning process should hold meaning for those who, in their haste to eliminate extrinsic goals such as grades or prizes, have sometimes not succeeded in providing suitable substitutes of an intrinsic nature. In newer educational techniques, where group activity is stressed, the approach to social learning here presented will be thought provoking.

GORDON W. BLACKWELL

University of North Carolina

RADIO'S LISTENING GROUPS: THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN. By Frank Ernest Hill and W. E. Williams. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 257 pp. \$2.75.

The anatomy of group listening as both a spontaneous and a formally organized and directed phenomenon of radio communication is the subject of this joint study by an American and an Englishman, with separate emphasis, naturally enough, on their separate countries, though both are in line with studies of the spread of adult education.

Mr. Hill finds two types of subjects which "have attracted rather sharply defined groups: public affairs and family life problems." But group listening, whether informal or elaborately organized and "registered," does not by any means stop there; it is a never-ending process which can find as its catalyst almost any sort of program ranging from a World Series baseball broadcast to the most weighty discussions of profundities under the auspices of the Chicago Round Table.

Though in the words of Mr. Williams "group listening, unlike other types of adult education, has to be continually bolstered up," and goes on to speak, perhaps only half seriously, of "tireless injections of publicity, bribes, bursaries for Group Leaders to attend training courses" and so on, both he and co-author Hill find group listening more than passably successful as a stimulating and worth-while project of mass adult education particularly.

Combing the field with tireless documentation they examine some scores of programs—of all types both entertaining and informative, as well as combinations—and offer detailed analyses of their respective popularity. Mr. Williams, in discussing the importance with which the English regard school broadcasting, finds that the War has brought a certain dislocation of group broadcasting activities, but finds that "school broadcasting is being used quite as much in war-time as it was before." It gives the reader a shock to read of group broadcasting and popular discussion programs that existed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and so on down the forlorn roll of those countries in which free discussion and untrammelled communication are now regarded only as anachronisms.

ROBERT M. HODGES

Washington and Lee University

EDUCATE A WOMAN: FIFTY YEARS OF LIFE AT THE WOMAN'S COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH

CAROLINA. Edited by Virginia Terrell Lathrop. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1942. 111 pp. \$3.00. Photographs.

Written in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Woman's College of the University of North Carolina and dedicated to "the education of children everywhere," this volume gives a pictorial account of student life at the first state institution for the higher education of women "during the fifty years since it was reluctantly established by the State of North Carolina as the State Normal and Industrial School." The book is an interesting study in social change, depicting changes in curriculum, style of dress, student activities, and physical equipment of the campus from the fall that the first 176 students arrived at "the Normal" until 1941-42 when over 2,200 students registered at one of the largest women's colleges in the United States. The traditions maintained throughout the years, but modified by the times, also incite interest.

Mrs. Lathrop, an alumna of the college and an experienced newspaperwoman, has written the text, which accompanies the more than one hundred pictures, in a delightful style. By a combination of humor and seriousness in the pictures and prose, she has succeeded in compiling a volume which is both entertaining and stimulating.

The title is borrowed from the words of wisdom of the college's founder and first president, Dr. Charles Duncan McIver: "Educate a man, and you educate an individual; educate a woman and you educate a family."

ANNE WILLIAMS TILLINGHAST

University of North Carolina

YOUTH AND THE FUTURE: THE GENERAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN YOUTH COMMISSION. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1942. 296 pp. \$2.50.

Six years of research and an obviously considerable amount of careful thinking and analysis have gone into the preparation of the American Youth Commission's final report, *Youth and the Future*. The result is such as to justify the belief that this report will become a classic in its field, consulted frequently in the future by persons desirous of helping American youths solve their problems. In reality, the book is not just a report, but is, instead, an outlined program of positive action.

Youth and the Future is centered around the consideration of certain underlying factors and conditions enunciated by Owen D. Young, Chairman of the Commission, in an introductory chapter. Here Mr. Young elaborates the theses that in the post-war years economic reconstruction depends upon sustained full employment, that this can be achieved only through substantial programs of public works, and that only through continuous effort can the American people achieve a rising standard of living. It is these basic theses elaborated in their relationship to the needs of American youth that constitute the subject matter of the book.

The report itself is divided into four main sections: Part I discusses "Employment Opportunity for Youth;" Part II, "Other Basic Problems;" Part III, "Responsibility for Action for Youth;" Part IV, "In Conclusion." The first two of these sections comprise about two-thirds of the length of the total report.

Each section, in turn, is devoted to a consideration of various phases of the general theses Mr. Owen postulated. Thus, Part I deals with youth unemployment, youth work programs now and in the future, the relationship between public schools and the work programs, and the problem of full employment for youth. Part II is devoted entirely to discussing specific problems that face youth: education, leisure time activities, marriage, health activities, crime, and adequate citizenship. The forty pages of Part III are concerned with how communities—local, county, state, and national units—can achieve the goals stressed so consistently in the other sections.

But it is really Part IV with its ringing challenge of how once more to give meaning to the lives youths lead that lifts the entire book from the realm of "just another study of youth" onto the heights of truly outstanding works. Within the space of the relatively few pages at her disposal, Dorothy Canfield Fisher—authoress of this special section—not only analyzes cogently the characteristics of modern youth problems but writes with such flare and fire she creates a section with exceptional merit as a literary masterpiece.

Throughout the entire report—with the possible exception of the weak chapter devoted to "Marriage and the Home"—the emphasis is upon the future and what can be done—specifically and concretely done—in the future to help American youths solve their problems. Nowhere is there wastage of words or space, nowhere any idea not

expressed clearly and succinctly. For page after page *Youth and the Future* lives up to the statement, "It is with the courage and conviction to declare that we Americans shall have the chance to do it over, and with the firm determination that we will resolutely do it better, that this report, founded on so much research and study, is issued. . . ."

GORDON W. LOVEJOY

Furman University

INTERVIEWING. ITS PRINCIPLES AND METHODS. By Annette Garrett. New York: Family Welfare Association of America, 1942. 123 pp. \$1.00.

Here in a small volume, presented in concise fashion, are the answers to many of the questions that are raised daily by those engaged in the art of interviewing.

Part I deals with the Nature of Interviewing. Throughout this section Miss Garrett has emphasized the basic factors involved in all interviewing. She has stressed the importance of an understanding of human nature, the need of a sympathetic approach to the causes of behavior, the importance of a nonjudgmental attitude, the significance of a person's feeling about a situation, and the value of a client's expression of his need. She emphasizes that the art and skill of interviewing is not solely a matter of intellectual understanding, but also of emotional understanding. These are all emphases which a good interviewer needs to keep constantly before her.

Part II includes nine interviews, each presenting a different problem. This is an exceptionally fine group of interviews and the analysis of them from the standpoint of interviewing techniques and skills is done in a clear, interesting and helpful fashion. These interviews are such that they could also be well used for a discussion of case work techniques and therefore should be found useful by case work teachers.

This is an expedient publication, coming at a time when so many people all over the country are engaged in the job of interviewing. It is hoped that this volume will be used with wisdom, for although its information is set forth in a simple and understandable style it does assume on the part of the reader a wealth of background information. It is a volume which rather than being handed over to the beginner for use should be used by supervisors and others who can provide the background needed for real understanding. No doubt this will be a useful handbook for many

who are looking for tangible material to use for in-service training of both staff and volunteers.

RUTH DODD MORGAN

University of North Carolina

PSYCHIATRIC ASPECT OF CIVILIAN MORALE. Prepared by the Military Mobilization Committee of the American Psychiatric Association. New York: Family Welfare Association of America, 1942. 63 pp. \$0.50.

"This is a total war. Fitness of the civilian worker is of equal importance with fitness of the fighter. The outcome of the war depends upon the staying power of the civilian worker just as much as upon that of the soldier." Just as the armed forces of our nation must withstand the physical might of the Axis powers, so our civilian population must be prepared to resist our enemies' methods of psychological warfare. This little pamphlet might appropriately be called a psychological manual of arms for the civilian group in war time. Five papers are presented. The first deals with the experiences of other countries in handling war psychoses; the second discusses the assets and liabilities of social institutions during periods of stress; while the remaining three papers treat of anxiety and its social control, morale, and fatigue.

This work should be a most valuable manual or guide for the instruction of civilian defense workers, and the part they can play in our total war effort.

WILEY B. SANDERS

University of North Carolina

REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN MICHIGAN: A STUDY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIAL INSTITUTION. By Ernest B. Harper and Duane L. Gibson. Special Bulletin 318. East Lansing, Michigan: Agricultural Experiment Station, Michigan State College, June 1942. 80 pp. Tables and Graphs.

From the viewpoints of content and methodology, this eighty-page bulletin on the reorganization of public welfare in Michigan is most intriguing, and it should be of value to social workers, sociology teachers, researchers, and social planners, as well as public administrators. The results of the study make a real contribution to the sociology of institutional accommodation or adjustment to social change, and also offer practical implications of the theoretical generalizations.

As to content, the report has four main divisions: "(1) a brief sketch of the history of the poor law in general with particular reference to events in Michigan up to the summer of 1938, (2) a detailed description of the administration of emergency relief during the transitional period of 1933 to 1938 in selected counties, (3) public knowledge and opinion of the emergency relief program in the summer of 1938 just before the welfare referendum vote, as discovered in the same counties, and (4) the 1939 reorganization and later developments."

As to methodology, the case-study approach was used "to discover social forces, problems, conflicts and trends" in the four selected counties, while the data obtained from the survey, in which 2,119 persons were interviewed, were subjected to statistical analysis "for the purpose of comparing typical groups in respect to knowledge and points of view." For purposes of interpretation the results are set in an historical frame of reference.

As stated in the Foreword by Professor Harper, "the study emphasizes the importance of recognizing that the development of a satisfactory system of public welfare, so essential for social organization and current defense efforts, is a slow and continuous process and dependent upon popular education and gradual changes in emotional attitudes, particularly on the part of the rural elements of the population. More specifically it represents an attempt to evaluate the part played by various interest groups in the state in the process of adjusting the institution of relief to changed social conditions."

ANNE WILLIAMS TILLINGHAST

University of North Carolina

THE TENNESSEE YEOMEN, 1840-1860. By Blanche Henry Clark. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1942. 200 pp.

For some years now, historians and sociologists of the South have been attacking the distortion, fathered by the northern abolitionists and fostered by southern romanticists, that the people of the Old South were composed essentially of wealthy planters, poor whites, and Negro slaves. Among those who have done much to rediscover the millions of middle class yeomen of the Old South is Professor Frank L. Owsley of Vanderbilt University. He and his students have been exploring the unpublished schedules of the Census which give a detailed and fairly accurate picture of this class. Miss Clark, working with Owsley,

has relied largely upon these schedules together with state and county records, newspapers, and agricultural magazines for her study of the Tennessee yeomen.

The book is organized around five major topics: the status of the nonslaveholder, the farmer and his landholdings, agricultural organizations, the agricultural awakening, and agricultural production. The first two divisions are the important and significant sections of this study. Here Miss Clark's findings are not only interesting but also noteworthy, one might almost say startling. Of the nonslaveholders in 1850, making up about 65 percent of the population, about 45 percent were nonlandowning tenants, squatters, sharecroppers, and laborers. Even 12 percent of the slaveholders were landless in 1850. The percentage of landless decreased about five percent between 1850 and 1860. Most of the landless owned property of some kind, generally livestock. Miss Clark finds that the evidence does not support the view that there was a wide social gap between the slaveholder and nonslaveholder. Neither does she find evidence to prove that the slaveholders pushed the nonslaveholders off onto the poorer lands. Furthermore the nonslaveholders took an active interest in politics, although they seldom occupied places of leadership. Position and social distinctions were determined by economic levels and not by slaveholding per se.

There is little variation in the agricultural organization and awakening of Tennessee from that shown by other writers in other southern states. There seems to have been a somewhat more concerted drive for statewide control of agricultural development that produced a single agricultural periodical as the state organ and a Bureau of Agriculture. We learn also that an agricultural college was established in Tennessee in 1846, the first in the Union.

It is too bad that such a worthwhile book is marred by a dull, tedious style. The repetitions and great mass of details tend to obscure the significant findings and conclusions. The book's usefulness would have been greatly increased by more generalization and interpretations.

FLETCHER M. GREEN

The University of North Carolina

GUINEA'S CAPTIVE KINGS: BRITISH ANTI-SLAVERY LITERATURE OF THE XVIIIth CENTURY. By Wylie Sypher. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1942. 340 pp. \$3.00.

While the author of this survey of British anti-slavery literature of the eighteenth century admits that the "book has been twice 'completed'—and is not yet complete," he has prepared one of the most detailed general reviews of a century of antislavery agitation in the British Isles which has yet appeared. Frank J. Klingberg's *The Anti-Slavery Movement in England* of 1926 was largely an analysis of "humanitarianism" as applied to slavery and the slave trade; W. L. Mathieson's *British Slavery and Its Abolition* of 1926 placed chief emphasis upon political and economic aspects of the movement; and Reginald Coupland's *The British Anti-Slavery Movement* of 1933, a course of lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute at Boston, was necessarily brief and generalized. Cecil Moore, Lois Whitney, and more recently Eva B. Dykes have also dealt with this subject.

Professor Sypher seems to have followed most closely the pattern of ideas which Russell P. Jameson developed in his *Montesquieu et l'esclavage: étude sur les origines de l'opinion antiesclavagiste en France au XVIII^e siècle* of 1911 and which E. D. Seeber developed in his *Anti-Slavery Opinion in France During the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century* of 1937. He does not, however, like Seeber, expand his analysis around a chronological framework and for that reason does not achieve Seeber's clarity. After a chapter in which Sypher gives a general picture of shifts in eighteenth century ideologies, he discusses "currents of opinion" with respect to the Negro and slavery: "Oriental" and Indian Slavery, "the Pseudo-Africa of Ignorance and Fancy," antislavery in the West Indies and the American colonies, "the Nature of the Negro," and the impact of natural rights, religious thinking, humanitarianism, and the "commercial spirit" upon antislavery thought.

It is in the last two-thirds of the book, however, that Sypher makes his contribution, an analysis of the treatment of the Negro in eighteenth century fiction, drama, and verse. Of special interest is his distinction between the noble and the Common Negro of English literature and his exposition of the influence of the Oroonoko legend created by Aphra Behn and the Inkle and Yariko legend of Mocquet, Ligon, and Steele. In this discussion of his material Sypher writes understandingly and well, but one detects a struggle against a hidden anti-Negro bias which reveals itself occasionally in such statements as: "... the eight-

eenth century atmosphere was tempered to that most outlandish of all noble savages, the noble Negro, . . ." (p. vii) or again "Anti-slavery found ready for its purpose a symbol, the African who united the traits of the white man, so that he might not be repulsive; the traits of the Indian, so that he might not seem base; and the traits of the Negro, so that he might rouse pity" (p. 131). Sypher maintains, however, for the most part an objectivity which makes his volume a useful contribution in the field of intellectual and literary history.

GUION GRIFFIS JOHNSON

Chapel Hill, North Carolina

DRIVIN' WOMAN. By Elizabeth Pickett Chevalier. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 652 pp. \$2.75.

As a study of the folk this book has value to the sociologist. It continues the pattern set by novelists of the southern scene, notably Margaret Mitchell and Clark McMeekin. The story begins in Tidewater Virginia at the close of the Civil war but moves rapidly from Virginia and North Carolina into Kentucky. It covers a span of some thirty-five or forty years carrying us into the second decade of the 20th century. Tobacco

culture, grading, marketing, and manufacturing provide the historical and economic frame of reference. The organization of tobacco trusts and combines in the East with the resultant effects upon the Kentucky independent grower of burley, who was forced to organize or starve, gives vivid and forceful portraiture of the clash of frontier folkways with what might be described as the early beginnings of the technicways of urban civilization. Perhaps rural folkways would be as much to the point as frontier folkways, since the early westward migrations into Kentucky carried with them the folkways of the rural South, modifying these only as the need arose to meet new environment and new situations. One admirable illustration is the Kentucky Night Riders patterned largely after the Ku Klux Klan, both in organization and procedure.

As a story, *Drivin' Woman* could scarcely be termed convincing. As a romance, it is fascinating reading. Characterization and portraiture are well done. And it is unfortunate that the reader almost inevitably, albeit sometimes unconsciously, compares later books, such as *Drivin' Woman* and *Show Me a Land* with the earlier *Gone with the Wind*.

KATHARINE JOCHER

University of North Carolina

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

CHILDREN'S BEHAVIOR PROBLEMS. Volume II. Relative Importance and Interrelations Among Traits. By Luton Ackerson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 570 pp. \$5.00.

OUR AGE OF UNREASON. A STUDY OF THE IRRATIONAL FORCES IN SOCIAL LIFE. By Franz Alexander. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1942. 371 pp. \$3.00.

AN INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS. By Melvin Anshen. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 640 pp. \$4.00.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE. OUR INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. By Harry Elmer Barnes and Oreen M. Ruedi, with the collaboration of Robert H. Ferguson. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1942. 802 pp. \$5.00. Illustrated.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY. Edited by Howard Becker and Reuben Hill. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1942. 663 pp. \$4.00.

CONTRACEPTION AND FERTILITY IN THE SOUTHERN APPALACHIANS. By Gilbert Wheeler Beebe. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company for the National Committee on Maternal Health, Inc., 1942. 274 pp. \$2.50. Illustrated.

PUBLIC CONTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS. A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. By D. O. Bowman. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 504 pp. \$5.00.

REBELS AND GENTLEMEN: PHILADELPHIA IN THE AGE OF FRANKLIN. By Carl and Jessica Bridenbaugh. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942. 393 pp. \$3.50. Illustrated.

THE NEGRO AND THE WAR. Public Affairs Pamphlets No. 71. By Earl Brown and George R. Leighton. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1942. 32 pp. \$0.10.

AMERICA IN A WORLD AT WAR. By William B. Brown, Maxwell S. Stewart, and Walter E. Myer. New

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- POLITICS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA. By Theodore W. Cousins. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 617 pp. \$4.00. Illustrated.
- PROBLEMS OF AGEING: BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL ASPECTS. 2nd ed. By E. V. Cowdry (ed). Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1942. 936 pp. \$10.00.
- PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHILDREN'S REACTIONS TO THE WAR, INCLUDING A CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE. By J. Louise Despert, M.D. New York: New York Hospital and the Department of Psychiatry, Cornell University, Medical College, 1942. 102 pp.
- EDUCATION FOR THE PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES. A REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS OF SOCIAL WORK. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1942. 324 pp. \$3.00.
- AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT. By Robert S. Ford and Frances H. Miner. Michigan Pamphlets No. 16. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1942. 29 pp. \$0.10.
- GENERAL EDUCATION BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 1941. New York: General Education Board, 1942. 145 pp. Illustrated.
- PROBLEMS OF A CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER. By John M. Gillette and James M. Reinhardt. New York: American Book Company, 1942. 824 pp. \$4.00.
- REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC WELFARE IN MICHIGAN: A STUDY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF A SOCIAL INSTITUTION. By Ernest B. Harper and Duane L. Gibson. Special Bulletin 318. East Lansing, Michigan: Agricultural Experiment Station, Michigan State College, June 1942. 80 pp. Tables.
- HOW CAN THE 1942 ELECTIONS HELP WIN THE WAR? REPORT OF THE NEW ENGLAND MEETING, ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS, June 13-14, 1942. National Policy Reports Number 8. Washington, D. C.: The National Policy Committee, 1942. 24 pp.
- CHILD DEVELOPMENT. By Elizabeth B. Hurlock. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942. 478 pp. \$3.50. Illustrated.
- THE I. L. O. AT WORK. Washington: International Labor Office, September, 1942. 40 pp.
- THE MENTALLY ILL AND PUBLIC PROVISION FOR THEIR CARE IN ILLINOIS. By Stuart K. Jaffary. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 214 pp. \$1.25.
- NEW WORLD CONSTITUTIONAL HARMONY: A PAN-AMERICAN ADIAN PANORAMA. By George Jaffin. New York: Reprinted from Columbia Law Review, XLII:4 (April, 1942). 53 pp.
- CHARLES HORTON COOLEY. HIS LIFE AND HIS SOCIAL THEORY. By Edward C. Jandy. New York: The Dryden Press, 1942. 319 pp. \$3.00.
- AMERICA IN TRANSITION. By John A. Kinneman and Richard G. Browne. (1st edition) New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1942. 581 pp. \$3.50. Illustrated.
- GROUP DIFFERENCES IN URBAN FERTILITY. A STUDY DERIVED FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH SURVEY. By Clyde V. Kiser. Baltimore: The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1942. 284 pp. \$2.50. Illustrated.
- THE ROLE OF THE RACES IN OUR FUTURE CIVILIZATION. A Symposium edited by Harry W. Laidler. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1942. 112 pp. \$0.50.
- PSYCHOTHERAPY IN MEDICAL PRACTICE. By Maurice Levine. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. 320 pp. \$3.50.
- THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA. By David A. Lockmiller. With Foreword by Fred J. Kelly. Chattanooga, Tennessee: David A. Lockmiller, University of Chattanooga, 1942. 160 pp. \$3.00 (Paper bound, \$2.00).
- CULTURE OF A CONTEMPORARY RURAL COMMUNITY: LANDAFF, NEW HAMPSHIRE. By Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young. Rural Life Studies: 3 (April 1942). Washington: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture. 117 pp.
- RIVER BOTTOM BOY. By Harold Matthews. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942. 354 pp. \$2.50.
- LABOR IN THE WORLD CRISIS. By Joseph Mire and E. E. Schwarztrauber. (Social Action pamphlet, VIII:7). New York: Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, September 15, 1942. 42 pp. \$0.15.
- ECONOMICS. PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS. (3rd edition) By James E. Moffat, C. Lawrence Christenson, Mark C. Mills, William C. Cleveland, Samuel E. Braden, and Gerald J. Matchett. Based on the original text by Lionel D. Edie. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1942. 1022 pp. \$4.00. Graphs and charts.

- MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE.** By M. F. Ashley Montagu. With a foreword by Aldous Huxley. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 216 pp. \$2.25.
- APPLIED OFFICE PRACTICE.** By Abbie A. Morrill, Mabel A. Bessey, and John V. Walsh. (3rd edition) Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1942. 368 pp. \$2.00. Illustrated.
- EVALUATING RURAL HOUSING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FLORIDA HOUSING INVENTORY AND THE INDEX OF HOUSING ADEQUACY.** By Charles I. Mosier. Gainesville, Florida: Florida Curriculum Laboratory, College of Education, University of Florida, and State Department of Education, 1942. 88 pp. \$0.50. Tables.
- THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF ECONOMICS.** By Radhakamal Mukerjee. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 376 pp. 10s.6d.
- THE NEGRO HANDBOOK. A MANUAL OF CURRENT FACTS, STATISTICS AND GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES.** Florence Murray (ed.) New York: Wendell Malliet and Company, 1942. 269 pp. \$3.50.
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- TEXAS. A WORLD IN ITSELF.** By George Sessions Perry. Illustrated by Arthur Fuller. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1942. 293 pp. \$2.75.
- MICHIGAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION: AN AREAL STUDY OF VOTING TRENDS IN THE LAST DECADE.** By James K. Pollock and Samuel J. Eldersveld. Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 10. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1942. 74 pp. Illustrated.
- POSTWAR PROBLEMS AND POLICIES.** Report of the Western Policy Committee, Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 19-20, 1942. National Policy Reports Number 9. Washington, D. C.: The National Policy Committee, 1942. 32 pp.
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- THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CULTURE.** By Constance Rourke. Edited and with a Preface by Van Wyck Brooks. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942. 305 pp. \$3.00.
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- JUVENILE DELIQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS.** By Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. \$4.50. Illustrated.
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- CONCERNING JUVENILE DELIQUENCY: PROGRESSIVE CHANGES IN OUR PERSPECTIVES.** By Henry W. Thurston. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 236 pp. \$2.75.
- WARTIME TRANSFERENCE OF LABOUR IN GREAT BRITAIN.** Washington: International Labor Office, 1942. 163 pp. \$1.50 (cloth, \$1.00 (paper)).
- EDWARD SYLVESTER MORSE. A Biography.** By Dorothy G. Wayman. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1942. 457 pp. \$4.50.
- A STUDY OF WAR.** By Quincy Wright. 2 vols. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. 1552 pp. \$15.00.
- SOCIOLOGY. A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE.** By Kimball Young. New York: American Book Company, 1942. 1005 pp. Illustrated.
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